All Spanish land operations, included the Disaster of Annual in 1921, were aimed at the occupation of Alhucemas, but all of them failed, mainly due to overextended resupply lines.

[6] The probable knowledge of the planned landing prompted Abd el Krim to fortify the area of the bay itself, placing artillery and mines along the shores.

These circumstances forced the Spanish command to change the landing site, choosing Ixdain and Cebadilla Beach, west of the Bay of Al Hoceima, in a sector southwest of Los Frailes point.

Primo de Rivera and other high officers had conceived a massive landing of troops at Alhucemas as early as May, even before the July 1925 conference at Madrid between Phillipe Petain and the Spanish dictator.

[11] They were joined by the Spanish cruisers Blas de Lezo, Mendez Nuñez, Victoria Eugenia and Reina Regente, along with the French Strasbourg and Metz.

The Spanish fortress at Alhucemas island, right in front of the bay, added to the heavy four-hour bombardment of the Rifian positions with 24 guns and howitzers and two mortars.

The most advanced outpost in that region was the stronghold of Kudia Tahar, defended by Aragonese and Catalan troops and supported by a battery of 75 mm mountain guns.

[17] The initial landings' date in Alhucemas was originally set for 7 September, but poor weather, which scattered the X-lighters, other amphibious craft and ships, resulted in a rescheduled for the following day at mid-morning.

[18] The spearhead of the invasion would be two brigades made of indigenous forces (Regulares and Spanish-allied troops loyal to the Khalifa of Morocco) led by the Spanish Legion.

A company of light tanks, part of Franco's column and intended at this phase to support the troops and the supply area as 'mobile bunkers' protecting the landing,[22] was unable to leave the amphibious craft in these conditions.

[19][21] The troops had a foreknowledge of the minefield thanks to a previous beach reconnaissance carried out on a motor boat by Captain Carlos Boado, the naval officer who commanded the landing lighters.

[11] After a few hours, the Legion and the Regulars had taken over the cliffs and slopes around the cove, capturing an enemy position with two heavy machine guns and a 75 mm piece of artillery.

[12] The indigenous forces of the brigade, commanded by Colonel José Enrique Varela, bore the brunt of the Rifian assault, carried out by Abd-el-Krim's selected unit, the juramentados ("the sworn ones").

Bad weather hampered the supply mission of the water tanker vessels, while the Rifian artillery shelled the beachhead at night, to avoid being pinpointed by observation aircraft.

[28] One of the solutions found by the Spanish command to overcome the rough seas and get the supplies disembarked was the use of wooden floating docks, a crude percursor of the D-Day Mulberry harbours.

[29] After a forward reconnaissance carried out by indigenous troops the previous day at dusk, Sanjurjo ordered a massive offensive on Rifian positions in the mountains surrounding the landing sites at 07:00 of 23 September.

[28] Preceded by a massive barrage of naval and ground artillery, combined with air strikes, the Renault FT tank company spearheaded the offensive.

[25][31] In the sector of the Ceuta Brigade, the initial attack of the indigenous forces was almost disrupted by the explosion of a massive mine, but the quick officers' reaction kept the offensive's momentum.

[32] At 10:50, supported by an intense artillery barrage, the Ceuta Brigade, led by Colonel Franco, attacked the main Rifian positions in the high slopes of Mount Malmusi.

The decision of Primo de Rivera to halt the offensive operations until the next spring bore some criticism among military historians, but his intentions were to force the stunned Rifian leader into negotiations with Spain and France from a weaker position rather than risking further losses and casualties.