Southern Libya offensive

Officially, the LNA announced that the reason for the operation was to remove terrorists, Chadian rebel groups, and secure the border, but it expanded Haftar's territorial control and acquired him oil fields near Sabha.

It also restarted some interethnic conflicts as the LNA had allied with local Arab tribes, while the Tuareg and Toubou tribal militias were loyal to the GNA.

Upon the collapse of Gaddafi's regime in 2011, the marginalized ethnic groups took up arms to gain political rights, while Arab supremacists wanted to expulse them as perceived foreigners.

Similar to its rivals, the LNA is not fully unified, but consists of autonomous militias who acknowledged the authority of the Libyan House of Representatives.

An LNA spokesperson stated that the objective was to "secure the southwest from terrorist elements of Al-Qaeda, ISIS and rogue bandits involved in kidnapping, extortion and smuggling and threaten to change the topography of southern Libya."

[2] On February 6, the GNA appointed Ali Kanna, a Tuareg militia leader, as the commander of the southern military zone, which includes most of Fezzan.

He made a deal with Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, head of the Government of National Accord, in exchange for fighting Khalifa Haftar's LNA offensive.

In the middle of the month the LNA began advancing to another one, al-Feel, and by 14 February was negotiating with GNA-aligned Toubou militants that controlled the oil field.

As the desert border was impossible to control, the real aim of the announcement remained unclear; observers noted, however, that it coincided with the LNA offensive in southern Libya.

The identity of the attackers remained disputed, as ISIL claimed responsibility, whereas the LNA blamed both Islamic State forces as well as Chadian insurgents.