1952 steel strike
On June 2, 1952, in a landmark decision, the US Supreme Court ruled in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), that the President lacked the authority to seize the steel mills.
Title II permitted the President to requisition any facilities, property, equipment, supplies, and component parts of raw materials that were needed for the national defense.
[5] On September 9, Truman issued Executive Order 10161, which established the Economic Stabilization Agency (ESA) to coordinate and supervise wage and price controls.
Placing the onus solely on workers to keep wages low risked the wrath of labor, a lesson that the administration had learned from the World War II experience.
[4] Confronted with the failure of the NSRB and a mobilization effort that was faltering and unable to meet the needs of accelerated production plans, Truman declared a national emergency on December 16, 1950.
Although opposed to the way in which the Capehart Amendment significantly weakened the administration's wage and price control program, Truman signed the legislation on July 31, 1951.
Five days later, Feinsinger let it be known that a number of economic issues (such as increased pension contributions) might be removed from the calculation of the basic wage rate in order to relieve the pressure on the negotiating parties.
[55] ODM director Charles E. Wilson made it clear in a public statement on January 15 that the administration's inflation program would be wrecked if the workers succeeded in winning a wage increase larger than 4 cents an hour.
A secret internal memorandum by OPS staff members indicated that the union was actually due a 22-cents-an-hour wage increase, and that the steel companies could absorb up to 40 cents an hour in additional costs without a price hike.
But for the union to win a wage increase without giving the employers price relief would appear inequitable and create political problems for both OPS and WSB with Republicans in Congress.
[61][62] Press speculation that the union would win a 14 cent an hour wage increased after Shulman made a similar recommendation in an unrelated aircraft industry workers' collective bargaining case on February 9.
[63] Benjamin Fairless, meanwhile, testified that the wage demands would reduce steel industry profits so much that the federal government would lose more than $11 billion in tax revenues.
Designed to emphasize the patriotism of the steel companies during wartime, the public relations campaign was implemented in newspapers and on radio and television stations nationwide.
[69] A pay increase, it was said, would ruin the economy of the Deep South, "hamper the country's defense against atomic attack, undermine our foreign economic policy and introduce totalitarianism".
Wilson flew back to Washington that afternoon, convinced he had won Truman's consent to settle the steel wage dispute at a level two-thirds lower than the recommendation of the WSB.
Truman named John R. Steelman, Assistant to the President of the United States (a post which would later become White House Chief of Staff), acting director.
Atomic weapons projects would be curtailed, 1,500 miles of highway would not be built, and U.S. commitments under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act could not be met—which might encourage Soviet aggression.
Truman attacked the steel companies' price demands, explained why he was not using the other legal options open to him, and called on the employers and union to meet in Washington the following day to negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement.
[101][102] Twenty-seven minutes after the conclusion of Truman's speech, attorneys for Republic Steel and the Youngstown Sheet & Tube Company arrived at the door of United States district court Judge Walter Bastian with papers in hand to demand a temporary restraining order to prevent the seizure.
[103] Unprepared and unfamiliar with the issues, Baldridge argued that no irreparable harm would ensue and that the steel companies had an adequate remedy under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
There were calls for Truman's impeachment, and a number of bills were introduced to strip the WSB of its powers, to permit the government to end the strike, and to withdraw congressional approval of the expenditure of funds to operate the steel plants.
Full-page advertisements in major metropolitan newspapers appeared the next day that excoriated the seizure, and within a week, tens of thousands of pamphlets and fact sheets had been produced supporting the steel manufacturers' position.
Newspapers denounced the claim, public opinion ran heavily against the president, and members of Congress took to the floor of their respective chambers to attack the argument.
"[110] Pine's decision was read as a ringing defense of limited government and was widely praised by the press and Congress, but a furious Philip Murray ordered union members on strike on April 30, and federal officials made plans to curb commercial construction projects, cut back automobile production, and shutter consumer appliance factories.
The government forcefully argued that the national defense was imperiled by the strike; only a stay of the district court injunction would induce the union to return to work.
At roughly 3:00 p.m., after Sawyer, Fairless and Murray had bargained for five hours, a tentative agreement had been reached, but word of the Supreme Court's acceptance of the case led the steel executives to back out of the deal.
Murray strongly condemned the actions of the steel manufacturers and declared that if a wage and benefit increase similar to the WSB's recommendation was not forthcoming, the union would strike.
Writing for a heavily-divided majority, Justice Hugo Black held that the President had no authority under the Constitution to seize private property on the grounds of national security.
Several other advisors were also present, in addition to the initial group: former White House Counsels and close Truman confidantes Sam Rosenman and Clark Clifford; Secretary of Labor Maurice J. Tobin; and National Production Authority director Henry H. Fowler.
[131][132][133] Murray reiterated the union's opposition to the law and its intention to fight an injunction, statements that tended to inflame emotions and delay a resolution to the strike.
