This included an anti-invasion role in East Anglia, training in Scotland, and redeployment to the North West where the division also helped unload merchant ships during the Liverpool Blitz.

By December, the convoy had reached South Africa and was preparing for the final stretch of its journey when news of the Japanese entry into the war was received.

Initially deployed to northeastern Singapore Island, the division remained largely inactive while the Japanese attacked the north-west sector.

To avoid war, the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain met with German Chancellor Adolf Hitler in September and brokered the Munich Agreement.

[7] On 15 March 1939, Germany breached the terms of the agreement by invading and occupying the remaining Czech provinces of Bohemia and Moravia.

This resulted in 34,500 twenty-year-old militiamen being conscripted into the regular army, initially to be trained for six months before deployment to the forming second-line units.

[31] When the campaign failed, Paget returned briefly to the division on 14 May 1940;[2][32] thirteen days later, he became Chief of Staff, Home Forces and was temporarily replaced by Brigadier Geoffrey Franklyn.

[2][33] The TA's war deployment envisioned its piecemeal use, as equipment became available, to reinforce the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) already dispatched to Europe.

[2][44] Although the division was then assigned to an anti-invasion role in East Anglia, a number of training exercises were held in other parts of England as well as in Scotland, and Wales.

[52] On 1 September 1941, Churchill contacted neutral U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt and requested shipping for two infantry divisions from Britain to the Middle East.

Three days later, an American-escorted convoy left Halifax with six cargo ships provided to the British as part of the Lend-Lease programme.

Since the convoy containing the 18th Infantry Division had only reached the Cape of Good Hope when Japan entered the war, it was diverted to the Far East on 9 December.

They demonstrated the unreality of their approach to the situation by lighting up all the buildings in the area, [and] stringing their transport along highly vulnerable and prominent crossroads....The battalion had not completed its move, when on 19 January the troops were ordered to Ayer Hitam.

[68] The defile had become a crucial position in the British attempt to delay the Japanese advance and prevent them from cutting off the 45th Indian Infantry Brigade.

The attack on Bukit Pelandok was repulsed and the British and Indian troops were moved to between the defile and causeway with the left flank covered by 2LR.

At 20:00, Lieutenant-General Arthur Percival, GOC Malaya Command, decided that the Japanese capture of the Pelandok defile seriously endangered Westforce's line of communications.

The Japanese positions gave a view of the ground east of the ridge, making surprise impossible to achieve, and more time was needed to arrange artillery support and concentrate 2LR.

The artillery took so long to register that there was another postponement to 09:00, but 2LR, who had assembled under cover of night, were spotted by Japanese reconnaissance aircraft and bombed and strafed.

With no prospect of surprise, and doubtful that the attack could succeed, Duke cancelled the operation and redeployed the three battalions to guard the causeway and the ground from there to the defile.

At a conference at Yong Peng, also on 23 January, Percival announced a new plan to defend a line from Jemalaung Kluang to Ayer Hitam and Batu Pahat, the 53rd Brigade reverting to the command of the 11th Division.

The brigade began to retire from Bukit Pelandok at noon, but the Japanese attacked with tank support and the causeway bridges were blown too soon for all the British to cross.

[72][73] The brigade was engaged in a series of isolated fights with the Japanese along the road from Benut to Senggarang as they tried to move north to reinforce Batu Pahat.

During the evening, the 15th Indian Brigade was ordered to break out, across country as the roads had been blocked by strong Japanese positions, and retreat south.

During this conference, it was decided that once the 18th Infantry Division had arrived in full force, it would be allocated to the sector on the island believed to be where the Japanese would land, as it would be the strongest formation available with fresh troops.

Wigmore commented that Wavell conceded the point "on the ground that [Percival] was the commander responsible for results and had long studied the problem.

[87] During the day, by which time Percival had drawn up a provisional plan to withdraw to a smaller perimeter around the city of Singapore, the division was committed piecemeal in the effort to stem the Japanese advance.

The Japanese 5th Infantry Division, supported by tanks, attacked along the entire front, including the position held by Massy Force.

Elements of Massy Force were pushed back and a Japanese tank attack penetrated deep into the British positions, before they were repulsed.

[99] Despite the Japanese attacks, the defensive line held; with food, water and ammunition running out, Percival decided on 15 February that counter-attacks would be fruitless.

[103] In the aftermath, the division was a political bargaining chip in a series of telegrams between Churchill and Prime Minister of Australia John Curtin which discussed the possibility of diverting Australian troops to Burma rather than returning home.