After defending along the Kingisepp axis it was forced to withdraw in late August as part of 8th Army, and helped to establish the Oranienbaum Bridgehead.

In September it was committed from reserve in an effort to sustain the Second Sinyavino Offensive, but this failed and the division was again encircled and forced to break out at considerable cost.

During Operation Iskra in January, 1943 the 191st played a secondary role in reestablishing land communications with Leningrad, partially raising the siege.

Its order of battle on June 22 was as follows, although it changed in several respects during the war: Col. Dmitrii Akimovich Lukyanov took command the day the division started forming.

[4] After its breakneck advance through the Baltic states, Army Group North began moving again early on July 9 from the Pskov and Ostrov regions.

A further German assault struck on September 20, forcing the 191st and the remainder of Shevaldin's shock group back to the line Novyi Petergof–Tomuzi–Petrovskaya, where the front stabilized once and for all.

[11] In early October the 191st was removed from the bridgehead into Leningrad proper, where it was assigned to the Eastern Sector Operational Group, formed by Fedyuninskii from 55th Army and Front reserves.

The harsh terrain in the Tikhvin region would have a major impact on the upcoming operations, a vast forested and swampy territory crisscrossed with many rivers and streams.

However, their defenses continued to collapse due to committing reserves into battle in piecemeal fashion, without preparation, and with weak command and control.

The 191st actually began its attack on November 2, but it failed in the face of heavy German air and artillery strikes and strong counterattacks.

Even before reaching the town, temperatures had dropped as low as -40 degrees and ill-equipped German soldiers were frostbitten or simply froze to death.

The 191st faced 18th Motorized just south of the town; this division was trying to hold a strongpoint defense line along the long route XXXIX Corps had taken to Tikhvin.

12th Panzer and 18th Motorized remained bottled up in Tikhvin on Hitler's orders, although the Soviet pressure on the strongpoint defense line, which had been reinforced with the 250th Infantry Division, required a constant drain on armor from the town.

"[24] On January 26, as he was leading elements of the division in a preliminary operation, General Lebedev was killed when his vehicle was blown up by an antitank mine.

After a four-day halt to regroup, Klykov had resumed the fight on January 21, focused on the German strongpoints at Spasskaya Polist, Mostki, Zemtitsy, and Miasnoi Bor.

However, after the cavalry and accompanying infantry passed through the gap, the XXXIX Motorized and XXXVIII Army Corps hastily assembled forces to contain the exploitation.

[26] Meretskov's renewed effort on January 27/28 again failed to take Spasskaya Polist and Zemtitsy due to weak cooperation, poor use of tanks and artillery, and costly frontal attacks.

However, the frozen terrain of wooded swamps and peat bogs hindered the advance and the narrow gap imposed its own difficulties on communications.

On February 26, an increasingly frustrated Stalin directed Meretskov as follows:... the STAVKA categorically demands that, under no circumstances are you to cease the 2nd Shock and 59th Armies' offensive operations along the Liuban' and Chudovo axes in the expectation of reinforcements.

On the contrary, it demands that, after receiving reinforcements, you reach the Liuban'-Chudovo railroad by 1 March in order to liquidate the enemy Liuban' and Chudovo groupings completely no later than 5 March.Stalin also sent Lt. Gen. A.

[31] By this time the spring rasputitsa had set in, what roads existed became impassable for vehicles, the supply routes through the gap were underwater, and 2nd Shock was running short of ammunition, fuel and food.

[33] In the event, this tentative date was not met, and on May 12 Khozin notified the STAVKA that Group Wendel was being reinforced, which he took as firm evidence that another attempt to cut the corridor was in the offing.

Heavy, chaotic, but mostly futile combat raged for several days as the ragged remnants of 2nd Shock Army, in large and small groups, tried desperately to reach Volkhov Front's lines.

In a critique from the General Staff on September 15, Meretskov was upbraided for allowing the 191st to be committed to battle with just a handful of mortar shells and 45mm antitank rounds available.

[43] The planning for a new effort to break the German blockade, dubbed Operation Iskra ("Spark") began shortly after the previous offensive had failed.

It opened with an artillery preparation that unleashed 133,000 shells on the German defenses, and assault detachments from each first echelon rifle battalion in 59th Army began the ground attack at 1050 hours.

7th Corps and the 5th Partisan Brigade had taken Peredolskaya Station on January 27; thereafter it changed hands three times in heavy fighting as German reserves were committed.

Early on March 1 the 2nd Shock, which soon included 14th Corps, and 59th struck but made very limited progress over the next two days, after which German forces launched heavy counterattacks against the 59th; the fighting raged on this sector until April 8 without any resolution.

During April 18/19 the Front launched intensive reconnaissance efforts in preparation for the crossings, including the elimination of German advance parties in the lowlands between the East and West Oder.

Attacking to the southwest and having beaten off five German counterattacks the Army advanced 5–6km in the day's fighting, and by the evening the 121st Corps had reached the line Pinnow–Hohenfelde.