Investigators found that the primary cause of the accident was adverse weather conditions encountered by the flight, and contributing factors included crew error, air traffic controller error, and the lack of equipment that could detect wind shear conditions at airports.

Investigators determined that an unauthorized student pilot in the cockpit who was flying the plane during the takeoff caused the crew to be distracted, leading to a loss of situational awareness.

The crew failed to react to dangerous weather conditions that were developing, and did not notice irregularities in the airspeed indicators that could have alerted them to potential hazards.

The sole air traffic controller on duty at the airport at the time also failed to notify the aircraft of rapidly deteriorating weather conditions.

The accident and the subsequent investigation led to changes in Mexican aviation regulations to prevent unassigned crew members from being present in the cockpit of an aircraft at any time during a flight.

[1][2] Originally scheduled to leave at 2:56 p.m. Central Time (UTC−06:00), the departure was slightly delayed when the first officer observed a fuel leak from the number one engine and asked maintenance crews to investigate.

As the plane taxied, rain started to fall with increasing intensity, accompanied by strong gusts of wind.

After it reached a speed of 147 knots (169 mph; 272 km/h), the pilot flying the plane rotated the controls to bring the aircraft airborne, and raised the gear when the craft was two feet (0.61 m) above the runway.

The plane rapidly lost airspeed and altitude, and an audible alarm of "DON'T SINK" sounded in the cockpit.

[3]: 18  Galván completed his captain training for the Embraer E-Jet series in June 2017 and had logged 1,064 hours in the type.

[3]: 18  He occupied the left-hand seat in the cockpit during the flight, and suffered serious injuries in the accident, requiring hip and spine surgery which doctors called successful.

The senior flight attendant had been employed by the airline since June 2012 and suffered a fractured lumbar vertebra.

[3]: 21  The junior flight attendant had been employed by the airline for about a week and received minor injuries in the crash.

[11] Some passengers said that a door had been torn off and that plane's fuselage had broken in two, allowing them to jump directly out of a gap in the side of the aircraft.

[10] Shortly afterward, Mexico's Directorate General of Civil Aeronautics (DGAC) issued a change in regulations that prohibited airlines from allowing inactive pilots and flight attendants from flying in the cockpit of aircraft.

[21][22] Aeroméxico pilots opposed this change and called for a strike, viewing the sudden removal of a travel benefit as a violation of their collective bargaining agreement between the union and the airline.

[21][23] After negotiations, the union representing the pilots agreed to a change in the agreement, where all non-working flight crews will have reserved seats in the main cabin, and continue to be denied access to the cockpit.

He said that the pilots had not received any notice of the adverse conditions prior to starting the takeoff, and that neither human nor mechanical failure appeared to be to blame for the crash.

[3]: 51  In one situation, the flight crew turned on the weather radar, recognized the signs of wind shear from the variations and visual cues on the instruments, and successfully aborted the takeoff.

In a second scenario, the wind shear weather conditions were not loaded into the simulator until after the takeoff roll had started.

The simulator group concluded that because the crew did not notice the presence of wind shear during the takeoff, they could not have been able to recover the aircraft in time to avoid the accident.

Additionally, it found that the pilots failed to follow standard operating procedures during the flight, including configuring the aircraft for the weather conditions that were encountered immediately before and during the takeoff.

The report said that the tower controller failed to follow proper procedures that were in place for weather conditions creating the possibility of low altitude wind shear.

It faulted the controller for failing to inform the departing flight about the rapidly deteriorating visibility and changes in wind speed and direction.

It said that the airline should make changes to its operating procedures to prevent a person who is not an assigned crew member from taking the controls of the aircraft during any phase of that flight.

The commission recommended that the airline revise its cabin crew operating procedures to identify and address situations where passengers are not in their expected place on the plane.

The commission stated that air traffic controllers should not operate alone and that there should be additional personnel to receive and communicate adverse weather conditions to aircraft.