Mujahideen groups, some of them more or less united as part of the "Afghan Interim Government", in the years 1989–1992 proclaimed as their conviction that they were battling the hostile "puppet regime" of the Republic of Afghanistan in Kabul.

In March 1992, having lost the last remnants of Soviet support, President Mohammad Najibullah agreed to step aside and make way for a mujahideen coalition government.

One mujahideen group, Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin, refused to confer and discuss a coalition government under the Pakistani sponsored Peshawar Peace Accords and invaded Kabul with the help of Khalqist Generals.

In spite of a UN General Assembly resolution condemning the 1979 USSR invasion and the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation demanding immediate Soviet withdrawal, the Russians stayed until early 1989.

They managed to take control of major cities and strategic installations, thus acerbating nationalistic feelings among rebels who drew Soviet troops into war with urban uprisings and tribal armies.

These uprisings failed and many of these groups fled to Pakistan to be trained by the ISI in a future insurgency against the Daoud Khan government, which would be overthrown by PDPA military officers only 4 years later.

[11] According to author Steve Coll, Hekmatyar attacked Ahmad Shah Massoud so often that Washington (who was supporting him through Pakistan) "feared he might be a secret KGB plant whose mission was to sow disruption within the anti-communist resistance.

"[11] Reports suggest that Hekmatyar's commanders were saving their men and weapons to establish Hezb-e Islami Gulbuddin as the dominant organization once the Soviets departed.

Ahmad Shah Massoud for the sake of Afghan unity declared: "My message to Hekmatyar's people is that without a united front we cannot succeed, we cannot achieve anything in Afghanistan.

However, Hekmatyar's supporters accused Massoud of having killed these commandants to centralize his authority in Jamaat's ranks and framed Jamal, whom they claimed had good relations with the victims.

However, this version of the story is uncorroborated and Hekmatyar was widely unpopular in any case for his vicious murders, though this was not necessarily true of his commanders some of whom like Abdul-Rauf Safi, Abdul-Sabour Farid and perhaps Jamal enjoyed decent relations with other groups.

[20] The U.S. provided Ahmad Shah Massoud with little to no support despite The Wall Street Journal calling him "the Afghan who won the Cold War", and the one ego was primarily responsible for the mujahideen victory.

Part of the reason why he still got only minor support was that the U.S. permitted its funding and arms distribution to be administered by Pakistan which favored Gulbuddin Hekmatyar who considered himself the archenemy of Massoud.

Others included two Heritage Foundation neoconservative foreign policy analysts, Michael Johns and James A. Phillips, both of whom championed Massoud as the Afghan resistance leader most worthy of U.S. support under the Reagan Doctrine.

[23] One of the beneficiaries of Saudi Arabian support, especially financial, was Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and his army Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan, also called Ittehad-e Islami.

[25] Analysts disagree as to whether Pakistan's Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto was totally kept in the dark about the ISI's plan to overthrow the Afghan government[24] or was one of the instigators of this attack.

[27]: 138  When government troops started to surrender, the attacking forces were soon blocked by the main Afghan army positions held by the 11th Division, that were protected by bunkers, barbed wire and minefields.

[30] Contrary to American and Pakistani expectations, this battle proved that the Afghan Army could fight without Soviet help, and greatly increased the confidence of government supporters.

[28] In this respect he cut off the barrier that his predecessors, Akhtar Abdur Rahman and Gul had placed between the mujahideen and the American secret service, which for the first time had direct access to the mujahedeen.

"[13] Ahmad Shah Massoud criticized the go-it-alone attitude of Pakistan and their Afghan followers stating: "The damage caused by our (Mujahideen forces) lack of a unified command is obvious.

The battle was organized by the National Commanders' Shura (NCS) led by Jalaluddin Haqqani and with representatives from all parties of the Seven-Party (mujahideen) Union, including Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf.

[8] After an eleven-year siege, Khost fell to Jalaluddin Haqqani's troops, that were in east Afghanistan, on 11 April 1991, following a negotiated surrender of the communist garrison.

This was a coordinated effort where the final push came in an assault with Ibrahim Haqqani acting as stand-in for Jalaluddin, who had been abroad at the time to raise funds and links.

It was claimed that much of the garrison had switched sides because the mujahidin fighters were offering amnesty and lenient treatment, partly an indication of Haqqani's skilful diplomacy.

[35] Despite its military successes, the communist regime of President Mohammad Najibullah was still plagued by its traditional internal divisions, namely the opposition between the Khalq and Parcham factions.

The DRA defense minister, Shahnawaz Tanai, disagreed with Najibullah's policy of National Reconciliation with the mujahideen and was in favor of turning Kabul's Scud Launchers at Islamabad.

[37] The Soviet Union having dissolved in late 1991 and Russia having decided to end fuel shipments to Afghanistan, by 1992 the Afghan regime of President Mohammad Najibullah began to collapse.

[37] General Abdul Rashid Dostum of the Afghan National Army defected the next day, allied with Hezb-i Wahdat and Jamiat-e Islami mujahideen forces, and took control of Mazar-i-Sharif.

[45][46] One of the putschists, Deputy Defense Minister Mohammad Nabi Azimi, appeared on Afghanistan National Television, saying: "I assure my countrymen that we will have peace in the very near future.

[37] Gulbuddin Hekmatyar on 17 April had moved close to Kabul and threatened to attack the city "if the present administration fails to transfer power to the mujahideen".