[1] While the army had all the power, it chose not to rule directly and instead entrusted politicians from the traditional political parties of the earlier Syrian Republic to form the secessionist government.

[2] The traditionalist conservative politicians were increasingly out of touch with the radicalized army, which eventually swept the old order away in the coup of 8 March 1963.

[3] After the rushed and overtly enthusiastic decision to unite with Egypt, Syrians realized that they had joined a very centralized, autocratic military dictatorship which increasingly destroyed Syria's traditional politics and economy.

The Ba’ath Party, despite being the champions of unity and the most natural political allies of President Gamal Abdel Nasser, was also removed from the positions of influence during 1959–1960.

From 20 February until 8 March 1961, Nasser was on his fifth and final visit in Syria, where he made speeches denouncing liberal economy and promoting a more socialist, state controlled model.

[4] In early July government seized grain from storage and announced increased import of cattle in order to meet food and meat shortages that were caused by severe drought that had plagued Syria for three years.

[5] In July 1961 Nasser announced his Second (Social) revolution by promoting a number of laws that nationalized most of the industries, toughened the agrarian reform, introduced employee management participation and profit sharing rights.

The President of the Northern Executive Council, Secretary General of the local branch of the ruling National Union, Syrian Minister of Interior and the long-time head of the secret police Sarraj had also been a significant supporter of Nasser and his rise to power with the United Arab Republic.

As a way of removing him from the power, on 17 August 1961 Sarraj was made one of UAR's Vice Presidents with responsibility over internal affairs and moved to Cairo.

[7] On 13 August Nasser sent his confidant Abdel Hakim Amer (in the role of Inspector General) to take control in Damascus.

To eliminate this conflict, on 18 September Nasser ordered the merger of Egyptian and Syrian National union branches.

[7] Amer also tried to rebuild positive contacts with Ba'ath politicians, including Salah ad-Din al-Bitar, who were enemies of Sarraj but supporters of Nasser's socialism, by awarding pensions to the former Ba’ath ministers on 17 September.

As the week progressed, some underground parties started street demonstrations against increased Egyptian control and the army was brought out to guard key buildings in Damascus.

At 4 am on 28 September an armoured column under the command of Lt-Colonel Abd al-Karim al-Nahlawi, the chief of Amer's bureau in Syria, and Desert Guard units under the command of Lt-Colonel Haydar al-Kuzbari entered Damascus, and met with the troops of the Damascus garrison and air force.

Just before his arrest at 4 am, Amer had time to order Egyptian Major General Anwar al-Qadi to move a field artillery brigade from its base 40 km away from Damascus to the city and to suppress the uprising.

At 7:25 am Damascus radio broadcast communique #1 of the Supreme Arab Revolutionary Command of the Armed Forces (SARCAF) in which they announced that "the army has taken steps to remove corruption and tyranny and to restore the legitimate rights of the people".

[1] While SARCAF at this time did not announce the break-up of the UAR or secession from it, most Syrians had had enough of Egyptian rule, and despite the never-ending professions towards the goal of Arab unity, they were happy to regain their traditional freedoms.

He announced that he would not dissolve the UAR (this was to be done by Anwar Sadat in September 1971),[8] that the rebellion in Damascus was small scale and that he had given orders to the Syrian army to suppress it.

Amer was certain that the UAR could be saved by meeting the rebel demands for greater local autonomy, softening the July laws and through agrarian reform.

As Egypt and Syria shared no land border, airborne paratroopers and some seaborne troops were ordered to leave for Latakia and Aleppo, where army bases were still loyal to Nasser.

[9] During that day, Major-General Abd al-Karim Zahreddine, a Druze, who was not involved in the planning of the coup, was appointed the army's commander-in-chief.

The Egyptian-Syrian propaganda wars started in October with Egypt calling the Syrian politicians “capitalists, reactionaries and feudalists”.

A new National Security Council was established which included the Army commanders, the President and five key ministers who supervised the government.

While the parliament and government were composed of largely traditional, right of centre politicians, the military wanted to retain and to implement many of the UAR era socialist reforms and gains aimed at improving conditions for the poor and creation of a state controlled economy.

[10] Abd al-Karim al-Nahlawi established a National Security Council, which served as a tool for continued army control over the civilian government.

This was aided by the fact that the main coup leaders had different political leanings and also business interests (through their extended families).

Akram al-Hawrani and his socialists were against the UAR, while both founders Michel Aflaq and Salah ad-Din al-Bitar sent confusing signals.

After the December elections, Peoples Party leaders Maarouf al-Dawalibi and Nazim al-Kudsi became prime minister and president, respectively.

Meanwhile, Nasserites and Ba’athists, with Egyptian support, planned another coup for the restoration of UAR, which was to take place on 28 July 1962, but was discovered and suppressed by the government.

The machinations and conspiracies in the army continued and eventually led to the coup of 8 March 1963, organized by junior officers from the Ba’athist Military Committee.