According to the official Air Force report, the aircraft experienced an uncontrolled decompression that required it to descend to 10,000 feet (3,000 m) in order to lower the cabin altitude.

[1] The following timeline is an abridged version of the description transcribed by Oskins and Maggelet[2] from a declassified copy of the original Air Force accident report.

6:50 – Mather control room contacted the aircraft and Wing guidance was to "continue mission as long as you can; call us back after second refueling tonight and advise us of your status, if it gets intolerable, of course, bring it home."

The heat in the cockpit was unbearable at this time and had cracked the glass case for the ball on both pilot's and co-pilot's turn and slip indicators.

14:20 – after 20 minutes of unpressurized flight, the decision was made to descend to 12,000 feet (3,700 m) and continue the mission as far as possible at this altitude.

We have descended to 12,000 feet [3,700 m] and plan to go 150 nmi [280 km] north of TP 3.19 and return direct to Mather."

They were advised to "proceed as planned, recommend you stay low altitude, give us an estimate on your fuel as soon as you get in close enough to contact us."

For approximately the next hour, several heading deviations up to 30 degrees were made by the pilot of Doe 11 to circumnavigate the weather associated with a front in this area.

It is estimated from study of weather and Doe 11 pilot and navigator interviews that 7 or 8 minutes were lost during this frontal penetration due to these heading deviations.

21:50 – Mather was contacted through HF radio and advised he had, "#1 main tank gauge stuck at 10,030 pounds [4,550 kg] .

The bomber maintained 280 kn (520 km/h) IAS to approximately 2 nmi (3.7 km) behind this tanker, and then lost power.

He initiated a 30-degree bank to the west toward a clear area as all engines flamed out together at approximately 22:40 hours after takeoff.

The aircraft made one complete 360-degree left turn and crashed into a clear flat barley field area 15.75 miles (25.35 km) west of Yuba County Airport, California, at approximately 22:50 after takeoff.

The aircraft struck the ground at a 15.3-degree left bank and an estimated attitude of 5 degrees nose down at an indicated airspeed of approximately 200 knots (370 km/h).

"[3] The weapon from the rear bomb rack was found still mostly intact, with its nuclear components inside of its ballistic drop case.

The primary was destroyed, with its high explosives shattered and scattered, and its enriched uranium pit separated from the assembly.

Its detonators were found scattered over a large area, and its tritium reservoir had separated but had remained full.

The next day, EOD personnel collected the scattered high explosives, as well as the high-explosive sphere from the intact weapon, and burned them.

[6] However, despite the switches being in "Safe" position in the Yuba City accident, the low-voltage thermal batteries in one of the weapons still activated.

According to the Defense Atomic Support Agency, "post-mortem analysis indicates a probable cause of the activation of the low voltage thermal batteries of the one weapon was a cable short which permitted the energy from the MC-845 Bisch Generator to bypass the MC-1288 Arm/Safe Switch.

It is suspected that the MC-845 pulse resulted from the mechanical shock sustained upon impact and was passed to the MC-640 [thermal batteries] through one of the possible random short circuits."

The high-voltage batteries of neither weapon were actuated, and in both cases it was later judged that "all design safety features of the bombs performed adequately".

[3] In a 2012 book, lieutenant colonel Earl McGill, a retired Strategic Air Command B-52 pilot, claims that the aircrew, after an inflight refueling session that provided inadequate fuel, refused the offer of an additional, unscheduled inflight refueling, bypassed possible emergency landing fields, and ran out of fuel.

[7] McGill, based on his experience, blames the aircrew failures on the use of dexedrine to overcome tiredness on the 24-hour flight preceding the accident.