Cardiff, on the lookout for aircraft flying supplies to the Argentine forces occupying the Falkland Islands, had misidentified the helicopter as an enemy Lockheed C-130 Hercules.

On the night of 5 June, HMS Cardiff was stationed to the east of the islands to provide gunfire support to the land forces and intercept enemy aircraft.

At around 02:00 a radar contact was detected; a British Army Air Corps Westland Gazelle helicopter was making a routine delivery of personnel and equipment to a radio rebroadcast station on East Falkland.

Defending their claim that the helicopter had been lost in action, the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defence (MoD) stated that they had not wanted to "cause further anguish to relatives" while they were still trying to ascertain how the Gazelle had been shot down.

[3] In early May, British troops landed at San Carlos on the western side of East Falkland, and from there moved overland towards the islands' capital of Stanley.

Tasked with a dual mission, Cardiff was to provide fire support to the Royal Marines of 3 Commando Brigade, and to interdict any Argentine aircraft attempting to fly into Stanley.

[7][8] Meanwhile, pilots Staff Sergeant Christopher Griffin and Lance Corporal Simon Cockton, of 656 Squadron Army Air Corps, had been ordered to fly equipment and personnel to a malfunctioning radio re-broadcast station on top of Pleasant Peak.

[1][8] 5th Infantry Brigade lost radio contact with the Gazelle, and simultaneously the exploding missile was seen and heard by the re-broadcast station's personnel atop Pleasant Peak.

[9][17] Immediately there were suspicions that Cardiff had been responsible for the shootdown, and later that evening Rear Admiral "Sandy" Woodward declared a "Weapons Tight" order, forbidding the engagement of any aircraft not positively identified as hostile, for all contacts detected flying over East Falkland at less than 200 kn (370 km/h) and under 610 m (2,000 ft).

Based on RAE Farnborough's test results, the Army Air Corps submitted evidence stating that the analysis of the warhead fragments found in the wreckage indicated that the helicopter had been destroyed by a type of anti-aircraft missile "known to have been in the possession of the enemy".

[9] In June 1986, John Stanley, the Minister of State for the Armed Forces, announced in his written answers to the House of Commons: "the [Southampton] coroner has been informed accordingly.

"[2] At the time, less than half of the land force's helicopters were fitted with IFF transmitters, and those that were had been ordered not to use them because they inhibited the tracking systems of the British ground-based Rapier anti-aircraft missile batteries.

[2][7] The board noted the establishment of the Permanent Joint Headquarters, designed to put an end to the "ad hoc and reactive way" in which operations had been carried out while under single service control.

[2] The board supported a recommendation that the responsibilities of naval gunfire-support liaison officers could be broadened to include the interpretation of air defence problems during inshore joint warfare operations.