After a fairly lengthy forming-up period near Moscow was sent south in August, eventually to Stalingrad Front, where it took part in the futile efforts to break through the German corridor to the city.
The division won the Order of the Red Banner for successfully crossing the Danube at Batina, but took heavy losses in fighting south of the Drava River in late December.
When completed it had the following order of battle: Col. Georgii Fyodorovich Kotov was appointed to command the division on the day it began forming and would lead it for the duration of the 1st formation.
By the end of July 5 the 233rd and 153rd were dug in in the Syanno region and were offering stiff resistance to the XXXIX Motorized Corps, imposing significant delays in difficult terrain south of the Western Dvina River, particularly against 7th Panzer Division.
[5] At 0030 hours on July 5, as directed by Timoshenko, General Kurochkin ordered his Army to "prepare and conduct an attack against the flank and rear of the enemy grouping operating along the Polotsk axis."
Timoshenko reported on July 18 that the 229th and 233rd were defending south and southeast of Dobromysl "against a concentration of enemy motorized infantry with 2,000 vehicles, which have apparently run out of fuel, and elements of 17th PzD and 35th ID in the Bogushevskoe region."
Group Rokossovsky had made some limited progress and the two pocketed Armies began their eastward withdrawal in earnest overnight on August 2/3, engaging company-size strongpoints manned by troops of the 20th Motorized Division.
The 229th was closest to Ratchino, with the 233rd close behind, and both got over the Dniepr there on August 4, running a gauntlet through the corridor, often under artillery fire and air attacks, and fording the river in places where it was less than 60 cm deep.
[18][19] The German 6th Army penetrated from the Don to the Volga on August 23, reaching the northern outskirts of Stalingrad and creating a corridor that would be a magnet for Soviet attacks on both sides of Kotluban over the following months.
To avoid doing so again he shifted the axis of his main attack westward to the Samofalovka and 564 km Station regions due south of Kotluban, which was defended by elements of VIII Army Corps.
While these defenses were judged as being weaker, the Red Army troops would still be forced to attack across open steppe with only darkness and gullies (balkas) for cover from fire.
According to the Front's report for that day, "24th Army conducted attacks of local significance with part of its forces in the vicinity of Hill 130.7 and the Motor Tractor Station beginning at 1400 hours... but, encountering strong enemy resistance, had no success."
By the middle of the month 6th Army was beginning its successful drive against the Tractor Works inside the city, and a further effort was deemed necessary to divert German attention and reserves.
In light of the earlier costly failures Rokossovskii later admitted that he expected the assault to achieve very little:We were given permission to use seven infantry divisions from the GHQ Reserve for the operation but received no additional supporting means in the shape of artillery, armour, or aircraft.
The former renewed his attack on November 25 with the same shock group, now backed by the 233rd, and the depleted 16th Tanks still in the direct support role, in the Panshino area, but again made minimal progress.
In one such action on December 1 the 233rd seized Hill 121.3, also known as Vertyachy Kurgan, from the 131st Regiment of the 44th Infantry Division but was forced off by German counterattacks within 48 hours despite the arrival of reinforcements to try to leverage the success.
The next day Rokossovskii deliberately paused the main advance to replenish fuel and ammunition, but this shock group continued pushing into the gap in an effort to forestall the German divisions from setting up a new defense on the high ground anchored on Hill 120.0.
The German forces, backed by remnants of 14th Panzer Division (with most of its remaining tanks immobilized for lack of fuel), won the race and the situation stabilized for several days.
By the end of the second day troops of Don Front were entering the city proper from the west and south; the 27th and 67th Guards with the 23rd and 233rd Divisions converged on Aleksandrovka and the western half of Gorodishche, capturing both towns as well as Razgulaevka Station.
General Batov coordinated closely with that Army on recognition signals and radio call signs to ensure there were no friendly-fire incidents, especially with the 13th Guards and 284th Rifle Divisions.
[51] Despite the many daunting problems caused by the spring rasputitsa the 4th Guards Army resumed its offensive on April 5. on the right wing the 75th Corps finally reached the Kula River by day's end and tried to force it on a 20 km-wide sector between Krasnosheny and Brianovo, between 15 and 35 km west of Orhei but this effort was stymied by strong resistance from the 13th and 14th Panzer Divisions.
The troops that participated in battles with the enemy on the outskirts of Bucharest, by order of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of 31 August 1943 and a commendation in Moscow, are given a salute of 24 artillery salvoes by 324 guns.
On October 4 Soviet forces reached Pančevo on the north bank of the Danube 16 km downstream from Belgrade and on the 8th the railroad running into the city from the south was cut.
[64] The first attempt to break out of the bridgehead began at 1000 hours on November 19 following a 45-minute artillery preparation but this was not successful; the 74th and 233rd Divisions were accused of indecisiveness and lack of initiative.
Conditions were also extremely difficult, with the Danube's autumn flooding making many low-lying areas impassable and forcing attacking infantry to wade through cold water sometimes chest-deep.
[67] During the first days of December the Front's forces advanced into Hungary, although the STAVKA ordered it to go over to the defensive upon reaching the "Margarita Line" along the southeastern shore of Lake Balaton–Nagykanizsa–the mouth of the Mur River in the face of increasing resistance.
By the end of December 8 the 75th Corps was fighting for Somogyvisonta, Erdecsokonya, Somogytarnoca and Barcs while two battalions of the 703rd Regiment crossed the Drava back into Croatia to capture Virovitica.
The Cossacks launched a surprise attack in fog and, after crashing through the forward elements, encircled the 703rd Regiment, the flamethrower battalion, and part of the 684th Artillery in Pitomača.
Colonel Sidorenko was slow to react to these developments and by the time he got the 734th Regiment into action the 703rd had been defeated with considerable losses; the 684th also lost 42 personnel killed or captured, six 76mm cannon, five 122mm howitzers, 14 vehicles and 14 radio sets.
As an indication of the rapidly evolving situation on the Soviet side, the next day the 135th Rifle Corps headquarters was also subordinated to the Army and the two divisions shifted to its command.