In the Rzhev-Sychyovka offensive that began at the end of July it took part in the liberation of Zubtsov in August but was stymied at the gates of Rzhev along with the rest of Western Front's forces.

During the Soviet summer offensive the division advanced through northeastern Ukraine and into Belarus, taking part in the battles along the Dniepr and Sozh River in the vicinity of Gomel.

[6] Marshal S. K. Timoshenko, commander of Western Front, began planning for a renewed effort toward Smolensk on August 14 which was intended to recapture Dukhovshchina en route to the city.

In the event, due to the chaotic situation, Timoshenko was forced to conduct the operation in piecemeal fashion and was unable to establish close cooperation with Zhukov.

Timoshenko issued his first report on the operation to the STAVKA at about 1030 hours on August 17, in which his chief of staff reported:246th RD was dispatched by 1000 hours on 17 August on 11 trains, of which 5 have been unloaded and 3 are still loading.In a further report the next morning it was noted that one rifle regiment had arrived the previous day and was concentrating in Army reserve in the Turlachikha, Pichevakha and Mikhalevo region and that its remaining trains were continuing to arrive.

In an operational summary issued at 2000 hours it was stated that, after unloading, the division was to concentrate in the Uste, Petugovo and Anashchiki region, 18 km north-northwest of Ilyino.

[8] On August 20 Maslennikov began reporting German reinforcements arriving behind the left flank of their 9th Army; apparently gained by air reconnaissance these were likely forces of LVII Motorized Corps regrouping toward Velikiye Luki.

On August 23 the Army attempted to continue its attacks but by the end of the day unsettling news from the Velikiye Luki area was forcing Timoshenko to alter his plans significantly.

It attempted to join the attack the next day with one rifle regiment engaged with as many as two German infantry battalions plus tanks in the vicinity Trofimovo in the defile between the lakes but withdrew part of this force to Zapenkove by 1300 hours.

Focused on cobbling together a force that could prevent the fall of Moscow, at 0200 hours on October 10 the STAVKA ordered seven rifle divisions pulled out of Western Front's right wing, including the 243rd and 246th from 29th Army.

Maslennikov was now to cross the Volga with five divisions, including the 246th, some 15 km south-southwest of Kalinin and from there link up with 30th Army, which was supposed to be attacking toward the city from the southeast, thus cutting off XXXXI Corps.

He then disregarded his orders from Konev and directed most of the 246th plus three other divisions (119th, 243rd, 252nd) to move north on the west bank of the river to cut the road between Kalinin and Marino.

The next day the regiment was reported as having been "driven into the Volga", but the war diary 3rd Panzer Group correctly noted that it had actually retreated toward Kalinin, which at least eased the German supply situation somewhat.

This brigade, with minimal fuel and ammunition, was ordered to abandon Mednoye and fight its way out between the road and the Tma River; this turned out to be the first Soviet soil to be permanently liberated during the war.

[18] Late on October 20 the XXXXI Corps reported that the 914th Regiment's bridgehead had been disposed of by 6th Infantry Division, although "the escape of some of the enemy on the eastern bank in a northeast direction must be assumed."

Continuing to push east it then took Krasnovo, less than 5 km from the vital German-held airfield at Migalovo; attacking without artillery support the leading battalion suffered up to 50 percent casualties.

The immediate aim was to free the German troops encircled in the Olenino area and the close the gap through which supplies were flowing to 29th and 39th Armies and the 11th Cavalry Corps.

Despite strenuous efforts to ensure timely regrouping and concentration of Central Front's forces into their assembly areas and jumping-off positions for the offensive, persistent poor weather and deteriorating road conditions caused delay.

Over the next five days the Front staged a two-pronged thrust northward on either side of Chernihiv which collapsed the flank of 2nd Army, allowing it to advance north toward Gomel.

By this point, the offensive had unhinged all of Army Group Center's defenses in southern Belorussia, and Soviet forces were exploiting into a 20 km-wide gap.

[49] On December 9 the STAVKA ordered Rokossovskii to transfer six divisions, starting with the 140th, 149th and 246th, to 1st Ukrainian Front, which had liberated Kyiv and was defending a large strategic bridgehead against strong German counterattacks.

The troops who participated in the liberation of Shumsk and other cities, by the order of the Supreme High Command of 5 March 1944, and a commendation in Moscow, are given a salute of 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns.

The 15th and 28th Corps were concentrated on a 4 km-wide sector and were to penetrate the German defense from the grove of trees north of Trostianets to Bzovitsa and develop the attack in the general direction Sokolovka and Lviv.

The operation began with reconnaissance actions on July 13, and the shock groups went over to the attack at 1600 hours the next day; the 28th and 15th Corps fought along the line from Perepelniki to Oleiouv.

By this time the Army's lead forces had wedged to a depth of 14–16 km into the German defenses and the following morning the 3rd Guards Tank was committed into the breach.

During the following day the 28th Corps continued beating off counterattacks by up to a battalion of infantry and 10-11 tanks at a time and reached the northern outskirts of Volchkovtse to Yaroslavitse.

[61] During the Vistula-Oder Offensive 60th Army began a deep exploitation to the west, through southern Poland, and on January 26, 1945, the Corps drove off German rearguards on the approaches to the Auschwitz concentration camp, which was liberated the next day by the 322nd Rifle Division.

Upon the arrival of his Front's main group of forces in the Neisse area the 59th and 60th Armies were to develop the attack from the bridgehead north of Ratibor to the west and southwest.

The joint offensive began on March 25 but still failed to be decisive, in part because 10th Guards Tanks was considerably understrength, and the German forces held advantageous terrain.

Meanwhile, on March 24 the 38th Army of 4th Ukrainian Front began attacking in the direction of Moravian Ostrava, and within days had advanced to a point where the German Ratibor grouping was faced with encirclement.