[1] In its early stages, changes in the NCAA's core beliefs in what a student-athlete should be rewarded and allowed to accept financially for their athletic talents had its effects on the definition of amateurism.
Over the course of the 20th and early 21st century, regulatory changes, court claims, and the beliefs of NCAA authority about student-athlete compensation further developed what an amateur collegiate athlete is entitled to receive.
This evolution is what impacted the evolving logistics of the NCAA Bylaw 12, which explains the current definition of amateurism and what it grants or restricts a collegiate athlete to be able to receive as compensation for their participation.
In 1906, one year after a college football season which resulted in the deaths of eighteen students and severe injuries to 150 more, 62 member schools formed the Intercollegiate Athletics Association (IAA).
[1] In 1916, the NCAA designated an amateur collegiate athlete as someone that played their sport purely for the enjoyment and developing their mental, physical, moral, and social skills.
The Carnegie report analyzed 112 college athletic programs, noting the threats that commercialism posed to the integrity of sport and the role of amateurism.
[7] Furthermore, it traced the roots of profit all the way back to 1880, in which the first ticket sales were recorded: "charges for admission to football contests advanced in some instances to $1.50...special financial support began to be solicited from alumni.
[7] In 1948, the introduction of a set of rules to "alleviate the proliferation of exploitative practices in the recruitment of student-athletes," deemed the Sanity Code, in part eliminated financial aid to athletes not available to other students at their school.
[5] However, towards the end of his career, Byers' views about athlete compensation changed in favor of allowing student-athletes to "endorse products and receive additional financial assistance".
[5] The next major regulation change occurred in 2011, when the president of the NCAA Mark Emmert allowed Division 1 institutions to give a $2000 stipend to student-athletes on top of their cost of attendance.
[9] The court agreed with the judge that the NCAA amateurism rules violated antitrust laws, but it took away both the trust fund and stipend beyond the cost of attendance.
Chloe V. Mitchell, a volleyball player at Aquinas College in Grand Rapids, Michigan, was one of the first collegiate athletes to create, post, and monetize her brand on social media.
[12] A student-athlete will lose their ability to participate in NCAA sporting events if they are discovered to be receiving payment through commercial advertisement, promotion, or endorsement.
[5] Jeremy Bloom was an Olympic skier who had opportunities to receive endorsement deals for his skiing ability, but could not do so if he wished to be eligible to participate as an amateur collegiate athlete.
[4] In the Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. case, it is argued that student-athletes have a right to endorsements and other commercial promotional opportunities due to their status as public figures.
[15] According to the initial NLRB ruling, key factors in their decision included the highly lucrative economy that Division I College Football produces and the demands and regulations instilled by the athletic department and coaching staff.
Furthermore, despite NCAA’s long standing claim that college athletes are students first, via the term “student-athlete” and the “amateurism” system, the CAPA argument was built upon comparing the demands of big time college athletics to a typical American workday:[15] “The players spend 50 to 60 hours per week on their football duties during a one-month training camp prior to the start of the academic year and an additional 40 to 50 hours per week on those duties during the three- or four-month football season.
Furthermore, the NCAA also immediately condemned the decision: “We strongly disagree with the notion that student-athletes are employees,” Donald Remy, the N.C.A.A.’s chief legal officer, wrote.”[14] Furthermore, President of the NCAA Mark Emmert came out with a notably strong stance: “the notion of using a union-employee model to address the challenges that do exist in intercollegiate athletics is something that strikes most people as a grossly inappropriate solution to the problem.” At the time, Mark Emmert was also dealing with several other public relation battles, including the repercussions from the Ed O’Bannon trial, in which the NCAA was accused of profiting directly off the likeness of their student-athletes.
During the end of 2014, the NCAA moved to make several reforms including improved protections for athletic scholarships and monthly stipends for student-athletes to cover the cost of living expenses.
On August 17, 2015, the NLRB unanimously voted to reverse the decision, noting several key reasons why classifying scholarship football players as employees of their respective universities would not lead to stable, equitable labor improvements for NCAA athletes throughout the country.
As a result, labor issues directly involving only an individual team and its players would also affect the NCAA, the Big Ten, and the other member institutions.
[16] In response to the NLRB overturning the decision, Ramogi Huma expressed his displeasure with the outcome, but made it clear this was not the end of the road: “It’s notable they didn’t rule that players aren’t employees,” he said.