The company, which employed 70, was designated by the Tianjin Maritime Safety Administration (天津海事局) as an approved agent for handling these hazardous chemicals at the port,[8] and its operating license was renewed two months prior to the explosions.

[9][12] The authorities stated that poor record keeping, damage to the office facilities and "major discrepancies" with customs meant that they were unable to identify the substances stored.

[13] State media revealed that Ruihai had only received its authorisation to handle dangerous chemicals less than two months earlier, meaning that it had been operating illegally from October 2014, when its temporary license had expired, to June 2015.

[2][25] Media reported the area to be densely populated, with around 5,600 families living within 1.5 kilometres (0.93 mi) radius of the plant, the closest being only 520 metres (1,710 ft; 570 yd) away.

[31] The death toll, which also included 11 police officers, was the worst in a single incident for Chinese front line responders since the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949.

[34] More than eight thousand new cars from Hyundai, Kia, Volkswagen, Renault, and Toyota, parked in lots located near the blast site, were largely burned as a result of the initial explosions.

[31][41] Nearby Donghai Road Station suffered severe damage as a result of the explosions and was closed until 2016, as was the rest of Line 9 of the Tianjin Metro beginning on 13 August.

[50][51] On 13 August, sulphur dioxide, carbon monoxide and nitrogen oxides, all of which are toxic, were detected within 500 m (1,600 ft) of the origin of the explosion, but the levels conformed with the national standards.

Deng Xiaowen, director of Tianjin's environmental monitoring centre, stated that the foam was "a normal phenomenon when rain falls, and similar things have occurred before".

Xi Jinping, the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party and Li Keqiang, the Premier of the People's Republic of China, instructed police to investigate the cause of the incident and punish those responsible for the blast.

Over 200 nuclear and biochemical experts, including a team from the International Atomic Energy Agency, began arriving in Tianjin to assess the health risks from the chemicals being released into the atmosphere.

A team of over two hundred chemical specialists was deployed to assess the hazardous materials on site and dangers to the environment, and to determine the best way to put out the remaining fires and proceed with search and rescue and clean-up operations.

[58] Later that day, rescue personnel were dispatched in an attempt to remove the 700 tonnes of sodium cyanide believed to be stored at the site, with hydrogen peroxide being prepared to neutralise the chemicals.

A press conference organised by local officials held on 14 August came to an abrupt end when a journalist began asking questions as to why such dangerous chemicals were stockpiled so close to housing estates.

[31] On 15 August, local authorities ordered the evacuation of residents within a 3 km (1.9 mi) radius of the blast site, prompted by the threat of "toxic substances",[61] including sodium cyanide.

[63][64] The Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI), CPC's anti-corruption body, charged Wu Changshun with bribery in 2014; Dong Peijun was also under investigation for corruption, but died that year.

[64] After the explosions, the CCDI placed Yang Dongliang, Director of the State Administration of Work Safety and China's highest work-safety official, under investigation on 18 August 2015.

In 2012, Yang Dongliang had issued an order to loosen rules for the handling of hazardous substances, which may have enabled Ruihai to store toxic chemicals such as sodium cyanide.

[1] On 8 November 2016, various courts in China handed jail sentences to 49 government officials and warehouse executives and staff for their roles in circumventing the safety rules that led to the disaster.

[41][69] In addition, the Global Times remarked on the inadequacy of emergency response and the reluctance of high-ranking officials to answer the public's questions or address their concerns until four days after the blasts.

[41] The People's Daily acknowledged that public scepticism of the reported death toll was fuelling rampant rumours; there was growing concern about the emergency assistance provided and how the aftermath was being handled.

[68][69] Willy Lam, professor at CUHK and senior fellow at The Jamestown Foundation, noted the highly unusual period of four days it took for Li Keqiang to make an official visit, suggesting that the lack of a top-ranking visitor to a major disaster site within forty-eight hours despite the proximity to Beijing reflected "division among the leadership on who should be the fall guy.

"[12][47][68] Initially, Tianjin authorities banned editors and reporters from sharing information about the disaster on Weibo and WeChat, and websites were ordered to follow state media.

[78][79][80] A great deal of specific information on the event, including the majority of early stage video, was first released over social media sites, and in particular microblogging platforms like Weibo.

[82] The censorship rate increased tenfold on the social media site Weibo,[83] with users reporting the deletion of their posts regarding the blasts, with "Tianjin" and "explosion" being the most censored words.

[78][79][84][85] An article by Caijing, which carried an interview with a firefighter who said that no-one on the front line had been informed of the dangerous chemicals on site that would react exothermically when mixed with water, was deleted after it had been reposted 10,000 times; many other posts mentioning the existence of deadly sodium cyanide were also expunged.

[91] Press freedom organization Reporters Without Borders (RSF) accused the Chinese state media of playing up the heroic efforts of rescue workers and firefighters while downplaying the causes of the explosions and the number of casualties.