[8] Although the two great Spanish workers' organizations, CNT and PSOE-UGT did not join the communist movement, the October Revolution "acted in Spain as an unstoppable mobilizing myth that shocked for years the working class, dragged its leaders and dazzled the masses they tried to frame".

The liberal government of the Count of Romanones opted for the path of negotiation accompanied by the approval of the "eight-hour" decree and a new social insurance system,[12][13] but had to give in to pressure from the employers, who demanded an iron fist and found valuable support in the Captain General of Catalonia, Joaquín Milans del Bosch, and King Alfonso XIII.

[21] The first problem that the new government formed after the assassination of Eduardo Dato, which was presided over by the also conservative Manuel Allendesalazar,[22] had to face was the controversy raised by Alfonso XIII's speech delivered on 23 May 1921 at the Casino de la Amistad in Cordoba before the large landowners of the province and the authorities of the capital.

[44][48] The new government dissolved the "informative commissions" in November, this time counting on the support of the king who in June had said in a meeting with the military of the Barcelona garrison: "At present it is shocking to note in our army groupings which, although motivated by a perhaps most noble desire, are frankly outside what the most elementary obedience and fundamental discipline advise.

In a letter he sent to the president of the government, Eduardo Dato justified his actions outside the law to achieve the "extirpation of terrorism and revolutionary syndicalism", since "ordinary justice and legislation" were "ineffective": "A raid, a transfer, an escape attempt and a few shots will begin to solve the problem".

[74] Primo de Rivera had met with Martínez Anido as soon as he arrived in Barcelona and together with him and Arlegui he had actively participated in the consolidation of "the para-police networks dedicated to the murder of anarchists" and in the promotion of the Free Unions, "this peculiar ultra-right-wing workerism that was subsidized by the Catalan businessmen", according to Alejandro Quiroga.

Primo was welcomed in triumph upon his return to Barcelona [on 23 June],[84] and circumvented the Government's refusal to declare a state of war by ordering the closure of Solidaridad Obrera and the arrest of Ángel Pestaña and other moderate cenetista leaders", says Eduardo González Calleja.

[86] Together with the "policy of order" —which continued after his return from his trip to Madrid with a very harsh repression of the CNT trade unionists who, for their part, continued with the robberies and the planting of explosives—[87] the other element which sealed Primo de Rivera's alliance with the Catalan bourgeoisie was the promise to protect their industry by raising tariffs on imports, precisely the opposite policy that was being applied by the government of García Prieto, which had negotiated with countries such as Great Britain, France, Germany and the United States to lower the tariffs that their products had to pay when they entered the Spanish market, with the aim of reducing domestic prices and favoring exports, especially agricultural exports.

[92] According to Julio Gil Pecharromán, "the release of the prisoners in exchange for money [was] received by many military men as a slap in the face, a proof of the liberal government's distrust of the operational capacity of the Armed Forces, especially when the left-wing press presented it as a sign of the failure of the "militarism and bureaucracy" that prevailed in the African Army".

The response of Minister Alcala Zamora was to remind the military that the policy on Morocco was determined by the government, in a telegram sent to the captains general in which he ordered them to stop "any collective tendency or external acts that would cause serious damage to the interests of the country and the Army, which are identical and nothing can put them in conflict".

But the "plan" would never be carried out, although in June he commented to one of the ministers that he envisioned a military Cabinet, "free of the obstacles that for certain actions weigh on constitutional and parliamentary governments", and two months later to a British diplomat that "he knew how to stage a coup (strike a blow) that would not only surprise the socialists and revolutionaries, but also many other parties".

Primo de Rivera resolved the paradox, according to Ben-Ami, thanks to "his ability to pour water on the wine of his abandonist position, once he decided to conspire, just as he did with his centralist spirit, when he sealed his alliance with Catalan autonomism... On the question of responsibilities, however, he did not need to pretend.

[119] During Primo de Rivera's stay in the capital, it became known that the Central General Staff of the Army, in accordance with the plan designed by Martínez Anido,[118] had recommended to the government a landing in Al Hoceima, in the center of the Protectorate, to put an end to Abd-el-Krim's rebellion, which caused the resignation of three ministers who were opposed to the proposal.

[136][140] And he handed them a proclamation to be read by the officers to the NCOs and sergeants calling for discipline and justifying the uprising:[141][...] We want you to know where we are all going in this noble and patriotic adventure: we are going to save the Motherland and the King from corruption and political immorality and then to set Spain on a new course.TO THE COUNTRY AND THE ARMY.

Spaniards: The moment has arrived for us, more feared than expected (because we would have always wanted to live in legality and for it to govern Spanish life without interruption) to gather the anxieties, to attend to the clamorous request of those who, loving the Motherland, see for it no other salvation than to free it from the professionals of politics, from the men who for one reason or another offer us the picture of misfortunes and immoralities that began in 98 and threaten Spain with a forthcoming tragic and dishonorable end.

