[11][12][13] The villa was hosting a gathering attended by high-ranking elders of the Habar Gidir and other major subclans, along with prominent members of the Aidid-led Somali National Alliance (SNA).

[9][23] The 12 July operation was heavily criticized by UNOSOM II's own Justice Division,[24][11] Doctors Without Borders,[21] Human Rights Watch,[18] Amnesty International,[17] and the Organization of African Unity.

Though General Mohammed Farah Aidid was not directly named in Resolution 837, his political organization, the Somali National Alliance was blamed; subsequent investigation concluded that the SNA was most likely behind the attack.

[12][31] In the days and weeks following the commencement of military operations, UNOSOM had (via radio broadcast and propaganda leaflets dropped over Mogadishu) made the clear distinction that it was not the enemy of the Habar Gidir clan, but only wanted to capture Aidid.

[34] Unlike in previous raids, Çevik Bir, his deputy US Lieutenant General Thomas M. Montgomery, and other coalition military leaders decided, after weeks of agonizing, not to issue any warnings prior to the attack.

[38][36] Sebastian Kaempf, a Senior Lecturer at the University of Queensland's Political Science department, argued that by not issuing a warning, UNOSOM II leadership had concluded that military necessity and the perceived risk of US casualties had overruled concerns for Somali civilians.

[43][44] On July 9, 1993, a handful of prominent Somalis, including Sheikh Haji Mohamed Iman Aden, the most senior member of the Habar Gidir clan, and former Deputy Prime Minister Abdiqasim Salad Hassan, met with US Admiral Johnathan Howe, the special representative of the UN Secretary-General in Somalia.

[20][53][54][55] According to Black Hawk Down author Mark Bowden: "...[a]ll leaders and elders of Habr Gidr clan [were present], most of whom were opposed to the military posture that Aideed was taking against the UN.

"[20] The conference to discuss Howe's peace initiative included high-ranking elders, intellectuals, businessmen, former judges, military officers, representatives of women's organizations, and other notable clansmen of the Habar Gidir clan.

[57][50][49][52][56][45] Representatives and notable figures of other Somali clans were present such as the:[18][58][45] Abdi Qeybdiid's villa was selected for the talks, as it possessed a large carpeted conference room on the second floor capable of holding a gathering of over a hundred people.

[50][63][1][64] The AH-1 Cobras launched the TOWs into the second floor of the villa where the conference was taking place, then specifically targeted the building's stairwells to block any escape routes and finally aimed for the roof in an attempt to crush the occupants.

[34] Also among those killed were civilians who were not directly participating in the conference such as multiple women who had been serving tea for gathering, children who had happened to be playing in the villa's courtyard, and nearby pedestrians who had been hit by stray 20mm rounds.

[27][34] The UN account, detailed in the Blue Book, claims that it took nine minutes for troops to clear the area, search the villa, and depart, all while leaving earlier than expected, marking the Abdi House raid as the fastest operation that had been conducted by UNOSOM II.

[78] A significant amount of the international press on the incident was primarily focused on the deaths of the four journalists—Dan Eldon, Hos Maina, Hansi Kraus, and Anthony Macharia–with less attention paid to the UN attack that had preceded it.

[87][88] According to Washington Post correspondent Keith Richburg, the actual casualty count was possibly higher as only two medical facilities in the entire city were canvassed, and since many Somalis follow the Islamic tradition of burying the dead immediately.

[41][7][53] In his research for Black Hawk Down, Bowden discovered that numerous interviewees, encompassing non-Somali aid workers, asserted that many of those killed in the attack were well-respected Habar Gidir moderates who had opposed Aidid.

"[12] The reason for the meeting, how many people were killed and even the very inhabitants of the house at the time is disputed by UNOSOM officials who claimed that the conference was a gathering of an SNA war council at a major command and control center, and that the operation was a tactical success.

"[85] In the view of Patrick Vial, a Doctors Without Borders France Coordinator in Somalia, the operation was particularly appalling because it targeted a building where a meeting of representatives of civil society was taking place.

[25][108][21] In Kenya, one of the countries largest papers, The Standard, ran a headline aimed at the UN titled, Who Are the Warlords Now?, and Kenyan state-run TV and radio broadcasting announced that it was joining other nations who were calling for a review of the UN's armed policy.

[116] The Social Democrats in Germany pushed against Chancellor Helmut Kohl’s offer to send a contingent of 1,600 German soldiers to Somalia, the first overseas deployment since the Second World War, and further called for it to be entirely withdrawn.

[61] The day following the raid former British Prime Minister Edward Heath criticized the UN, claiming that the emphasis on military operations was costing innocent lives and fuelling hatred for the West.

[127] The Italians, who had ruled Somalia as a colonial territory for half a century, believed that the unprecedented attack against the Habar Gidir threatened to widen the civil war and turn the Somalis against the entire UN peacekeeping force.

[132] American envoy to Somalia, Robert B. Oakley, stated that after the raid countries such as Italy, France, and Zimbabwe, as well as other UNOSOM contingents, ceased their participation in operations against Aidid upon receiving orders from their respective governments.

[11][134][5] At least nine UN civilian employees in Mogadishu working for the humanitarian sector either resigned or walked away from their posts in protest, including the top UNOSOM Justice Division official in Somalia, Ann Wright.

[48] Abdiqasim Salad Hassan, a prominent member of the Habar Gidir (later president of the Transitional National Government during the early 2000's), had used his influence in the clan to press for diplomatic resolution to the war with UNOSOM and had met with Admiral Howe before the attack, but gave up his efforts following the raid.

[57] To the Habar Gidir, including the former moderates and even other clans that had formerly opposed them, the attack marked a declaration of outright war from the United States and signified the point where a diplomatic solution to the "Somalia problem" had become inconceivable.

[22][41] In the notes for Black Hawk Down, Mark Bowden found while researching the book that the attack stirred up deep anger among Somalis from all walks of life that he interviewed in Mogadishu.

[154][155] In the weeks following 12 July, parts of the city turned into near-anarchy as UNOSOM positions all over Mogadishu were directly assaulted on a daily basis, forcing many foreign troops to withdraw into UN compounds.

[170][100] The raid was the first time the UNOSOM II forces in Somalia had deliberately targeted people instead of buildings or armaments caches, marking a decisive turning point in what had until then been a low-level intensity conflict.

[103][9] The events of Bloody Monday led Aidid to make the decision to specifically target American soldiers for the first time and resulted in the August 8, 1993, killings of US troops[170] that pushed President Clinton to send in Delta Force and the Rangers to capture him.