It was primarily a contest between Prime Minister Ngo Dinh Diem, who proposed a republic, and former emperor Bảo Đại, who had abdicated in 1945 and at the time of the referendum held the title of head of state.

[14] In addition, General Paul Ely, the head of the French presence in Vietnam, tried to impede Diem;[15] his troops put road blocks against the VNA and gave intelligence to the Bình Xuyên.

[16] Buoyed by his successes, and fueled by increased hatred of both the French and Bảo Đại after their attempts to prevent him from dismantling the Bình Xuyên,[17] Diem became more confident as he went about consolidating his hold on power.

[20] This was echoed by the Saigon press, which ran articles assailing communist elections as shambolic, rigged, and meaningless;[20] at the time, the northern half of Vietnam had a greater population than the south.

A month earlier, North Vietnamese Prime Minister Phạm Văn Đồng wrote to Saigon asking to begin negotiations over the specific details of the elections.

The prime minister cited a plethora of petitions from various social, religious, and political groups calling on him to stage a plebiscite to remove Bảo Đại, claiming he was motivated by these "legitimate and democratic" sentiments.

[26] It was previously agreed that a National Assembly would be elected first, but Diem went ahead with the plebiscite, which meant that he would have total power if he deposed Bảo Đại before a legislature was formed.

[28] Diem reportedly saw the poll as an opportunity to legitimise him as a symbol of Vietnamese democracy, so that he could frame and justify his refusal to participate in national elections as a struggle between freedom and communist authoritarianism.

Diem asserted that South Vietnam would eventually reunify the nation under a democratic administration and liberate their northern compatriots from communist oppression, and championed the referendum as a first step in nurturing democracy.

[36] Diem's advertising included the parading of giant pageant-style floats of Bảo Đại through the streets of Saigon, depicted with bags of money on his shoulders, a deck of cards in his hands, and with naked blonde women and a bottle of cognac in his arms.

[37] Walls and public transport were plastered with slogans, including "Beware of the evil king Bảo Đại's preference for gambling, women, wine, milk, and butter.

"[34] Diem's government-controlled press overwhelmed Bảo Đại with endless personal propaganda attacks, with special editions of newspapers being devoted to polemical biographical accounts of the former emperor.

[38] The paper claimed Bảo Đại was "big yet foolish, had many children, and was very fond of women" while Khải Định was uncomfortable with females, hinting that the different personalities were inconsistent with a common biological lineage.

The editorials accused her of being a French agent and claimed she had treated the queen mother badly,[39] a serious character flaw as Confucianism strongly emphasized respect for elders.

Hong Van went on to claim that Bảo Đại's sequence of Gallic lovers was an indication that colonial officials were successfully using sex to turn the head of state into a puppet of France.

[42] The pictures featured full frontal nude depictions of Bảo Đại and his mistresses, their genitalia prominently exposed, including a frame showing a naked blonde performing an erotic dance for the head of state.

They criticised him as being too soft in his dealings with French colonial authorities, and for serving as the head of state of the Empire of Vietnam, a puppet regime set up by Imperial Japan after they invaded during World War II.

[31] After elaborating on the powers of the head of state, the pamphlet went on to champion Diem as an anti-communist who could defend people's freedom, while explaining why Bảo Đại was unfit to lead, saying that he did not have respect among the international community.

The following day, he denounced "the police methods" of Diem's "dictatorship" and warned the Vietnamese populace "against a regime that was bound to lead them to ruin, famine, and war".

[49] Another Hòa Hảo rebel leader, General Trần Văn Soái, assailed Diem's undemocratic regime and declared the referendum illegal.

[23] The logistics of the referendum were organised and supervised by Diem's brother and confidant, Ngô Đình Nhu, who was the leader of the family's secret Personalist Labor Revolutionary Party, which supplied the Ngôs' electoral base.

[57] The near unanimous voter turnout and support for Diem was replicated in Central Highlands and Mekong Delta swamp areas, which were not even under the control of the government and its Vietnamese National Army.

[58] In some districts of the Mekong Delta, overwhelming tallies for Diem in excess of 90% of the registered voters were recorded,[59] even though the Hòa Hảo warlord Ba Cụt and his army had prevented voting.

[52] Historian and writer Jessica Chapman said "Even Diem apologists like Anthony Trawick Bouscaren and American CIA officer Edward Lansdale concur with the prime minister's harshest critics on the conclusion that the South Vietnamese government was either incapable of or unwilling to hold a truly free, representative plebiscite".

[45] The U.S. government privately concluded that the monopoly Diem had on the media and the election campaign was a greater factor in the victory than intimidation and the fact that the voting was effectively public.

"[60] Buttinger said that while the monarchy was "another rotten relic of Vietnam's past" and Bảo Đại "its last, unworthy representative", fraud and intimidation were unnecessary as Diem would have won easily in any event.

[50] He said "The October 23rd plebiscite in which [the people of South Vietnam] took such an enthusiastic part, constitutes an approval of the policies pursued thus far and at the same time augurs a whole new era for the future of our country.

"[61] Mansfield had been a professor of Asian history before entering politics; as a result his opinions about Vietnam were more influential and held in high regard by his fellow senators.

[62] Archives of policy discussions show that the Americans were concerned more about the negative image created by Diem's autocratic and antidemocratic style among the international community, rather than its possible effects on national cohesion.

[67] In January 1956, with no legislature and constitution in place, Diem used his absolute power to dissolve the Revolutionary Council by launching police raids on the members, forcing those from the Cao Đài and Hòa Hảo who had rallied to his side to go on the run.