Later the same day, the Sovereignty Council was dissolved, a state of emergency was put in place,[10] and a majority of the Hamdok Cabinet and a number of pro-government supporters were arrested.

[12] Key civilian groups including the Sudanese Professionals Association and Forces of Freedom and Change called for civil disobedience and refusal to cooperate with the coup organisers.

Civilian groups including Forces for Freedom and Change and the Sudanese Professionals Association rejected the deal, refusing continued power-sharing with the military.

The protestors represented by the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) agreed to a power-sharing deal with the military, creating the Sovereignty Council in August 2019.

According to the Minister of Information, the perpetrators were "remnants of the former regime" who tried to take control of the state broadcasters television buildings and the military central command.

[9] According to Sudan Tribune, al-Burhan replaced "state governors, undersecretaries in the federal ministries, banks and public agencies directors" by members of the National Congress Party that held power under former president Omar al-Bashir.

[28] Following the arrest of the prime minister and civilian leaders, demonstrators started gathering in the streets of Khartoum, lighting car tires and setting up roadblocks.

[14] Plans for continued protests called the "Revolutionary Escalation Schedule" were published by the Joint Chamber of the Marches of the Millions for Civilian rule and Democratic Transition.

The resistance committees, the Sudanese Bankers Association, the Bank of Khartoum and the Democratic Lawyers Alliance called for continued strikes and civil disobedience.

[60] On 5 November, the list of those detained included "government ministers, members of political parties, lawyers, civil society activists, journalists, human rights defenders, and protest leaders", and the detainees were held in unknown locations, without access to their lawyers or families, according to Michelle Bachelet, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

Fifteen protestors were shot dead by the security forces, who raided hospitals and fired tear gas to block medical treatment of wounded survivors.

[18] The Guardian described the killings as the "deadliest security clampdown to date" and described the "cycle of demonstration and use of lethal force in response" as similar to the early 2019 phase of the Sudan Revolution.

Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Monitor described Ibrahim's comments as being part of a "framework of the de facto authority's policy of falsifying the facts" since the coup.

[62] On 9 November, a judge in a Khartoum court ordered the country's major providers (MTN, Zain, and Sudani) to restore Internet services immediately.

"[64] On 25 October, the Ministry of Information declared that Hamdok was "still the legitimate transitional authority in the country" and called for the "immediate release of the prime minister and all detained officials."

The Ministry also stated that "all unilateral measures and decisions taken by the military component lack any constitutional basis, violate the law, and are considered a crime.

Some observers judged that despite local and international efforts to mediate between al-Burhan's forces and civilian groups, there was little progress, as large sections of the Sudanese public appeared to be no longer willing to return to the pre-coup power-sharing system.

[23] Perthes spoke with Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemetti), deputy head of the Sovereignty Council of Sudan under the pre-coup transitional arrangements, on 29 October.

[17] On 21 November 2021, Hamdok was reinstated as prime minister after a political agreement was signed by Sudan's top general Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to restore the transition to civilian rule.

However, the Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) civilian coalition, which shared power with the military, and the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA) both rejected the political deal.

In his report and analysis, he made the following remarks:[70] Sudan’s military and political leaders will primarily have to rebuild trust with their own domestic public, particularly with the young generation.

Similarly, Sudanese authorities will need to take demonstrable steps to regain financial, economic, and political support from the international community.Hamdok later resigned in January 2022 after two people were killed in further pro-democracy protests.

[51] Jonas Horner of the International Crisis Group predicted strong civilian resistance to the coup and judged that the military had underestimated the likely strength of civil disobedience.

"[44] Alex de Waal, researcher in African politics and executive director of the World Peace Foundation, saw multiple reasons motivating al-Burhan and Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemetti) to carry out the coup.

[75] In de Waal's view, after the transfer of the Sovereignty Council Chair to a civilian, al-Burhan and Hemetti would risk loss of military control of the national budget.

They would also risk being affected by the Commission for Dismantling the 30 June 1989 Regime, Removal of Empowerment and Corruption, and Recovering Public Funds that could expose and disrupt military-owned commercial interests.

De Waal described the coup as a "gamble" offering no practical solutions and risking "turmoil and bloodshed at home and pariah status abroad".

Rickett described Hemetti as "know[ing] that he is repellent to the Sudanese out on the streets" and "that the coup is stumbling and that the people are holding firm," and waiting to make a decision on how to act.

A former Sudanese intelligence head based in Abu Dhabi, General Abdel Ghaffar al-Sharif, also allegedly helped Sheikh Mansour in the background.

"[78] The former finance minister of Sudan, Ibrahim al-Badawi, had also claimed that state revenues from meat exports to Saudi Arabia had been diverted to military funds and that a Swiss-based firm had collected the income of the civil aviation authorities and transferred it to an Emirati bank account.