Despite many shortages of equipment and specialist personnel, and a near-complete absence of formation training, the division joined the active army on July 15, thrown into the fighting near Smolensk.

At the start of Operation Typhoon on October 2 it was defending part of the sector attacked by 9th Army and 3rd Panzer Group south of Bely and was quickly overwhelmed.

After fighting in encirclement for most of the rest of the month its remaining men were able to break out and reach Soviet-held territory, but the losses were to too great to justify rebuilding and the division was disbanded.

It was soon assigned to block the German forces on the Mount Elbrus axis, and from January to October, 1943 took part in the long, attritional struggle for the Taman Peninsula, where it won a battle honor.

As part of the Separate Coastal Army it crossed into the Crimea and was decorated for its role in the liberation of Kerch in April 1944, and several of its subunits were also distinguished in the battles for Sevastopol.

After being transferred to 4th Ukrainian Front it fought through the Carpathian Mountains and into Czechoslovakia during the winter and spring of 1945, gaining further honors along its combat path.

In orders issued by Timoshenko at 0240 hours on July 26 the division was to attack toward Chalishchev, Berezovka, and Boldino and retake the region around the latter place, 30km south-southwest of Bely.

But they are there, and if we smash a dozen of them, the Russians simply put up another dozen.Timoshenko began planning for a renewed effort on August 14 which was intended to recapture Dukhovshchina en route to Smolensk.

In the event, due to the chaotic situation, Timoshenko was forced to conduct the operation in piecemeal fashion and was unable to establish close cooperation with Zhukov.

The Army was to protect its right flank toward Bely with the 250th Division, penetrate the German defense and then commit the mobile forces to encircle the objective from the west.

However, by the end of the day word had reached Timoshenko that 22nd Army, which was supposed to be advancing south of Velikiye Luki, was in fact facing defeat from the forces of 3rd Panzer Group moving northward.

At 0145 hours on August 25 Khomenko dispatched a warning order to his subordinates which included:242nd RD - defend the Staroe Morokhovo and Novoe Morokhovo sector to protect the right flank of the army's shock group and attack toward Churkino and Kostino on the left wing.Near the end of the day it was reported that the division, "overcoming fierce enemy resistance", captured the eastern outskirts of Erkhovo by 1700, before beginning fighting to capture the rest of the village.

[14] Timoshenko, determined to carry out his design and press the advantages he had won, issued orders to Western Front to prepare to resume the offensive on September 1 after regrouping.

Despite generally poor results for his Army on this first day, Khomenko ordered the division to concentrate its main effort on September 2 toward Hill 215.2 and Churkino in cooperation with the 162nd, beginning at 0800.

As the offensive ran down, at 1700 hours the next day Khomenko was able to report that the 242nd had partly enveloped Churkino from the north, south and east and was fighting to capture the strongpoint.

In a report produced by the Army's military council on September 6 the division was criticized for poor collection of intelligence, to the point of appointing a procurator to investigate if criminal proceedings would be justified.

Khomenko decided to fire a preemptive artillery bombardment between 1100 and 1130 hours on October 1 in an effort to disrupt the German forces which, by then, were clearly massing against his left flank.

Almost every soldier of the Battalion was killed in the unequal struggle, but they refused to abandon their positions; the radio operator, who was reporting the situation to regimental headquarters, announced in his final message, "I'm blowing up the set.

Boldin's Group was largely intercepted by advancing German forces (significantly underestimated in numbers by Western Front) long before reaching its assembly areas.

It was later learned that this was a fake reply broadcast from a German transmitter, but it held the division in place until noon on October 6 when Kovalenko took the decision to destroy its heavy weapons and break out to the east.

The Group's forces immediately crossed to the right bank of the Northern Donets River in the Savintsy area and took the remnants of 64th Tank Brigade under command.

During May 24–27 Group Sherstiuk repeatedly and unsuccessfully attempted to break through the German defenses covering Chepel in the face of heavy machine gun fire and powerful air attacks.

At the same time, Group Sherstiuk managed to penetrate the outer encirclement on a front about 1,000m wide against stiff resistance, and over the following hours some 22,000 Red Army officers and men were able to escape through the narrow corridor.

This effort unhinged the defenses of Southwestern Front and 38th Army was authorized to retreat from the Oskil to a line situated 35–40 km to the east along the Aidar River.

By around August 24 the sudden advance of the German mountain troops had finally galvanized the STAVKA and the Front into forming a more rational plan of defenses for this key region.

The second group was to attack northward through Tabac State Farm to cut communications routes 3 km west of Krimskaia, However, the 242nd was unable to reach its jumping-off positions on schedule due to heavy rains and poor road conditions.

By mid-March it was clear that the Soviet advance had been completely halted by 17th Army's defensive positions, known as the "Blue Line", and preparations began for a major assault to break the German front.

Lisinov had previously led the 217th Reserve Rifle Regiment; he would remain in command for the duration of the war and would be made a major general on November 17.

The troops who participated in the liberation of Sevastopol, by the order of the Supreme High Command of 10 May 1944, and a commendation in Moscow, are given a salute of 24 artillery salvoes from 324 guns.

On March 22 the Front's forces began striking west toward Ratibor, which was abandoned by Army Group Center on the 30th in order to prevent a breakthrough to Moravian Ostrava.