This strongly held German position needed to be secured in order to facilitate the next phase of the Somme offensive, the Battle of Bazentin Ridge.

[4] Historian Peter Simkins wrote that Kitchener held the Territorial Force in disdain, calling it an ill-trained "Town Clerk's Army", and this was partially why he set up a parallel recruitment system.

[6] This thought quickly picked up support from politicians and from Kitchener; a Welsh Army Corps of two divisions totalling 50,000 men was approved on 10 October.

Final training took place and limited instruction was given on tactics for trench warfare, on the assumption that practical experience would be easier to gain in France.

[31][32][33] Hughes commented that Philipps's political appointment "can hardly have improved his standing" and that he was viewed as a "jumped-up ex-Indian Army major who had no right to a divisional command",[31] who had received his position via his association with Lloyd George.

Units of the division took turns on the front line, maintained positions, conducted trench raids and were subjected to German bombardments, all of which allowed the men to gain experience of active service conditions.

[21][26][27][34] During this period Captain Goronwy Owen of the 15th RWF carried out a trench raid into no man's land, where he located a party of German soldiers who had just finished laying barbed wire.

Farr states that Horne's account to Haig was self-serving, did no justice "to the difficulties confronting the troops on the ground", and did not acknowledge the failure of the bombardment.

[56] Despite the losses, the three battalions of the Welsh regiment were able to form a cohesive line defending the edge of the wood and repulsed strong German counter-attacks.

The subsequent bombardment to support the attack fell short in places, hitting British troops and provoking German artillery fire.

The difficulty of wood fighting was not appreciated at the time, and Farr wrote that the reputation of the division suffered due to the repeated interference by Horne in matters best left to the divisional or brigade staff and his "inexperience of battlefield command at this level".

At the same time, aerial reconnaissance and infantry patrols by the division confirmed that the British preliminary barrage had forced the Germans back to their second line positions.

The 14th Welsh then rushed Iron Cross Ridge and engaged in hand-to-hand combat to seize the position, before pushing on to capture a dressing station.

Fighting continued throughout the day, with the forward British battalions forced to pull back beyond the Steenbeck; German attempts to retake further territory were thwarted.

The divisional history described the scene: "the men who had been lying in shell-holes which were gradually filling with water found great difficulty in getting out and advancing and keeping up with the barrage".

Using what had been learned "thorough previous reconnaissance", in addition to sniping, it was "possible to move about unmolested in exposed trenches or even in the open" in front of the German lines.

[96] After the first ten days of the German offensive, the casualties suffered by the 2nd and the 47th (London) Divisions were such that the 38th was ordered south to take up positions near Albert to relieve the two formations.

[101] The division attempted an abortive attack on another German-held ridge and conducted several raids on the German lines, before they were withdrawn for a short break on 20 May.

[107] The 113th Brigade crossed the river via bridges in Albert and assaulted Unsa Hill 1 mile (1.6 km) to the north-east, taking 194 prisoners, three artillery pieces and seven machine guns.

On 3 September, having noticed a weakness in the German positions, elements of the 13th and 14th Welsh stormed across the canal and cleared the eastern bank allowing the rest of the 114th Brigade to cross.

The troops were held up by undetected barbed wire and heavy German fire until 11:30, when they disengaged and pressed forward exploiting the success of the 115th Brigade.

The divisional history commented that the attack "progressed rapidly and resulted in a complete rout of the enemy" and that the brigade was able to achieve its final objective on the Prémont–Esnes road.

The footbridges were brought forward and the river crossed with ease but, the divisional history commented, the "railway embankment on the far side was a much greater natural obstacle" due to heavy rain and was "heavily wired" and defended.

From the start of the Hundred Day Offensive until the signing of the armistice on 11 November, the division had advanced 60 miles (97 km), taken 3,102 prisoners, seized 520 machine guns and captured 50 mortars and 43 artillery pieces.

[143] Historian Gary Sheffield commented that, since the division was "employed on trench-holding duties from September 1917 to July 1918", it likely "was not regarded by GHQ as an elite 'storm' formation".

In addition, Sheffield cited improved staff work and tactical doctrine and high morale, which had led to the ability of the division to carry out effective combined arms operations.

To avoid war, the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain met with German Chancellor Adolf Hitler in September and brokered the Munich Agreement.

[166][175] Michael Glover and Jonathan Riley note that while in reserve, the Royal Welch Fusiliers battalions of the 115th Brigade took part in coastal defence duties.

[176] The division spent 1943 and early 1944 moving around the country spending time in Kent, Hertfordshire and Northumberland, and were assigned to II and XII Corps.

[183][f] The remaining 4,800 men were considered ineligible for service abroad at that time for a variety of reasons, including a lack of training, or being medically unfit.