The enthusiasm for the Volunteer movement following an invasion scare in 1859 saw the creation of many units composed of part-time soldiers eager to supplement the Regular British Army in time of need.

[5] When the Volunteers were subsumed into the new Territorial Force (TF) under the Haldane Reforms of 1908,[7][8] it was organised into regional infantry divisions, each with an establishment of four Royal Field Artillery (RFA) brigades.

On 19 July, the Royal Engineers exploded a mine under the German Army's positions at Hooge, but the infantry of 3rd Division tasked with seizing the crater had not been given a supporting artillery fireplan.

When the Germans attacked the Hooge crater with flamethrowers on 30 July, 139th (Sherwood Foresters) Brigade of 46th Division was able to stabilise the line with the help of the divisional artillery.

Over the first 10 days of the month, the divisional artillery took over the existing battery positions along this front and began digging additional gun pits, observation posts (OPs) and dugouts to new designs.

The British infantry were unable to keep up with the covering barrage of the 18-pounders, which was lifted onto each enemy trench line to a strict timetable: artillery observation during the attack was difficult due to the smoke and confusion.

At about 08.45, VII Corps ordered a renewed bombardment on Gommecourt Wood, but the support units were already inextricably held up by mud and shellfire in their own trenches and the attack was postponed several times.

[53] The first of these creeping barrages actually progressed at twice the normal pace while the infantry rushed downhill to seize the canal crossings; it was described in the Official History as 'one of the finest ever seen'.

On 8 November 1918, in its last operation of the war, 46th Division pushed forward 138th (Lincoln and Leicester) Brigade to seize the Avesnes road, aided by concentrations of fire from the field artillery, which had managed to keep up with the rapid advance.

The divisional artillery were joined at Luton by the 1st Line 4th Home Counties (Howitzer) Brigade, RFA, and Wessex Heavy Bty, RGA, which were fully equipped and could lend guns for training.

[12][22][56][59][60] In January 1917, the 59th Division was relieved in Ireland and returned to the UK, concentrating at the Fovant training area on the edge of Salisbury Plain preparatory to embarking for France.

[22][61] The 59th Division took part in following the German retreat to the Hindenburg Line in March and April, but it was not until September that it was engaged in its first full-scale action, the phase of the 3rd Ypres Offensive known as the Battle of the Menin Road Ridge.

Instead the gunners worked out the position on the map and fired with a reduced charge to get in half a dozen effective shots before the Germans closed the range so they could no longer engage.

The battery No 1s removed the dial sights from their damaged guns and the crews took up rifles before making a run through the gap in the back of the wire surrounding them to reach a trench.

During the night of 22/23 March Akerman pulled his guns back to a position north west of Gomiecourt to fire in the Mory–Ervillers–Behagnies area, covering the defence line that the surviving brigades of 59th Division were endeavouring to establish.

It moved to the coast to operate demobilisation centres at Dieppe, Dunkirk and Calais in early 1919, and to train drafts for continued service in Egypt and the Black Sea.

[83][85][87] On the outbreak of war in September 1939, 60th (North Midland) Army Field Regiment mobilised at Lincoln and Grimsby, trained at Bordon Camp, and crossed to France to join the British Expeditionary Force on 7 January 1940 under the command of Lt-Col F.P.

[90][91] The decision to evacuate the BEF through Dunkirk (Operation Dynamo) was made on 26 May, and 5th Division's stand helped to maintain the north-eastern front of the shrinking 'pocket' as troops streamed towards the port.

Kingcol moved on from Rutba on 15 May, crossing the desert in exceptionally hot weather, digging the heavy vehicles out when they broke through the surface of the poor tracks, and under attack by German aircraft.

[106][110][111] Eighth Army was preparing a new offensive in the Western Desert (Operation Crusader) to drive the Axis forces back from the Egyptian Frontier across Cyrenaica and to relieve Tobruk.

60th Field Regiment was very short of men, but Brigadier Campbell himself helped the gunners swing the trails of their guns round to engage these targets, before bringing up a squadron of tanks.

[114][118][119] The confused fighting continued as the returning Afrika Korps attacked again in the Sidi Rezegh area, but 7th Support Group engaged the Ariete Division at Bir el Gubi and prevented its participation (4 December).

While the positions round Gazala and Alem Hamza were attacked on 15 December, 7th Support Group was ordered to deal with any enemy in the open country to the south of Sidi Breghisc.

The group reached Tengeder on 17 December and then turned north towards Mechili, which convinced Rommel to pull back with all speed to the Tripolitania border before he was cut off by this flanking movement.

[125][128] As early as October 1940, it had been planned that field regiments would adopt an organisation of three eight-gun batteries, but shortages meant that in most units this reorganisation was not completed for many months.

The Chindits had no role for conventional artillery, so 60th Fd Rgt joined 23rd Brigade on 22 October 1943 to train as infantry under the designation of 60th Regiment, RA, (North Midland).

After the Relief of Kohima the British continued towards Imphal, still with 23 Brigade as flank guard on the Kharasom–Ukhrul axis, with the task of cutting Japanese communications back to the Chindwin River.

[134] Aerial reconnaissance from Grimsby by du Vallon and Hotchkin identified a suitable site for the next firm base, named 'Grimbsy II' at Nungphung, where four important tracks met.

After that, they were not troubled, even though the garrisons at Grimsby II were dangerously small when platoons were on offensive operations, possibly because the Nagas fed the Japanese false information about the strength of the columns.

Over the next three weeks, aggressive patrols by platoons from Grimsby II and Jessami harassed the Japanese communications round Kharasom, suffering minimal casualties, although a significant number of sick had to be evacuated by air.