The newly-appointed Secretary of State for War, Earl Kitchener of Khartoum, issued his famous call to arms: 'Your King and Country Need You', urging the first 100,000 volunteers to come forward.

Starting from London and Liverpool, the phenomenon of 'Pals battalions' quickly spread across the country, as local recruiting committees offered complete units to the War Office (WO).

At the time a large number of otherwise medically fit volunteers were being turned away because they did not meet the minimum height requirement of the prewar Regular Army, of 5 feet 3 inches (160 cm).

Alfred Bigland, the Member of Parliament for Birkenhead, persuaded Kitchener that this pool of potential manpower should be tapped, and he was given authority to raise a battalion of 'Bantams' (named after the small but pugnacious fighting cock).

Three Bantam battalions were quickly raised at Birkenhead for the Cheshire Regiment, many of them coal miners who had travelled long distances to enlist, including from Wales, and the scheme spread to other areas.

Retired Lieutenant-Colonel Rodney Style, formerly of the Queen's Own (Royal West Kent Regiment), was appointed on 22 July to command the brigade with the rank of Brigadier-General.

Brigadier-Gen Style had been replaced earlier in the month by an officer with recent battle experience, Brig-Gen Charles Prichard from the Northamptonshire Regiment.

Although both armies were concentrating on the Somme Offensive further south, units in the Calonne sector still saw casualties mount up during the summer, from enemy bombardments, snipers and trench mortars.

He was succeeded by a noted 'fighting general',[40] Brig-Gen Frank Crozier, previously commanding officer of 9th Royal Irish Rifles in 36th (Ulster) Division.

[44][45] During the bitter winter of 1916–17 40th Division remained in the mud of the old Somme battlefield, continuing its training where possible, with emphasis on Lewis guns and the new 'fighting platoon' tactics.

However, the barrage and moppers-up had missed three strongpoints in front of the ravine, and the garrisons of these posts opened fire in the rear of 12th SWB and on the carrying parties from 119th Brigade Trench Mortar Battery, who were bringing forward supplies for the battalion.

19th RWF and 12th SWB were warned to move east of Villers-Plouich and for 13th Green Howards to come up, but this was not required and 119th Bde had finished its work for the day after what the divisional history calls a 'smart and well-managed attack'.

[17][18][54][59][60][61] The brigade then spent the next five months in this area, consolidating and developing the new British front line, and patrolling No man's land (in which Crozier took a personal role).

The capture of the wood by 40th and 51st (Highland) Divisions would provide a defensive flank to allow Third Army to continue developing the successes of the first two days.

The attacking infantry were preceded by a barrage of high explosive and shrapnel shells that fell on the edge of the wood at 10.10 and then lifted forwards 200 yards (180 m) every 10 minutes from 10.30.

About 15.00 another German attack began to make progress, but at 16.00 the mixed force of Welsh battalions, Highlanders and cavalry pressed forward again, pushing the enemy back down the northern slopes of the wood, where they were caught by the British barrage.

During the first day 119th Bde was around Mercatel at half an hour's notice to move; 40th Division passed from GHQ to VI Corps' reserve at midday.

As it grew dark about 17.30, Crozier was personally ordered by a corps staff officer to move towards the threatened Henin Hill in the second line of defences.

German patrols were in the neighbourhood of Gomiécourt, and Crozier ordered the catacombs cleared to prevent the various HQs and signal units from being captured.

21st Middlesex reached Bienvillers first and deployed on the ridge to the south while 18th WR and 13th ES at Monchy-au-Bois formed the left flank of 40th Division.

Initially 13th ES holding Fleurbaix was not attacked, but about 09.30 it found that it had been surrounded by the Germans who had penetrated to the support line, and it was soon overwhelmed, most of the battalion being captured.

Some of its strongpoints held out until the afternoon, though Crozier was later critical of the speed with which the main body of 13th ES surrendered, and also of the slowness of 120th Bde coming up to form the defensive flank facing the broken Portuguese line.

Part of 40th Bn MGC and 229th (Doncaster) Field Company, RE, held the bridges at Bac St Maur, to which Crozier ordered up the brigade training school to form a mobile reserve.

119th Brigade's HQ with the trench mortar men, cooks and various other details briefly held the line, but were driven back by the fire and lost direct observation over the river, where a German regiment began crossing the intact bridge at 16.00.

[109][110][111] By dint of 'weeding out' the least fit officers and men and by hard training, the reconstituted formation was made ready for frontline service; the battalions officially dropped the 'Garrison' part of their titles on 13 July 1918.

[115][116] The brigade was back in the line in August, taking a full part in trench raids, encouraged by Crozier's offer of a £5 reward for the first German prisoner brought in, and £1 for each subsequent capture.

The ultimate objective was Rue Prevost: Plunkett observed that this was strongly held by the Germans and called down artillery fire on it, just as the enemy counter-attacked.

On 7 September 13th ELR was ordered to capture Pont de Nieppe and establish posts beyond it, but a counter-attack by 60–70 Germans forced the attacking company out of the village and back to its start line.

However, the open ground beyond Le Bizet made a direct advance inadvisable in daylight, so 13th RIF took it by an encircling movement before dawn, after which the battalion pushed on with its flanks in the air as far as the Lys, where it scouted possible bridging sites.

However, the individual battalions within 119th Bde wore various coloured geometric shapes on the upper sleeve:[132][133] 119th Brigade was never reformed, but the number was used for deception purposes during World War II.