The joyous atmosphere included participation from viziers, governors-general, district governors, palace members, janissaries, scholars, and city residents.

[14] In the early months of 1555, a rebellion erupted in present-day northeastern Bulgaria, where a man derisively dubbed Mustafa the Impostor in Ottoman sources led the uprising.

Organizing his followers akin to Ottoman administration, he appointed a chief vizier and military judges, emulating princely structures.

[15] As the rebellion expanded, Bayezid, informed by developments, took the first steps, making military preparations and initiating secret negotiations through a district governor.

[18] The pretender's uprising, as chronicled during Ogier Ghiselin de Busbecq's stay in Constantinople, triggered speculations suggesting that Bayezid might have orchestrated the revolt with aspirations to ascend the throne during Suleiman's absence.

Suleiman, aiming for fairness or influenced by Bayezid's supporters, tactically relocated him to the Germiyan district, Kütahya, echoing Selim's distance from Constantinople in Manisa.

This strategic maneuver maintained an equilibrium in their positions as both princes remained poised to return to the capital upon news of their father's fate.

In June 1557, the French ambassador noted Suleiman's strategic display of vitality upon returning to Constantinople, countering speculations about succession plans.

Bayezid's continued complaints and requests for reassignment escalated even after reaching Amasya, signaling a growing intention for armed conflict, presented as self-defense.

Upon learning of Bayezid's expedition, Suleiman deemed military action necessary, instructing the third vizier Sokollu Mehmed to join Selim with janissaries, accompanied by Rumeli troops.

[26] Suleiman also sought secured legal opinions (fatwas) from the religious establishment, declaring it lawful under Sharia to combat a prince who amassed soldiers, collected funds, and committed violent acts.

Exhausted and defeated, Bayezid retreated to Amasya, seeking pardon from his father and the grand vizier Rüstem, while simultaneously attempting to regroup.

Governors and judges in various provinces were alerted, with efforts made to thwart Bayezid's potential escape, involving Crimea's Khan in anticipation of a Black Sea crossing.

[22] On June 22, 1559, a decree was issued just three weeks after Bayezid's defeat, directing the kadi of Kütahya to promptly seize his assets and possessions in the region.

His actions raised concerns within the Ottoman establishment about the potential threat of his forceful return and the possibility of an alliance with Tahmasp I, the Shahanshah of Safavid Persia.

Although Tahmasp initially wholeheartedly and lavishly welcomed Bayezid, including giving magnificent parties in his honour, he later imprisoned him on the request of Sultan Suleiman[33][34] in April 1560.

[37][38] Finally, on 25 September 1561,[39][40] Bayezid and his four sons were handed over by Tahmasp and executed in the environs of the Safavid capital Qazvin by the Ottoman executioner, Ali Aqa Chavush Bashi, through the way of garrotting.

[39] Bayezid's supporters within the Ottoman territories faced pursuit, with consequences ranging from punishment, including executions, to the dismissal of tımar holders from their roles.