Having been demoted from province to district in 2018, al-Barakah administered a small strip of land along the Euphrates in Deir ez-Zor Governorate until the Battle of Baghuz Fawqani; since then the "territory" has turned into an insurgency.

Having captured vast swaths of Iraq and Syria, IS reorganized itself as proto-state in 2013/14, creating a government and 18 provinces ("wilayah") under the authority of the "Provincial Council" to administer its territories.

[8] Nevertheless, the province's actual control remained limited to al-Hasakah Governorate's west and south,[9] while the rest was held by YPG/YPJ and the Syrian Army.

[10] On 19 April 2018, much of al-Barakah's leadership, including its governor, general Sharia official, and 30 battalion and sector commanders, were killed by a bombing during a meeting.

[13] After the launch of a SDF campaign to evict IS from its last Syrian strongholds east of the Euphrates in September 2018, IS further reorganized its territorial divisions.

[16] Even as their last pocket in al-Baghuz was reduced to a small tent city and a cave system, IS continued to keep its institutions functioning, including its bureaucracy, police, and distribution of food and monetary aid to civilian followers.

[17] Even though al-Barakah ceased to exist as coherent territorial entity following the Battle of Baghuz Fawqani, its forces remained active.

Militants affiliated with al-Barakah pledged allegiance to the Islamic State's new caliph Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi on 9 November 2019,[18] and reportedly attacked a U.S. base in al-Shaddadah on 26 December.

[19] The IS media office in Syria also published videos in 2019 and 2020, threatening further attacks on anti-IS forces in the former territories of al-Barakah and al-Khayr.

[35] Militant anti-Kurdish members of the Arab Tayy and Jibur tribes sided with IS in order to defend al-Barakah Province from the YPG-led Eastern al-Hasakah offensive of 2015.

[39] In early 2014, IS was preparing to set up a "dhimmi pact" to deal with Christians living in al-Barakah Province, and ordered them to pay the jizya (a special tax for non-Muslims).

[40] Nevertheless, IS militants under al-Barakah's jurisdiction were known to abduct, ransom, persecute, and execute local Christians,[41][42] sometimes disparagingly referred to as "crusaders" by IS followers.

Most notably, al-Barakah's media center released a report in March 2015 according to which several Christians from Tell Tamer had voluntarily converted and "received the caliphate's blessing".

[4] Like all IS provinces, al-Barakah was assigned money by the Islamic State's treasury department and Delegated Committee each month based on what was available and where support was most needed.

This money was spent on paying salaries of IS fighters, recruiting new troops, buying weaponry and ammunition, weapon development, and organizing military campaigns.

[50] Al-Barakah's regional military was known to include a unit of Southeast Asian child soldiers, called the "Putera Khilafa" (Princes of the Caliphate).