Other models, such as the street performer protocol or voluntary collective licenses, could arguably be called "alternative compensation systems," although they are very different and generally less effective at solving the free rider problem.
[1] But most ACS advocates go further, holding that P2P file sharing is in fact greatly beneficial and that tax or levy-funded systems are actually more desirable tools for paying artists than sales coupled with digital rights management copy prevention technologies.
Recipients of the AFV contribution would in turn be required to register with the government in similar fashion to that of religious or charitable institutions do so for tax-exempt status.
Alongside registration, artists would also now be ineligible for copyright protection for a set period of time (5 years for example) as the work is contributed to the public domain and allowed to be freely reproduced.
Proponents claim that this system could create up to $20 billion annually to pay artists, which is far greater than what currently flows to them through copyrighted material.
Baker also states that it is realistic to assume that the savings from the reduced expenditures on the copyrighted work would vastly exceed the cost of the AFV.
"[3] While the systematic restructuring of copyright laws proposed by AFV is far from being put into practice, the concept of paying artists with donations has been tested, with some success.
For example, if the default option for ISP subscribers was to pay an ACS surcharge, which could be avoided by filing a signed commitment not to make unauthorised downloads from P2P networks, the effects might be quite similar.
The two greatest drawbacks of ACSes are the excess burden of the taxation that is collected, and the need to decide what tax/levy rates to use for the system (although methods such as contingent valuation may help a little with that question).