[58] The SAC used terror tactics against the population, including burnings, beheadings, mutilations, war rape, torching villages, and a massive aerial bombing campaign that has displaced nearly 3 million people.

[24] In late June 2024 the Three Brotherhood Alliance restarted Operation 1027 after claiming that Tatmadaw forces had broken the ceasefire, capturing the tenth district level town, Kyaukme, by the end of the month.

[26] On 3 August, the MNDAA as part of a wider effort from the Three Brotherhood Alliance and other resistance groups captured Lashio, the largest town in northern Shan State, as well as the headquarters of the SAC's Northeastern Command.

[66] The 8888 Uprising, in response to the one party dominated rule of Ne Win, resulted in some of the first modern Bamar militias forming from protestors heading to areas under ethnic rebel control.

[17] By late March 2021, dozens of protesters had travelled to Myanmar's border areas to enlist in and train under one of the country's many insurgent groups,[82] elevating the risk of a countrywide civil war.

As part of the announcement he said that ousted leaders Aung San Suu Kyi and Win Myint would retain their positions and asked the international community to recognize their government over the SAC.

[123] According to analyst Matthew Arnold, the civil war's momentum passed critical threshold by the end of the 2022 dry season where the revolutionary sentiment had grown into a broader social and armed resistance that the SAC could no longer suppress.

[127] On 14 December, around 200 Tatmadaw troops searched the Karen National Union (KNU)-controlled town of Lay Kay Kaw Myothit near the Thai border, arresting people suspected to be activists or members of the PDF.

[153] On 14 January 2022, units of the CNA moved into Senam village, south of Tamu, in neighboring Sagaing Region to attack a base run by the Indian-based People's Liberation Army of Manipur.

[166] On 23 July 2022, the State Administration Council announced that it had executed four political prisoners, including Zayar Thaw and Kyaw Min Yu, which was the first use of capital punishment in Myanmar since the late 1980s.

[183][184] In October 2022, Bangladeshi Foreign Minister AK Abdul Momen made a statement that border bombings by Myanmar stopped after he met with the Chinese ambassador to Bangladesh, Li Jiming.

[234] Urban Owls also claimed that Ye Khaing was a confidante of Steven Law, the owner of Asia World Company, which operates the airport, and is a major supporter of the regime together with the second-in-command, Senior General Soe Win.

[241] On 15 September 2023, members of the Northern Thandaung Defence Force, along with the Lethal Prop drone unit, attacked the Aye Lar military base near the Nay Pyi Taw International Airport with 2 makeshift bombs.

[265][266][267] They also took Panlong base in Kunlong Township, killing Brigadier General Aung Kyaw Lwin in the battle,[268] and the strategic Goktwin bridge near the Goteik viaduct on the main Mandalay-China highway.

[312] Following the fall of Laukkai and the junta facing serious threats by the Three Brotherhood Alliance, the war has turned into a more multipolar landscape with borderlands being seized by powerful anti-junta groups with significant implications for the foreign relations of Myanmar.

[316] On 3 February 2024, as the clashes between Arakan Army and Tatmadaw increased in Rakhine, mortar shells and several bullets reportedly landed in Bangladesh territory, which injured some local residents near Ukhia, Cox's Bazar.

[22] After a prolonged siege and several days of negotiations, on 5 April over 600 junta soldiers and their families in Myawaddy surrendered to the KNU and withdrew across the border to Mae Sot,[394] leaving only the 275th Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) near the western entrance to defend the town.

[430] Although 1027 began in Shan State, widespread escalation dramatically shifted the balance of power, leading to EAOs in other areas making dominant gains and crippling the military junta with personnel attritions and historic levels of defections.

[513] China's support temporarily slowed the rebels' momentum but failed to reverse the trend of humiliating losses, including the fall of a second Regional Military Command in Ann, Rakhine State.

[514] In late August, the Tatmadaw began preparing an offensive to recapture key towns in northern Shan State, terming it as “Operation Hsin Phyu Shin” (after the Burmese king Hsinbyushin).

[515] Throughout September and October, the Tatmadaw began massing forces in the final towns it controlled in Northern Shan State (Namlan, Mongyai, and Tangyan) in preparation for the counteroffensive to retake Lashio.

[527] At the same time, the junta-allied PNO intensified military preparations by training 10,000 militia members in Pinlaung Township, in southern Shan State, aimed at bolstering the defense of Naypyitaw.

The Burmese military has escalated its use of war crimes, including murder, mass killings, sexual violence, torture, arbitrary detention, attacks on religious buildings, and the targeting of civilians.

[597] The legal procedure is "a strong warning to Myanmar’s abusive military leaders that they’re not beyond the reach of the law,” said the Human Rights Watch senior international justice counsel Maria Elena Vignoli.

[625] A February 2022 report by United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Myanmar Tom Andrews stated that China, Russia, India, Belarus, Ukraine, Israel, Serbia, Pakistan and South Korea were selling weapons to the Tatmadaw.

[628] On 31 January 2023 the Ministry of Home Affairs issued a directive enabling organisations and citizens deemed "loyal to the state," including civilians, civil servants, and army personnel, to obtain firearms licenses.

[629] The regulatory shift has enabled the SAC to arm pro-military Pyusawhti militias and to suppress pro-democracy forces in light of waning military recruitment and their challenges with concurrently operating in multiple war theatres throughout the country.

[632] SAC-aligned Pyusawhti militias have reportedly used force to recruit local men, but have been less than effective in building up grassroots enforcement on behalf of the junta, and have "taken root only in the small number of communities where the military's own party is traditionally strong.

[640] Activist Thinzar Shunlei Yi thought the military's historic "indoctrination techniques are deeply rooted in nationalism and religious ideologies" leaving "soldiers and their families feeling disoriented amidst shifting societal paradigms".

[670][671] However, the fact that the Three Brotherhood Alliance's Operation 1027 in late 2023 was carried out near the China–Myanmar border may indicate a shift in China's stance,[672] which was attributed by analysts to concerns about cyber-scam centers, the pursuit of favorable concessions from the junta on the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor, and the opportunity to influence the PDF in light of evolving dynamics between NUG and EAO groups.