Assassinations of prelates, ex-governors, agents of authority, employers, foremen and workers; audacious and unpunished robberies; depreciation of the currency; racket of millions of reserved expenses; suspicious tariff policy because of the tendency, and even more because those who manage it flaunt their brazen immorality; creeping political intrigues taking as a pretext the tragedy of Morocco; uncertainties before this very serious national problem; social indiscipline, which makes work inefficient and null, precarious and ruinous the agricultural and industrial production.

Also at two o'clock in the morning he gathered four journalists from Barcelona newspapers at the Captaincy and gave them his Manifesto to the Country and the Army (so that they would publish it without adding any commentary), in which he justified the rebellion he had just led and in which he announced the formation of a Militar Inspectorate Directory that would take power with the King's approval.

[150] Meanwhile, the President of the Government Manuel García Prieto had telephoned twice to King Alfonso XIII, who was in San Sebastián where he had extended his usual summer stay, and the monarch told him that he was exaggerating and that he should contact Primo de Rivera so that he would withdraw his attitude, but that he should not cease.

[132][158] Also in the early hours of the morning —at 3:30 a.m., according to Roberto Villa García— Primo de Rivera sent a telegram to Alfonso XIII informing him of his "movement", offering him his "unconditional support" and asking him to remove "the corrupt politicians" who were damaging the "honor" and the "interest of Spain" from his side.

[240][241][242][243] The Socialists were invited to join the Committee but they opted to remain on the sidelines and the leaderships of the PSOE and the UGT warned their affiliates not to intervene in any revolutionary attempt, since they would only serve as "a pretext for repressions that reaction craves for its advantage", according to the newspaper El Socialista.

[241] For its part, the CNT published on 18 September in its official newspaper Solidaridad Obrera that "if the coup d'état does not have as its mission to go against the workers, against the liberties they have, against the improvements achieved and against the economic and moral demands which have gradually been obtained, our attitude will be very different than if all this, which is the product of many years of struggle, is vilified, not respected or attacked".

The newly created Catholic party, the Partido Social Popular, with the notable exception of Ángel Ossorio y Gallardo, enthusiastically welcomed what it called the new "national movement", as well as the Maurists who considered the Dictatorship, "whatever the anomalies of its origin", as the beginning of the "resurgence of Spain".

[...] If the Directory understands well this lesson of things that are taking place all over the world, and against which the claims of the fallen can do nothing, it will have to continue in power for a long time.As for the two parties of the turn, according to Ben-Ami, "they seemed relieved by Primo de Rivera's decision to temporarily anesthetize Spanish politics".

All the goods, rights and shares of his property that are in the national territory will be seized, for the benefit of the State, which will arrange the convenient use that should be given to them.The president of the Provisional Government, Manuel Azaña, addressing the deputies, said: "with this vote the second proclamation of the Republic in Spain takes place".

According to Shlomo Ben-Ami, "Alfonso XIII had for years shown absolutist tendencies, a strong desire to rule without parliament, a rigid, undemocratic courtly etiquette, and manifested an unhealthy admiration for the army, in the promotion of whose officers he was the main arbiter".

[261] This is what he stated on 23 May 1921 in a speech delivered in Cordoba, in which, after affirming that "the parliament does not fulfill its duty" (since debates take place in it whose purpose is to prevent projects from prospering, in the service of political ends) and that "those who listen to me may think that I am violating the constitution",[262] he affirmed:[261]I believe that the provinces should begin a work of support to their king and to the projects that are beneficial, and then the Parliament will remember that it is the mandatary of the people: inside and outside the Constitution it would have to impose itself and sacrifice itself for the good of the Motherland.He reiterated these criticisms during a fraternal meal with the officers of the Barcelona garrison held on 7 June 1922 in a restaurant in the town of Las Planas, in which he told them: "always remember that you have no other commitment than the respect given to your country and your King".

[268] Shortly afterwards, in a statement to the Daily Mail newspaper, he assured that the dictatorship had ended with "the claudicating weakness of the politicians" and in 1925 he reiterated to Paris-Midi that "if he reopened the parliament the old parties [would] lead the country to ruin", in which he coincided with Primo de Rivera who declared on several occasions that "the parliamentary system" had "passed to history".

After interposing himself as a traditional obstacle in the various attempts to democratize the system through the abusive use of the royal prerogative and the encouragement of militarism to the detriment of civilian power, Don Alfonso instrumentalized the military threat that loomed over the parliamentary regime to enhance his own role, going from arbiter to fundamental actor in the political game.

Faced with the stigma of the perjurer, he made it clear [later to Romanones] that he was fulfilling "the tacit article of every Constitution [:] "to save the Fatherland"".According to Francisco Alía Miranda (2023),[276]According to all indications, Alfonso XIII was the one who convinced the conspiring generals in the spring of 1923 to free him from the nightmare of responsibility for the disaster of Annual, in the Moroccan war.

Still on vacation in San Sebastian, in mid-September, he returned without haste to Madrid, which gave the coup plotters valuable time which was enough for Primo de Rivera to establish his plans.According to Roberto Villa García (2023),[277]The army almost en bloc only expected its supreme leader to legalize the victory of the movement.