As the security situation across the country deteriorated the government of the Somali Democratic Republic saw these rapidly growing movements as a serious threat and issued bans; forcing them to continue work underground.

[8] Al-Ittihaad Al-Islami played a significant role in spreading the Islamic da'wah, educating the youth, and establishing Quranic schools and religious books until the collapse of the socialist government in 1991.

This worried the regime greatly, and the government started banning Islamic publications and increasing inspections.During the 1980's, Al-Itihaad also placed a major focus on providing welfare to refugee camps housing Somalis displaced from the Ogaden region following the 1977–1978 war with Ethiopia.

Crackdowns and executions by government forces led many Islamic students and religious scholars to flee abroad, primarily to Arab states.

[8] Despite tensions with the government, Islamist organizations in the country relied on nonviolent methods and none took up arms until the total collapse of the Somali Democratic Republic at the start of 1991.

[17] Many members of AIAI believed that a protracted strategy of focusing on social programs should be emphasized instead of attempting to achieve their goals via armed struggle.

[20] On 11 August 1992, Ethiopian government forces ambushed AIAI, killing the organizations top leaders and two dozen other high ranking figures.

Recent success in curbing the rise of organizations like the Oromo Liberation Front encouraged the Ethiopian government to eradicate Al-Itihaad before it had grown firm roots in the region.

[24] In a January 1993 interview with the New York Times in Merca, Al-Itihaad leaders stated that they viewed UNITAF (Operation Restore Hope) as an occupation force.

While the group had refrained from engaging with foreign troops at that point, the NYT noted, "But by all accounts, the fundamentalists are heavily armed and well disciplined, and should they choose to act could form the nucleus of a formidable resistance movement".

[25] When the conflict had begun in June 1993, AIAI and other Islamic factions had divided over whether not to begin fighting foreign troops because Aidid had previously been a major threat to them.

Independent sources in Mogadishu, corroborated by Al-Hayat, indicated that the majority of night military operations throughout 1993 were coordinated by a variety of Somali Islamic groups within the city, most prominently Al-Itihaad.

[25][27] While Aidid did not overtly claim responsibility for these night operations, Al-Hayat noted that he was 'delighted' by AIAI's support and that he further sought to project the appearance of being the orchestrator for propaganda purposes.

[17] Funded by wealthy Saudis, Al-Itihaad had extensive connections with the Somali expatriate community in Kenya, in particular the Eastleigh district of Nairobi and the predominantly Muslim coastal regions.

[17] Funded by wealthy Saudis, Al-Itihaad had extensive connections with the Somali expatriate community in Kenya, in particular the Eastleigh district of Nairobi and the predominantly Muslim coastal regions.

[19] Al-Itihaad sent a delegation to the Peace and Unity Conference of the Somali Nation, which was held February 1995 at Kebri Dehar, at which they made pledges which would cause the organisation to effectively cease to exist as a political and military force within the Ogaden.

Established local security forces cleared al-Itihaad infiltrators from the Jigjiga Zone, and the defeated remnants retreated to disputed border areas between the Somali and Oromia regions, which has served as a refuge for them, as well as for Oromo fundamentalist rebel groups.

[34] In 1997 Al-Itihaad collectively decided to abandon the idea of using force in order to change the status quo due to internal fissures and military setbacks.

The Bush administration did not publicly offer evidence supporting its allegations, but some US officials asserted that links between AIAI and Al Qaeda date back to the U.S. presence in Somalia during UNOSOM in 1993.

Despite its association with al-Qaeda, other analysts cautioned against overgeneralisation, noting that al-Itihaad had elements of a genuine social movement and that the characters of sub-factions throughout the country substantially differed from each other.

[38] US officials alleged that Al-Qaeda operatives utilized the AIAI base on Ras Kamboni island, south of Kismayo near the Kenyan border.

[43] An article published in the San Francisco Chronicle on 16 December 2001 quoted unnamed intelligence officials who claimed AIAI was extensively connected to al-Barakat.