[26] It was led by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) and was part of a series of insurgencies by traditionally nomadic Tuaregs which date back at least to 1916.

[27][28] On 22 March, President Amadou Toumani Touré was ousted in a coup d'état over his handling of the crisis, a month before a presidential election was to have taken place.

[29] Mutineering soldiers, under the banner of the National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State, (CNRDR) suspended the constitution of Mali, although this move was reversed on 1 April.

[30] The Islamist group Ansar Dine, too, began fighting the government in later stages of the conflict, claiming control of vast swathes of territory, albeit disputed by the MNLA.

Issues such as climate change and a rooted background of forced modernization onto the northern Nomadic areas of Mali have caused much tension between the Tuareg peoples and the Malian government.

Locals believed that the presence was due to the MNLA's promise to root out AQIM which was involved in drug trafficking allegedly with the connivance of high-ranking officers and threatened to turn Mali into a narcostate.

[14][48] On 13 February, the French radio station RFI reported statements by the Malian army that the MNLA had carried out executions of its soldiers on 24 January by slitting their throats or shooting them in the head.

French Development Minister Henri de Raincourt mentioned that there had been about 60 deaths, while a Malian officer involved in burying the dead told the AFP that 97 soldiers had been killed.

[14] Mali launched air and land counter operations to take back seized territory,[50] and President Touré then reorganized his senior commanders for the fight against the rebels.

[51] In early February 2012, talks were held in Algiers between Malian Foreign Minister Soumeylou Boubeye Maiga and a Tuareg rebel group known as the 23 May 2006 Democratic Alliance for Change.

[57] On 23 February, Médecins Sans Frontières stated that a girl had been killed and ten other women and children injured when the Malian air force bombed a camp for IDPs in the north.

[61] On 11 March, the MNLA re-took Tessalit and its airport after efforts by the government and its allies to re-supply the town failed, and the Malian military forces fled towards the border with Algeria.

[65] The French newspaper Libération also reported claims that the rebels controlled one third of Mali and that the Malian army was struggling to fight back.

[79][80] An agreement was mediated between the junta and ECOWAS negotiators on 6 April, in which both Sanogo and Touré would resign, sanctions would be lifted, the mutineers would be granted amnesty, and power would pass to National Assembly of Mali Speaker Dioncounda Traoré.

[81] Following Traoré's inauguration, he pledged to "wage a total and relentless war" on the Tuareg rebels unless they released their control of northern Malian cities.

[84] Though the offensive ostensibly included both the MNLA and Ansar Dine, according to Jeremy Keenan of the University of London's School of Oriental and African Studies, the latter group's contribution was slight: "What seems to happen is that when they move into a town, the MNLA take out the military base – not that there's much resistance – and Iyad [ag Aghaly] goes into town and puts up his flag and starts bossing everyone around about sharia law.

"[85] On 24 March, Amadou Sanogo, the leader of the National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State, announced his intention to seek peace talks with the MNLA.

[32] Checkpoints were erected around Timbuktu[87] as rebel forces encircled it[101] with the MNLA saying that it sought to "dislodge Mali's remaining political and military administration" in the region.

[107] Al Jazeera reported the capture of Timbuktu the day an ECOWAS imposed 72-hour deadline to start returning to civilian rule was set to expire.

[111] The speed of capturing the larger towns was read as a consequence of the instability in Bamako with the junta's hands bound between the rebels and the threat of economic sanctions by ECOWAS and others.

We will start talks with all political entities to put into place a transitional body that will oversee free and transparent elections in which we won't take part.

"[113] Juppé referred to the MNLA as a credible interlocutor in the ongoing dialogue between Paris and the feuding factions in Mali, acknowledging it as distinct from Ansar Dine and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, groups with which he ruled out negotiations.

[19] On 15 May, Amnesty International released a report alleging that fighters with the MNLA and Ansar Dine were "running riot" in Mali's north,[115] documenting instances of gang rape, extrajudicial executions, and the use of child soldiers by both Tuareg and Islamist groups.

[116] On 4 April 2012, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees said that in addition to the roughly 200,000 displaced persons, up to 400 people a day were crossing the borders into Burkina Faso and Mauritania.

We'd like to reiterate that UNHCR is committed to helping neighbouring countries and host communities which have been providing safety and shelter to the refugees despite these shortages and the difficult conditions.

[127] Some Arabs/Moors opposed to the rebellion formed the National Liberation Front of Azawad, which held non-secessionist, non-Islamist views, and stated its intention to fight for "a return to peace and economic activity".

[133] On a 26 February visit to Bamako, French Foreign Minister Alain Juppé suggested the government of Mali negotiate with the MNLA; however, he was criticized for trying to legitimize a rebellion seen in the south as run by sectarian opportunists.

[136] Amongst the media reactions to the uprising, Agence France-Presse was accused by Andy Morgan of Think Africa Press of uncritically accepting the government portrayal of the rebels as "armed bandits," "drug traffickers" and "Qaddafi mercenaries.

[137] Social media amongst the Tuareg diaspora was reported to be euphoric at the imminent "liberation," while those in southern Mali were strongly against what they called "bandits" in the north who they said should be "killed".

[27] In late June, Reuters noted that in contrast to the Islamists who had "appropriated the uprising" from them, the Tuareg separatists were "regarded in the West as having some legitimate political grievances".