[1] In the 2 March 1962 coup, the military replaced the civilian AFPFL-government headed by Prime Minister U Nu, along with the Union Revolutionary Council Chaired by General Ne Win.

[2] In the first 12 years following the coup, the country was ruled under martial law, and saw a significant expansion in the military's role in the national economy, politics, and state bureaucracy.

The elected Prime Minister U Nu appointed Ne Win as Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, on 1 February 1949, and was given total control of the army, replacing General Smith Dun, an ethnic Karen.

[7] Yet the general public continued to perceive the elected government as corrupt, inept at ruling the country, and unable to restore law and order in a Burmese society characterised by ever-increasing crime rates.

[8] The military continued to be perceived as crucial to ensuring social stability, which was a high priority among the Burmese people following years of colonialism and World War II.

[1] He arrested U Nu, Sao Shwe Thaik, and several others, and declared a socialist state run by a "Revolutionary Council" of senior military officers.

[citation needed] Due to the AFPFL-government's weak position in society, the coup was not unexpected, and Ne Win had been urged to seize power by members of the army.

[14] The coup was executed with the arrest of Prime Minister U Nu, five other cabinet members, the Chief of Justice, and around thirty politicians and former leaders from the states of Shan and Kayah.

According to historian Robert H. Taylor, Ne Win assumed power in secrecy, without the knowledge of even the deputy commander of the armed forced, Brigadier General Aung Gyi.

[17] In contrast, historian Mary P. Callahan describes the coup as a highly coordinated military accomplishment that "deployed troops and tanks in an overt seizure of power.

In fact, Callahan argues that the coup illustrated that the military acted as a united, bureaucratised entity, and that it might be this unity that explains the durability of the authoritarian rule that followed.

A reason, which is highlighted by multiple historians, is that the coup was a response to a growing fear within the army that the Union of Burma was drifting towards disintegration under the AFPFL-Government.

[13] The army and Ne Win saw it as their responsibility to protect the cohesion of the Union and in the official press release the coup was presented as a necessity due to the policies of the AFPFL-government.

[7] Furthermore, the military rule justified the abolition of the political system by saying that multi-party democracy served the wealthy in society in being open to politicians representing capitalists and landlords.

This critique of the political system served both as a reason for conducting the coup but also as a justification of the state structures and policies that were implemented in the subsequent years.

Ne Win's political credentials were based on his fighting for the country in the 1940s and the fact that he served as a trusted lieutenant to Aung San, who was considered to be a national hero.

[24] In contrast Callahan argues that neither the specific character of Ne Win nor the threat of disintegration were the decisive causes for the staging of the coup, since these factors were present throughout the 1950s, without them leading to an army intervention.

Long-term structural development led to shifting fortunes of the military and political elites, which created: "... winners and losers, rulers and ruled, citizens and enemies.

"[25] The consolidation of the military was a result of lengthy periods of wars, as well as intra-military struggles, which led to a purge of army commanders who had tense relationships with Ne Win.

[30] The concentration of power in the hands of Ne Win continued on 5 March 1962 when he undertook all executive, legislate and judicial authority by virtue of being the Chairman of the Revolutionary Council.

[36] In a security perspective the leftist state ideology furthermore minimised the risk of Chinese attacks, which in 1962 constituted the largest external threat to Myanmar.

The priorities in the ideological framework were the establishing of a socialist economy and the interests of the peasants, who comprised the largest group in society, and potentially the biggest threat to the government.

To distinguish the Burmese Way to Socialism from communism, Ne Win argued that the socialist system of Burma should benefit all people of society and that the business class was not seen as the enemy, as long as they supported the Revolutionary Council.

The notion of ethnicity should be neutralised by developing new community affiliations based on a national cultural identity and a shared public history founded in a Buddhist past.

To the majority of the population who worked in agriculture the coup initially improved the living conditions due to the military regime's egalitarian politics which prioritised the peasant.

[32] Despite the limited immediate implication for society at large the military coup resulted in comprehensive societal changes in the subsequent years with the Revolutionary Council's implementation of their policies founded in the Burmese Way to Socialism.

On 24 April the council met for a two-day meeting to discuss the Burmese Way of Socialism in detail before publishing the statement, and the issue which caused the most negotiations was the question of nationalisation.

[38] By the mid 1980s the neglect of the industrial sector and policies of protecting the peasants from over-taxation and land-seizure meant that the state had limited ability to generate capital to maintain even the most basic services in society.

[27] Another narrative can be characterised as cosmopolitan and frames the significance of the coup in terms of the following isolation from the international society and disconnectedness due to the state's economic and cultural detachment from the outside.

Elements of this narrative are evident in Taylor's account, where the period from 1962 to 1988 is described as one where: "... the state in Burma appeared to much of the rest of the world as isolated and sui generis.