The conflict grew into a wider conflagration involving the Ai-Lao people from Sip Song Chau Tai along with the Mekong river valley Tai peoples from the Yuan kingdom of Lan Na, Lü kingdom Sip Song Pan Na (Sipsong Panna), to Muang along the upper Irawaddy river.

[5] The conflict ultimately lasted approximately five years growing to threatened the southern border of Yunnan and raising the concerns of Ming China.

Early success in the war allowed Đại Việt to capture the Lao capital of Luang Prabang and destroy the Muang Phuan city of Xiang Khouang.

By the 1460s, the Lê dynasty, in connection with nearby Tai chieftains, had been able to establish a series of stable positions from north to south, from the Black river down to Xieng Khouang along the western frontier of Đại Việt.

By the time Lê Thánh Tông invaded, there would have been a vague sense of a maze of mountain valleys, with the major threat of Lan Xang beyond them.

The capital, Xieng Khuang, and surrounding plain were well suited for rice cultivation with excellent forage for cattle and dependable water supplies from mountain streams.

[14] As early as the 1390s, Ming Chinese gunpowder technology had started to spread to upper and mainland Southeast Asia, including the Tai Shan regions and Vietnam.

Although Vietnam gained independence with Lê Lợi in 1428, the Vietnamese were greatly influenced by the Ming as evident by their adoption of the neo-confucian model and military technology.

There is no evidence that the Cham ever acquired firearms; a Chinese source reported in 1441 that their army was ‘weak’ and that the guards on the city walls were armed only with bamboo spears.

[23] The Lao chronicles do not make extensive mention of firearms during the conflict with the Đại Việt as a greater emphasis was placed on the military use of elephants.

According to Vietnamese chronicles, during the reign of Lan Kham Daeng, an offer was made to Lê Lợi of 30,000 men and 100 war elephants to help drive out the Chinese.

[36] In 1451, the ruler of Phitsanulok, a prince of the Sukhothai line, defected to Lan Na and encouraged Tilok to liberate Sukhothai from Ayutthaya, leading to decades of intermittent Lan Na-Ayutthayan warfare known as the “Chakravatin wars.”[35][37] Ming dynasty China held significant influence, or was a least a significant consideration, to geopolitics in Southeast Asia during the fifteenth century.

[40] The Ming Shi Lu states that the cause of the war was the policy of centralization and expansion of Lê Thánh Tông, which affected the political life of the Tai peoples in the frontier region between Muang Phuan and present-day northern Vietnam.

The policy provoked the submission of many Tai noblemen to Lan Xang, and the deployment of troops to protect present-day Phong Saly region.

Upon hearing of the auspicious event, Lê Thánh Tông sent an ambassador to Lan Xang requesting the elephant be taken to Đại Việt so his people might see it.

Lê Thánh Tông received the casket, flew into a rage and ordered his troops to cross into Phuan and from there to attack Luang Prabang.

(The ruler) dared to call the Cao Hoang emperor (Lê Lợi) his younger brother, and Dụ Tông (of the Tran dynasty) his nephew.” Similarly, when invading the Cham, the first crime King Trà Toàn had committed was that “he was so wildly arrogant that he called himself uncle and our emperor his nephew.” Despite the seeming trivial nature of these incidents, they mark a departure from centuries-old tradition.

Severing ties with the “barbarians” and seeing itself as a state dedicated to a just cause gave a particular edge to the process of Đại Việt's subjugation of polities nearby, particularly when by now, they were much more advanced in their military technology than their neighbors.

Thus, it became a particularly important issue under Lê Thánh Tông, who was attempting to sever the connection with the rest of Southeast Asia, and took mentioning of blood ties as a capital crime[44] Lê Thánh Tông began the campaign by proclaiming attacks against the Phuan of Xieng Khuang to the south and the Ai Lao of Hua Phanh to the north.

He cited the Chinese classics (the Books of Changes and of Poetry and the Rituals of the Zhou) and called on his forces to spread righteousness and virtue through the mountains.

The Lao king Chakkaphat placed his son, the chief minister, at the head of an army of 200,000 men and 2,000 elephants to march against the Vietnamese ultimately ambushing Lê Thánh Tông's forces near the Plain of Jars.

[50] What the chronicles show is that Tilok criticized the governor of Nan for his rash action taken after the Vietnamese defeat, and his reappointment to Chiang Rai is a clear demotion.

The deportation of war captives was a usual strategy in Southeast Asian warfare, but could be counterproductive if the adversary was superior in terms of demographic and economic resources, as was the case between the Đại Việt and Lan Na.

The edicts likely provoked Tilok in his decision to go to war against the Đại Việt, Chiang Rung was still considered as being part of Lan Na's sphere of influence.

On the 26 August 1482, the Chinese also reported that the Lao king was making plans to launch further attacks to avenge the killing of his father and elder brother.

[50] On 5 July 1481, the Ming shi Lu recorded that the Chinese emperor sent the king of Lan Na 100 tael (about 4 kilograms) of silver and four rolls of variegated silks (caibi) to reward him.

[53] A memorial was submitted by Duke Mu Cong, Regional Commander of Yunnan to the Ming Court Lan Na (Tilok) is able to protect the lives of his people and defeat the bandits of Jiaozhi (Vietnam).

With the city destroyed, the strategic necessity had changed and the Viet settled for a tribute-trade relationship along the Ming example, which saw the local population retain autonomy.

[57] The period also saw an economic expansion as foreign demand for Lao goods (gold, benzoin, sticklac, musk, ivory) increased rapidly.

The crucial support King Tilok gave to the Lao in their struggle against the Đại Việt invaders enhanced the prestige of Lan Na as a reliable vassal state in the eyes of the Ming court.