[2][3] One such unit was the Metropolitan Artillery Volunteers raised in Islington, North London, on 12 September 1861 by Charles Wilde, 2nd Lord Truro and known as 'Truro's Tigers'.
[a] It was numbered as the 3rd Middlesex Artillery Volunteer Corps (AVC), and competition to join was so great that it was able to set a minimum height standard of 5 foot 11 inches (1.8 m).
[8] After mobilisation the 2nd London Division's artillery brigades moved to the country round Hemel Hempstead, Berkhamsted and Kings Langley in Hertfordshire to begin war training.
[7][20][27][28] At the end of October 1914 the 2nd London Division was chosen to reinforce the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) fighting on the Western Front and training was stepped up, despite bad weather and equipment shortages.
The attackers ran into devastating machine gun fire (there was no artillery barrage to suppress the defenders) and they found that the wire was inadequately cut and the breastworks barely touched.
A renewed bombardment was ordered from 06.15 to 07.00, but the artillery's forward observation officers (FOOs) were unable to locate the hidden German machine gun positions, which required a direct hit from an HE shell to be put out of action.
The second attack failed as badly as the first, as did two others launched during the afternoon, and the survivors were pinned down in No man's land until nightfall, despite a further bombardment being laid on to allow them to withdraw.
[30][31][32] Although 2nd London Division suffered few casualties at Aubers Ridge, its gunners had learned a sobering lesson about the impossibility of suppressing strong defences with inadequate guns and shells.
Massy's Group fired continuously on the German front line and Cité St Pierre behind, supporting 142nd (6th London) Brigade on the right; the wire was well cut and having reached their objectives among the mining spoil-tips, the infantry formed a defensive flank south of Loos, which it held resolutely.
Later that winter, while in action near North Maroc, No 1 gun-pit of the battery suffered direct hits on two successive days, losing the whole gun crew each time.
During the night the gun pits were shelled with gas, but on 22 May the artillery duel began to swing towards the British, with fresh batteries brought in, despite their shortage of ammunition.
However, the tanks proved useless in the tangled tree stumps of High Wood, and the artillery could not bombard the German front line because No man's land was so narrow.
Casualties among the attacking infantry were extremely heavy, but they succeeded in capturing High Wood and the gun batteries began to move up in support, crossing deeply-cratered ground.
On 16 January 1917 a German attack was anticipated, and the divisional artillery, together with that of 23rd and 41st Divisions and the Corps and Army heavy guns, carried out an intense bombardment, which brought considerable enemy retaliation.
[54] Several weeks before the Battle of Messines (7 June) the artillery had begun destructive shoots on various points in the enemy lines and communications, and began wire-cutting in May.
The enemy response was fierce: on one day 200 heavy shells fell on the position of D/CCXXXV Bty and its neighbour, scoring 12 hits on trenches, wagons and living quarters.
[55][56][57] After Messines the division was withdrawn for training, and following a short spell back in the line at Hill 60 it was in reserve for the opening of the Third Ypres Offensive on 31 July.
The British defences were not a continuous trench line, but a series of platoon or company strongpoints, the area between each to be covered by the artillery and machine guns.
[62] CCXXXV Brigade had been out of the line training in mobile warfare, but A Bty was on call to send up sections at 15 minutes' notice for anti-tank duties if required.
During the night orders came to join 51st (Highland) Division, but when Aschwanden and his adjutant went to reconnoitre the position they found it already in front of the British line after the fighting of 21 March.
From now on the battle was constantly moving, and the British divisions began sending forward all-arms brigade groups including artillery batteries to clear strongholds and round up prisoners as they advanced.
Although the Master-General of the Ordnance, Major-General Sir Stanley von Donop, was pleased with their work and promised them the first guns available, it was not until February 1915 that some old 15-pdrs arrived for training.
The artillery was mostly engaged in suppressing troublesome German trench mortars (Minenwerfers) by firing short concentrated bombardments on specific sectors of the enemy line.
The regiment blamed a French withdrawal and lack of air support for the failure of the operation, but it is now recognised that the Arras counter-attack seriously delayed the German advance.
5th Divisional artillery was concentrated and did 'much execution' to the attackers but by late afternoon on 23 May the enemy were across in strength, despite having their bridges destroyed several times by the gunners.
[115][116] 5th Division landed at Reggio di Calabria on 3 September 1943, covered by artillery fire from the opposite side of the Straits of Messina, and then advanced up the coast road to meet US Fifth Army.
The division's 'silent' assault crossing (without artillery fire) on the night of 17/18 January 1944 using beach landing techniques was successful in establishing a firm bridgehead that was held against enemy counter-attacks with the support of the guns, but without further troops it was impossible to advance further.
After a period of rest and reorganisation, followed by internal security duty in Palestine from July 1944 to February 1945, 5th Division was chosen for Operation Goldflake whereby troops from the Mediterranean theatre were transferred to reinforce 21st Army Group fighting in the final stages of the campaign in North West Europe.
During the fighting on the Escaut 140th Fd Rgt was in action with 42nd (East Lancashire) Infantry Division at Wannehain, where it suffered a number of casualties and had three guns knocked out by enemy shellfire.
On 29 May the enemy closed in with tanks: five of these were knocked out before the remainder forced their way into the town, and German infantry attacked troop command posts until they were driven out by the gunners.