A group of Christian officers in the military and police planned to topple the government of Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike during the night of 27 January 1962.

Dissanayake (DIG, Range I), Sydney de Zoysa (retired DIG) and Douglas Liyanage (deputy director of Land Development), it was to take place in the night of 27 January 1962, but was called off as the government gained information in the afternoon and initiated arrests of the suspected coup leaders before the coup was carried out.

Bandaranaike, an Anglican who had converted to Buddhism, was elected after a nationalistic movement in which he gathered the support of the Buddhist Sinhalese people majority of the country, who were considered underprivileged compared to the Christian minority.

As promised during the election Bandaranaike began a rapid Sinhalisation of all parts of the government, which culminated in the passage of the controversial Sinhala Only Act.

[6] At the same time, he had the last of the British military bases in Ceylon removed and led a move towards a socialist form of economy, nationalizing several private business and implemented controversial language policies.

After sending the serving Inspector General of Police (IGP) Osmund de Silva on compulsorily retirement for refusing to carryout Bandaranaike's orders which de Silva considered to be unlawful, Bandaranaike appointed a Buddhist civil servant, M. Walter F. Abeykoon from the Lands Settlement Department, over three other senior Christian police officers.

The government responded by dispatching army units to the Jaffna District and declaring a state of emergency under the Public Security Act.

In October 1961, Felix Dias Bandaranaike Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of External Affairs issued an order to the service commanders to prepare for a series of strikes and rioting by Leftist and trade unions.

On 13 December 1961, Dr N. M. Perera said in parliament that Felix Dias Bandaranaike was making arrangements to rule the country with the army and navy.

The first indications of a threat to overthrow the government came on Saturday 27 January 1962, when the IGP Walter Abeykoon, who was at the Orient Club playing bridge was visited by Patrick de Silva Kularatne who had hurried to Colombo from Ambalangoda after receiving a call from his daughter Maya.

Mala Senanayake immediately called her father Kularatne who was a member of parliament and a founder of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party.

Abeykoon called and informed the head of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) S. A. Dissanayake and went back to his game of bridge.

S. A. Dissanayake understanding the depth of the situation, discussed the matter with John Attygalle, SP (CID); given the nature of the threat and not knowing the extent of the conspiracy, they both decided to approach Felix Dias Bandaranaike, who was the Minister of Finance and Parliamentary Secretary for Defence and External Affairs.

Felix Dias Bandaranaike wanted to act quickly to stop the potential coup and left for the Prime Minister's official residence, Temple Trees with the two CID officers.

[14] Having decided that no officers of the Royal Ceylon Air Force were connected to the coup, a security cordon around Temple Trees was deployed from airforce personnel, since no one was sure how deeply the conspiracy had penetrated the ranks of the army, navy and police.

The initial detainees were housed in an annex at Temple Trees, while CID and Special Branch carried out investigations to identify other conspirators.

[16] The plan of the coupe which was code-named Operation Holdfast, came to light based on the statements given the arrested officers and was published in a parliamentary white paper on 13 February 1962.

[17] Lieutenant Colonel Wilmot Abrahams leading the 3rd Field Artillery Regiment was tasked with the capture of Temple Trees and detailing the Prime Minister assisted by ASP Lionel Jirasinhe.

[17] Soon after midnight police cars equipped with loud hailers were to be sent out to announce an immediate curfew in Colombo city limits.

Signals Corps despatch riders, fully armed on motorcycles, were standing by from about 11pm at Torrington (Independence) Square to storm Radio Ceylon once the password 'Holdfast' was given.

He would be assisted by a governing council of former prime ministers made up of Dudley Senanayake and Sir John Kotelawala, with Wijayananda Dahanayake also invited to join.

The coup leaders had intended to send Sirima Bandaranaike to the United Kingdom by plan with her family to join her daughter who was studying at Oxford at the time.

Felix Dias Bandaranaike called for regular security briefings for the prime minister which were held at Temple Trees, Horagolla Walauwa and at Weke Walawwa.

[17] Both General Winston Wijekoon and Colonel Heyn were not aware of the coup and their regiment, the 1st Battalion, Ceylon Light Infantry, based in Panagoda, was the unit the plotters had wanted to prevent coming to the aid of the Government.

In June 1962, the Attorney General of Ceylon, Douglas Jansze, QC filed charges against 24 on three counts of attempting to The Minister of Justice, under the new law, appointed a Trial-at-Bar made up of three Supreme Court Judges.

The prosecution was led by Attorney General Jansze, who relied heavy on the confession given by Colonel de Saram assuming full responsibility and on witness accounts.

[21] Of the accused, De Saram returned to his family law firm and legal practice, Douglas Liyanage was appointed Secretary to the Ministry of State in the early 1980s, Capt.

[citation needed] The primary result of the coup attempt was that it led Sirima Bandaranaike to develop a distrust of the military.

Funding for the services were cut drastically in the immediate aftermath, greatly affecting its growth and disabling its ability of defending Ceylon in the long term.

As a result, the military was under strength and ill-equipped to deal with the 1971 JVP Insurrection, which took the Bandaranaike government by complete surprise and almost defeated.