[4] Between 2002 and 2005, Afghanistan appeared relatively calm, but underlying tribal tensions and flawed US military actions led to a resurgence of Taliban support in rural areas.

A study by the World Bank found that government aid primarily benefitted the urban elite, leading to widespread frustration and resentment among rural communities.

[7] In June 2002, Lieutenant General Dan McNeill, commander of XVIII Airborne Corps, took charge of combat operations for the 8,000 US troops stationed in Afghanistan.

In February 2002, special forces stationed in Kandahar carried out a nighttime raid on compounds in Uruzgan, believing them to be Al-Qaeda hideouts based on local intelligence.

[9] By 2004, the Taliban had established communication routes into Afghanistan from Pakistan and strengthened their control over mountainous regions bordering Kandahar, Zabul, and Uruzgan.

Amrullah Saleh, head of the Afghan National Directorate of Security, believed the Taliban had devised a comprehensive strategy based on undermining the democratic process, persuading key Pashtun tribes in southern Afghanistan such as the Noorzai, Popalzai, Alikozai, and Ishakzai to switch sides, and ultimately to establish a parallel government in rural villages in the south.

In October 2003, a UN Security Council Resolution expanded ISAF's mandate to operate beyond the capital, eventually leading to the deployment of NATO forces in southern Afghanistan in 2006.

This led to the most significant foreign infringement in Afghan politics during the whole war as the British lobbied President Karzai to replace Akhundzada with the more Western-oriented Mohammed Daoud.

These groups traveled through various routes: some came up from Pakistan through the red desert south of Panjwayi, while others descended from the Hindu Kush foothills in Uruzgan and Helmand, or moved west from Zabul.

Mullah Dadullah headed to northern Helmand and began exerting influence over an area inhabited by around 100,000 Afghans spread across five districts: Baghran, Nowzad, Sangin, Musa Qala, and Kajaki.

[25] The Taliban may have chosen to make their move at this time because the transition of security duties to the ISAF, which was to be completed by July 1, was seen as evidence that the American military's presence in Afghanistan would not sustained long-term.

Stuart Tootal, commander of the 3rd Battalion, Parachute Regiment described the aftermath as he saw "[t]he grisly residue of the body parts of the dead [as they were] lifted off the back of an ANA pick-up truck.

The main combat force was the 16th Air Assault Brigade, primarily the 3rd Battalion of the Parachute Regiment, stationed at Camp Bastion, which was still under construction.

Control over Sangin was strategically important for the Taliban because it facilitated the transportation of poppy from north to south, towards Maiwand and Pakistan, and allowed them to cut off government garrisons.

Conversely, the Ishakzai tribe faced mistreatment, particularly from Dad Mohammed, an Alikozai leader who served as the head of the Afghan secret police in Sangin.

After evacuating Dad Mohammed's family, ninety men from A Company remained in Sangin to reinforce security, alongside twenty Afghan police officers.

That night, Taliban insurgents, hiding in the Bazaar's shops and alleys attacked the British in the governor's compound with mortars, assault rifles, and RPGs.

Over the next week, an average of five attacks per day occurred, and the paratroopers found themselves besieged in a never-ending battle to save the governor's compound.

During one mission to extract a serious casualty, Royal Marine pilot Major Mark Hammond faced intense insurgent fire as they approached Musa Qala.

The British forces eventually regained control and fortified the Garmser district center, turning it into yet another besieged outpost encircled by Taliban insurgents.

[41] In mid-April, the Taliban launched attacks in Kandahar, targeting police posts, ambushing Canadian patrols, and planting IEDs on key roads.

A Canadian light armored vehicle was struck by two rocket-propelled grenades on April 14 after having been sent to rescue a group of Afghan soldiers and police officers who had been ambushed by the insurgents.

"[43] The Taliban seized control of several villages, including Zangabad, Taloqan, and Sangesar, and then launched assaults on the district centers and police headquarters.

Although the Canadians successfully captured their objectives, they quickly withdrew from Zharey and Panjwayi, allowing the districts to fall back under insurgent control.

His mission had failed miserably, providing the Taliban with a significant propaganda victory by claiming that the entire Noorzai tribe had united with them against the evil Razziq.

[45] Sixty new Afghan army commandos, backed by US special forces teams, advanced from the south, encountering heavy resistance near a ridge overlooking several villages of Pashmul.

The Afghan commandos and American special forces teams engaged in a fierce battle for 20 minutes, but had to retreat due to dwindling ammunition supplies.

Media reported 40 civilian casualties, but this is probably an underestimation, as the rules of close air support had been loose, and had allowed Canadian and American units to carry out airstrikes against compounds in which women and children were likely hiding.

[53] Taliban ambushes on Canadian troops in Pashmul showed that Operation Medusa had failed to establish long-term government control over Panjwayi and Zharey.

In areas under their control, the Taliban established their own governance structure, appointing provincial and district governors and implementing a justice system based on Islamic law.