As such it is not subordinated to the Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet/Russian Armed Forces, but directly to the Minister of Defense, which makes it higher in status compared to the GRU.

The position of the Chief of the 12th GU MO is equal to that of the commander of a military district, and supposed to be occupied by a 4-star General or by a Marshal of Artillery.

Non-essential specialists (those commissioned and non-commissioned officers and soldiers who perform general tasks unrelated to nuclear weapons) could be supplied by other military colleges and academies, but these people can not obtain positions in the 12th GU MO or in either of its subordinated units unless they (as well as their family) could get a special security clearance.

In the USSR only members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union could be appointed to serve in the 12th GU MO or in any of its subordinated units, including its Special Control Service (even young conscripts who served there only two years without actually knowing anything about nuclear weapons must obtain special security clearance and must necessarily be members of the Communist Union of Youth, a.k.a.

Only in case of real necessity those who are supposed to have nuclear weapons would get them and it could only happen when authorized by the top political leadership.

For this reason each military unit that armed with nuclear warheads currently in service also has some permanently attached representatives of the 12th GU MO nearest arsenal bases whose main duty is to supervise prescribed handling and to conduct required technical maintenance of these issued nuclear warheads.

Another function of the 12th GU MO is to serve as a link between the Armed Forces and those branches of Soviet/Russian industry and science related to nuclear weapons developing and manufacturing.

Most of officials of the 12th GU MO headquarters wear gunnery uniforms and bear military ranks typical to artillery, since this organization is considered being primarily an "arsenal".

For example, nuclear arsenal base unit number 62047 in Krasnokamianka, Kizil-Tash, Crimea, was masquerading as a "wine-making enterprise".

Active disinformation measures to this effect are meticulously planned and are regularly conducted not only in order to create a wrong impression among local population and neighbouring military units, but even to misinform conscripts and other unrelated staff serving at actual arsenal bases.

In order to minimize spreading of information about these bases, their commissioned staff was encouraged to serve at one location for as long as possible and not to seek promotions outside their bases (while it was typical for Soviet military in general to move officers every 3–5 years to various places and to promote them exclusively outside of their former military units).

Even those auxiliary tanks that are designed to serve as a cover for the arsenal base could be used to reinforce these STGs on their full march.

The 12th Chief Directorate maintains its own secure communication system, independent of others, that links its peace-time and war-time headquarters with all its bases and with other subordinated units.

Additional local communication systems of each arsenal base securely link its main command post with its multiple mobile STGs.

It has been created on September 4, 1947, based on "KB-11" (in Russian: "КБ-11" - "Design Buhhkkvccreau 11", also known in Russia as off-limits town "Arzamas-16", later "Sarov"); its first chief was Major-General-Engineer (later – full General) Viktor Bolyatko [ru].

On the next stage of its development the Nuclear Technical Service was headed by General Nikolai Pavlovich Yegorov [ru].

The next and the most well-known chief was Marshal of Artillery Yefim Boychuk [ru], who held this position from February 1974 until November 1985 and was credited with transforming the organization into the most effective nuclear weapons protection, delivery, and maintenance system.

During his command the 12th GU MO lost its initial "warehouse image" and became a real effective branch of the Soviet Armed Forces, in some respects surpassing by its effectiveness of well-known Soviet special purpose forces such as "Spetsnaz" and the "VDV" (Russian Airborne Troops).

"On March 4, 1954, the Service for Special Monitoring of Nuclear Weapons Tests of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR was established.

[3] In an interview with TASS to mark the 75th anniversary of the 12th Chief Directorate, General Lieutenant (two-star) Igor Kolesnikov, head of the Directorate, said that staff of the Special Control Service "..take part in the implementation of the International Monitoring System (IMS) project, but are also regularly involved in activities as part of the working groups of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization when discussing the creation of IMS facilities, the development and improvement of operational manuals, and the training of ..personnel.