[3] Training began in the desert at Khataba, north west of Cairo[4] and was focused on tank operations and integrating the Rhodesian elements into the division.

[9] The South African Brigade held these positions until after the fall of Monte Cassino and the breakout from the Anzio beachhead, when they were withdrawn and reunited with the division.

After Rome had been taken by the Allies in early June 1944, the division was ordered to move up the Via Casalina to take over the spearhead of the Eighth Army's British XIII Corps.

[12] The division advanced with the Tiber River to the east and Lake Bolsena to the west at a rate of 10 miles (16 km) per day, outstripping their flanking units.

[13] On 10 June the Armoured Brigade which was leading the advance, came up against the anti-tank screen of the newly arrived German 365th Infantry Division south of Celleno.

For the first (and only) time Brigadier Furstenburg was able to deploy all three of his armoured regiments and his motorised infantry battalion in battle to gain an important victory.

This prompted Prime Minister Smuts, who had been meeting the British Chiefs of Staff on 21 June, to divert his aircraft to Orvieto airfield on his way back to South Africa to discuss the political and military consequences of this event with the division command.

The division advanced in two columns through Rapolano and Palazzuolo until they encountered the LXXVI Panzer Corps on the Georg Line, a delaying position on the north side of Route 73.

[17] The South African Division had been stopped on the left flank with the two Infantry Brigades spread over a 10-mile (16 km) front, the armour having been withdrawn into reserve because of the difficult terrain.

[20]On 20 July General Kirkman, XIII Corps commander, issued orders for a "...powerful thrust to seize all crossings across the River Arno to the west of Florence.

[23] Kirkman again placed the South African and New Zealand Divisions as the spearhead of his Corps advance, this time to break the Paula Line and to take Florence.

[24] General Harold Alexander, commander of Allied Armies in Italy, had indicated that he had no intention of fighting in Florence and so Kirkman gave orders for the by-passing of the city.

[25] On 31 July the heavy artillery support for the attack had resulted in an ammunition shortage and Kirkman ordered a 24-hour pause for fresh supplies to arrive.

By 4 August, advance parties were exploring the outskirts of Florence to find that all bridges across the Arno River viable for military transport had been destroyed.

[36] General Pool, observing the lack of resistance ahead of the division, encouraged a rapid advance, but this was countermanded in order not to compromise the surprise of the main 5th Army attack north of Florence.

[37] The order to wait and hold the Albano Massif until further notice was deeply resented by the division command and was considered representative of the persistent inflexibility displayed by the Fifth Army leadership.

As part of the plan, the 6th SA Armoured Division was ordered to advance along Route 64 leading to Vergato and Bologna and to capture the twin peaks of Monte Sole and Caprara di Marzabotto.

Two days of extended fighting in drenching rain against elements of the 36th SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment brought no break through and Poole then decided to pause and prepare a divisional attack on the mountain, to be led by 12th Mot Bde with 11th Armd and Guards Brigades in support.

Combat Command B was to advance on Route 64, the 24th Guards Brigade along the Setta Valley road, with 11th and 12th Bdes covering the high ground between the two.

[6] The battle had been fierce for all the division's troops involved and in the succeeding successful exploitation of Monte Caprara heavy losses were incurred.

On 21 April, 11th Armd Brigade, who were supporting the U.S. 349th Engineering Regiment, converged on the centre of the town of San Matteo della Decima.

Soon furious house-to-house fighting erupted which continued until nightfall and resulted in several tanks being destroyed by fire from German Panzerfaust rockets.

Poole committed all available South African troops to flush out German snipers and anti-tank positions and by 22 April all resistance had ceased.

[65] After advancing through the Po River Valley, the division was assembled southwest of Treviso on 29 April and were instructed to move far to the west to garrison the city of Milan.

[66] General Mark Clark, the 15th Army Group commander, commented on the division's achievements during the Spring Offensive, stating: It was a battle-wise outfit, bold and aggressive against the enemy, and willing to do whatever job was necessary.

Neither did Smuts, who made it clear that the Union of South Africa intended to do its part in the War – and it most certainly did.General Mark W. Clark, Calculated Risk.

[6] On 16 July, the Italian Cremona and Mantova Battle Groups were placed under command of the division to assist in these duties, allowing some of the battalions to be withdrawn for repatriation to South Africa.

[71] The staging depot at Helwan north of Cairo was soon overcrowded and the number of troops being flown back to South Africa were substantially lower than had been planned.

Food was in short supply and the standard of discipline deteriorated further as men arriving at the depot were split up alphabetically and were not retained in their unit structures.

[71] By 25 January 1946, 101,676 men had been ferried back to South Africa[72] and the last aircraft left Egypt on 26 February 1946, carrying Major General Evered Poole who arrived in Durban on 2 March 1946.