[4] As of 1964, the country was among the largest producers of uranium and manganese in French Africa, which Time suggested was one of the reasons for France's response to the coup.

[5] In fact, France maintained 600 paratroopers and an air force unit, which included Mirage V and Jaguar jet fighters, at the Camp de Gaulle military base until at least 1987, a warning to any Gabonese coup plotters.

[8] French journalist Pierre Péan asserted that M'ba secretly tried to prevent Gabonese independence; instead, he lobbied for it to become an overseas territory of France.

[15] M'ba now had full executive powers: he could appoint ministers whose functions and responsibilities were decided by him; he could dissolve the National Assembly by choice or prolong its term beyond the normal five years; he could declare a state of emergency when he believed the need arose, though for this amendment he would have to consult the people via a referendum.

Still, [M'ba] wasn't happy until he had the constitution rewritten to give him virtually all power and transforming the parliament into high-priced scenery that could be bypassed as needed.

[22] The president did not hesitate to enforce the law himself: with a chicotte, he whipped citizens who did not show respect for him, including passersby who "forgot" to salute him.

[23] Aubame served as foreign minister under the coalition government, though in early 1963 he was dropped from the Cabinet for refusing to create a single-party Gabon.

[24] To oust Aubame from his legislative seat, M'ba appointed him President of the Supreme Court on 25 February,[25] practically a powerless post.

[29] The 1964–1965 edition of the Adelphi Papers speculates that the continued presence of young French military officers in Gabon may have been an inspiration to the plotters of the coup.

His nephew, Pierre Eyeguet, a former ambassador to the United Kingdom, may have known of the plot beforehand and notified his uncle, although it is unknown whether or not Aubame established contact with the plotters.

[36] That day, Gabonese chief of staff Albert Bernard (later Omar) Bongo informed President M'ba that the number of troops outside Libreville was unusually high.

[40] They issued radio statements every half-hour promising that "public liberties will be restored and all political prisoners will be freed"[34][41] and ordered the French not to interfere in the matter, claiming that it would be a violation of their sovereignty.

[36] Aubame was unaware of the coup until the French ambassador to Gabon, Paul Cousseran, called him on the telephone roughly a half-hour after sunrise.

However, about midway through the morning an automobile carrying the revolutionary committee arrived at Aubame's residence and drove him to the governmental offices, where he had been named president.

[47] President de Gaulle, upon advice from his chief adviser on African policy, Jacques Foccart, decided that he would restore the legitimate government.

[49] Foccart, on the other hand, had only decided to launch the countercoup to protect the interests of the French petroleum group Elf, which operated in Gabon and was led by a close friend of his.

[52] In 1995, the French Minister for Foreign Assistance Jacques Godfrain explained that Paris "will intervene each time an elected democratic power is overthrown by a coup d'état if a military cooperation agreement exists".

[56] This was to officially open a school built by the Peace Corps nearby, in Yembit's birthplace of Moussambou, and completing his electoral campaign.

[59] Maurice Robert and Guy Ponsaille, who were among a group Foccart convened to discuss the French intervention, were part of the paratrooper unit.

[5][47] The rebels closed the airport but failed to establish obstacles, allowing the French troops to land unharmed,[51] albeit during a large storm.

[47] Sweeping through Libreville unopposed, the troops easily captured the provisional council, though they met resistance at the Baraka military base in Lambaréné when they attacked at daylight.

After receiving the false assurance from the ambassador that the French government had no intention of restoring M'ba to power, Aubame sent out a military officer to the countryside to find the deposed president.

[60] France's intervention in the coup was openly applauded by the Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Madagascar, Niger, and Upper Volta.

Upon insistence of the French, M'ba allowed opposition candidates to run, which it claimed was the main reason for starting the coup in the first place.

[75] The UDSG disappeared from the political scene, and M'ba's opposition was composed of parties that lacked national focus and maintained only regional or pro-democracy platforms.

[69] A "state of precations" was imposed, which decreed that local government kept surveillance on suspected troublemakers and, if necessary, order curfew, while special permits were required to travel through the town.

He reasoned that the French intervention was effectively an illegal act of interference, an assertion which Gondjout and the former education minister, Jean Marc Ekoh, shared.

"[89] On 9 September, without consulting M'ba, Leon Auge handed down a verdict which acquitted both Ekoh and Gondjout; although the charges carried the death sentence as a maximum.

[69] Following these events M'ba became increasingly reclusive, staying in his presidential palace protected by French troops known as the "Clan des Gabonais".

[92] Not even Yembit was close to him, but Foccart's friends Ponsaille and Robert "were never far" from M'ba, according to Pean, and provided the aging president with counseling and advice.