This case is noteworthy in a broader sense as a sign of evolving judicial standards surrounding the First Amendment, and the changes that have occurred in modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence.

This funding was to be put towards providing remedial education services for low-income students who were at significant risk of failing to meet state academic performance standards.

A number of stipulations were attached to this, aimed at preventing a violation of the Establishment Clause, including mandatory surprise visits by state-employed supervisors and removal of all religious articles from the room to be used for Title I instruction.

This plan was reviewed by the Supreme Court in Aguilar v. Felton, where it was deemed to create a constitutionally impermissible "entanglement" between government and religion.

In 1995, the Board, along with a group of parents of eligible parochial school attendees, filed motions in District Court, seeking an exemption from the Aguilar decision under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).

The District Court appeared sympathetic, and said that they were pursuing the appropriate method of relief, but denied the motion, noting that Aguilar was still in effect and it was unable to offer the exemption the Board sought.

The Court notes that it has moved away from the idea that a public employee teaching in a parochial school will necessarily inculcate some of the religious messages inherent in their pervasively sectarian environment.

In this vein, the Court concludes that to consider a public employee's presence in a religious school inappropriate in and of itself would put far too much emphasis on form over substance.

Another change in the Court's approach was that it no longer considered impermissible the use of government money to directly aid the educational functions of a religious school.

The idea of a public employee teaching in a religious school, the Court went on to say, was no longer commonly considered to foster a "symbolic union" between Church and State.

Applying these rationales to the Board's case, the Court determined that the program, previously found unconstitutional in Aguilar, was neither aiding nor inhibiting religion in an impermissible fashion.

It noted that, while stare decisis is an important doctrine, the Court is not prohibited by precedent to review changes in law or making alterations to previous decisions.

It stated that the principle of stare decisis was of too great weight to overrule a previous decision so easily, and that the case presented appeared to be more of a re-hearing of Aguilar than a new proceeding.