A helicopter was at the time parked on MHN, however it could not fly to Samudra Suraksha due to the rough seas making a landing there unsafe.

Shortly before 15:00, the Mumbai High North offshore installation manager (OIM) received a request for the transfer of the injured person onboard MHN.

The OIM and the master agreed on the use of the south crane,[5] which was located on the windward side of the platform, an arrangement that made the MSV approach more complicated.

[6] The vessel experienced an issue with her dynamic positioning system, having been observed at around 15:30 that her starboard azimuth thruster pitch was sluggish.

However, the master decided to proceed with the approach to the platform, operating the thrusters manually and using an emergency source of control via pushbuttons.

Crucially, they had been installed outside the jacket structure footprint, which made them liable to be struck in case of ship collision.

They were protected by structural guards, but these had been designed for collision from smaller offshore supply vessels (OSV), not larger MSVs.

[10] Prabha eventually shifted the firefighting efforts on Suraksha, which was drifting dangerously at the mercy of the swell and the current.

At the time of the accident, six divers were in a saturation chamber on the MSV; they were rescued 36 hours after the shipboard fire was put off.

[5][13] The following issues of interest, as well as lessons learnt in process safety, have been pointed out in the years after the accident: Daley, Jenine (2013).