He chose this course lest he strike directly south from Warrenton, exposed to a flanking attack from LTGEN Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley and because he felt the Orange and Alexandria Railroad (O&A) would be inadequate for logistics as well as the fact that Lee had blocked the O&A.

As the regiment emerged from the woods, they were surprised to see across the river, four lines of troops in this grand division lying flat on the ground while a much smaller force assaulted Prospect Hill.

Berry ordered Col. Roberts to advance, and the 17th moved forward without dropping their knapsacks[40] as Meade's withdrawing men passed through their lines after a failed attempt to take the hill.

Just as the 17th arrived at the crest of a slight rise between the river and the dip through which the tracks of the Richmond, Fredericksburg, and Potomac Railroad (RF&P) ran, Rebels emerged from the woods in pursuit of Meade's retreating men.

The 17th spent most of their time on line laying prone slightly forward of some batteries to minimize casualties from the Rebels' foot and horse artillery on Prospect Hill and on their extreme left.

The men were further disheartened when, flush with cash, the suttler's prices had risen dramatically[52] The scarcity and irregularity of the delivery of government rations made the purchase of food from these merchants a necessity and added to the regiment's, and army's, discontent.

Finally, they realized the scarcity of wood in the surrounding environment caused by the army's fuel requirements for cooking and heating as well as the negative affect the deforestation would have come warmer, drier weather.

He sent Birney's division, flanked by two battalions of Col. Hiram Berdan's U.S. sharpshooters, south from Hazel Grove to Catharine Furnace with orders to pierce the column and gain possession of the road.

In 1866, Houghton wrote: "The sunset was piling its temples of fire, of blood and amethyst over the forests and hills, that seemed to touch the flaming west, and the shades of evening began to envelope our little band ere the truth became fully apparent to the rank and file, of the desperate nature of our situation.

[83] He sent them back to tell Hooker that a portion of Whipple's 3rd Division's ammunition (mule) train, some of the caissons of his batteries, and two or three of his cannon were in the woods occupied by the enemy, between III Corps and the Plank Road.

Hooker was active, moving to and fro, directing his subordinates when at 9:30 a.m., a spent Rebel shell hit a column, knocking him senseless and rendering him hors de combat.

Luckily for the regiment, they were able to recoup during the day because the order to move did not arrive until 6:00 p.m. A six-hour march via Licking Creek and Warrenton Junction to Catlett's Station, where they stopped at midnight.

III Corps had made a concession to the heat and continued its series of having its units make short, marches and on Sunday, June 28,the 17th passed through Frederick and seven miles further north where they stopped.

Recalling Chancellorsville, where he vacated Hazel Grove's high ground only to have it used against him as a deadly Confederate artillery platform, he acted without authorization from Meade and pushed his corps forward occupy the peach orchard.

[160] Burling's 3rd Brigade from the 2nd Division sent their white diamond badged 115th Pennsylvania and 8th New Jersey to the left of de Trobriand on the east slope of Stony Hill, a wooded and rocky elevation just west of Plum Run and south of the Wheatfield Road.

George B. Winslow's Battery D, 1st New York Light Artillery,[172] at the rear of the wheat field and ordered it to join the 17th, who were in front of but below it, and, although they could not see the Rebels, support Ward by firing just over the 17th's heads at the sound of battle in the woods.

The artillery combined with the 17th's stone wall rebuffed several Rebel attempts to close with the Maine lines, but, with "a heroism worthy of a nobler cause,"[174] the Georgians kept assailing the 17th's strong position.

Once aware and in imminent danger of capture and a severe enfilading fire, Merrill refused the 17th's line with its three right companies, H, K, and C, forming along a rail fence perpendicular to the stone wall and separating the field from the marsh along Plum Run.

Pushing ahead through de Trobriand's brigade aiming for a linkup with Anderson, a portion of Kershaw's men made for the west corner of the Wheatfield through the thick alder growth there which both impeded their rush and broke the solidity of their ranks.

Although the 17th still drove off the Georgians and felt secure in their strong position at the wall, Kershaw's attack, forcing Tilton, Sweitzer; and de Trobriand away, in turn compelled the 5th Michigan and 110th Pennsylvania to move rearward.

Ignorant that the 17th Maine was still a coherent entity almost completely screened by the crest, the Rebels expected that all they had to do to break the U.S. Army's line was to push up the slope through the handful of U.S. soldiers they could see through the smoke and capture the battery.

With this in mind and unable to discern any intact infantry in the field, Birney rode over to the Wheatfield to see where his line was and send someone to stop Anderson's men thereby buying time for inbound reinforcements from II and V Corps to get in position.

[183] With a mounted Birney at its head, the reformed regiment gave a cheer and charged over the crest at the stubborn Georgians and sent them in disordered retreat out of the field and over the wall foiling their attempt to capture the battery.

[188][note 19] At first content to remain behind the wall in the woods and fire at the 17th and its comrades in the open just below the crest, the Rebels gradually became more aggressive as small parties charged uphill through the smoke and grappled with the U.S.

[199] Despite having held the advanced position where Sickles had placed III Corps at the end of the day, Meade, well aware of the dangers of remaining forward, brought army back to the Cemetery Ridge.

This time the action began on the extreme right where during the night Ewell's Corps had succeeded in occupying breastworks on the lower slope of Culp's Hill that had been vacated the day prior by troops sent to shore up the army's line while the 17th was battling for its life.

Lee had massed 138 guns[note 22] in front of Seminary Ridge and hoped a powerful and well-concentrated barrage would destroying the AoP's artillery batteries and demoralize its infantry.

Fire from Lt. Col. Freeman McGilvery's artillery positions north of Little Round Top and screened from Lee and Alexander's view by the high ground where III Corps had been the day before, raked the Confederate right flank to great effect.

[note 27] Although armed and ready, the 17th had no need to engage the advance because the fire of the batteries nearby stopped it cold, and a last charge of two regiments of Stannard disintegrated it taking many prisoners.

They took a dim view of his headboard noting his prior terms as a U. S. Congressman, seeing him as a traitor "... whose laws he had sworn to uphold, and, paying the penalty of treason is death at the hands of United States soldiers, buried in a blanket, with a pasteboard monument erected to his memory.