It and its subunits won several decorations and honors for its role in crossing the Oder before taking part in the Lower Silesian Offensive, in which it helped isolate the German garrison of Glogau before advancing west to the Neisse River.

In common with most of the divisions formed in this District in July and August it was desperately short of machine guns, heavy weapons, trucks, and basic communications gear;[3] the absence of an antitank battalion is noteworthy.

[4] The situation was not improved when the 1st Panzer Group overran the Kryvyi Rih area on August 15, and although the division was identified at the front by German intelligence it was probably never completely formed.

[7] In mid-October the STAVKA, hard-pressed on the approaches to Moscow and with few available reserves, ordered the Southwestern and Southern Fronts to establish a new defense line along the Oskol, Northern Donets, and Mius rivers between October 17–30.

[9] As it turned out, due to the ground hardening as the freeze set in, Col. Gen. E. von Kleist, commander of 1st Panzer, had also selected November 17 for the resumption of his drive on Rostov.

Timoshenko reported to the STAVKA at 1730 that the German attack likely aimed "to secure the Barvenkovo, Izium region and attempt to cut off [our] offensive on Kharkov from the south.

By the following afternoon the remaining Red Army forces were crowded into a 16 km-by-3 km pocket along the Bereka River valley; the remnants of the 253rd was withdrawing with 6th Cavalry Corps in the area of Mikhailovka under pressure from 23rd Panzer and the 113th Infantry Division.

On September 20, as the Army was approaching the Dniepr River, the division was noted as being among its strongest, with 5,035 personnel, 55 medium and 19 heavy mortars, ten regimental guns, 19 76mm cannon and 12 122mm howitzers.

40th Army was committed to a pinning attack out of the bridgehead on November 1; this diversion began with 40 minutes of artillery and airstrikes and 47th Corps was able to take the village of Kanada.

The fighting continued into November 5 and achieved little more than drawing the 2nd SS Panzer Division out of reserve but by the next day it was clear that Kyiv was about to be liberated from Lyutezh and the 40th and 27th Armies were ordered to maintain the impression of a coming attack with false troop concentrations and dummy tanks.

On the night of November 11/12 the headquarters of 47th Corps was withdrawn from the Bukryn bridgehead to the left bank along with the 253rd and 68th Guards Rifle Division, with the intention that they would recross in the Kailov area.

On the evening of January 10 he called a conference at Batov's command post, which included officers of 61st Army as well:He said that the unsuccessful beginning of the operation was the result of the forces' stereotypical actions.

Snowy weather forced cancellation of the air support, but the artillery preparation began at noon, this time only long enough for the tanks to reach the forward German trenches.

The troops who participated in the liberation of Mozyr and Kalinkovichi, by the order of the Supreme High Command of 14 January 1944, and a commendation in Moscow, are given a salute of 20 artillery salvoes from 224 guns.

[55] Overnight on January 15/16 the 19th Rifle Corps began a stealthy advance across the Ipa, penetrating the positions of 707th Security, which had just been reinforced by battalion groups from the 35th Infantry Division.

Elements of 82nd Rifle Division seized the village of Novoselki after a see-saw battle and the remaining defenders withdrew westward through heavily forested swampland.

The 253rd and 132nd, plus the 75th Guards, which had been held as the Army reserve, reinforced the 19th Corps to advance eastward and westward and seize ground north of Savichi and Syshchichi to the west.

3rd Guards Army continued to attack, against resistance, to the northwest, rolling up the German lines along the river; elements of the 21st and 76th Corps, actively assisted by 25th Tanks, advanced 6 km during the day.

Despite desperate German efforts the 3rd Guards Army persistently threw them out of one inhabited locale after another and by the end of the day units of 21st Corps had outflanked the city from the north, east and south.

Thus the decision was made to encircle it and leave behind the 329th Rifle Division to blockade the fortress while the remaining forces of the Army's shock group continued the offensive.

The remainder of 21st Corps, with the 25th Tanks, completed cutting off the Glogau garrison before continuing to advance westward to roll up the defense along the Oder beginning on February 12.

On the morning of the 17th the tankers, in cooperation with units of 21st Corps, crushed the resistance of the "Matterstock" Special Designation Division and advanced 12 km toward Guben and on February 18 seized the Forstadt suburb.

Altogether as a result of the fighting during February 15–20 the 3rd Guards Army had crushed German resistance along the Bóbr and reached the Neisse with its right flank along a 10 km sector.

On April 18 the Corps, still in the same configuration, forced the Fliess Canal in heavy fighting, broke through the second defensive zone and, by day's end had gained a line from Hasow to the eastern outskirts of Karen to Frauendorf, having reached the Spree River in this area after another advance of 8 km.

With the support of this advance the 3rd Guards Tank Army managed to cut the German grouping's retreat route to the west and pinned it to the Spree's swampy flood plain.

T. Busse, received orders from Hitler on April 25 to break through the encirclement ring and attack in the direction of Halbe in an effort to link up with 12th Army, which was operating southwest of Berlin.

On April 27 Gordov was ordered to preempt the formation of another breakthrough group by attacking with his first echelon divisions from the south and west in the general direction of Münchehofe.

At dawn, following heavy fighting, the German grouping managed to break through the 21st and 40th Corps, reach the Staatsforst Stachow woods and cut the highway 3km southeast of Tornow.

Taking advantage of this breach, despite powerful artillery and mortar fire from north and south, German forces began to break out, first in small groups and then in entire columns, to the Staatsforst Kummersdorf woods.

[87] Overnight, the Army commanders of 1st Ukrainian Front undertook a number of measures directed at preventing any further German advance to the west and finally eliminating the pocketed forces.