Because the right elevator cable was partially restricted, however, both pilots had to apply back pressure on the yoke for the landing flare.

The tendency to turn right was offset by using 45 degrees of left aileron, combined with asymmetric thrust of the two wing engines.

In spite of the partial restriction of the controls, the pilots managed to return to Detroit Metropolitan Airport and land safely, with no major injuries.

On March 3, 1974, the rear cargo door of Turkish Airlines Flight 981 experienced the same failure and blew open, causing the aircraft to lose all control and crash in a forest near Paris, France.

[1] At 7:25 pm, while climbing through 11,750 ft (3,600 m), at 260 knots (480 km/h; 300 mph), the crew heard a distinct "thud" and dirt in the cockpit flew up into their faces.

Two crews were in the rear lounge area, and the floor under their feet partially collapsed into the cargo hold, giving them both minor injuries.

One of the attendants obtained a walk-around oxygen bottle and called the cockpit on the intercom to inform them that the damage was in the rear of the aircraft.

[7] It happened that while training to convert his expertise to flying the DC-10, McCormick had practiced, in a simulator, controlling the plane with the throttles in this fashion, in the worst-case scenario of a hydraulic failure.

Investigators immediately studied the maintenance history and found that on March 3, 1972, three months before the accident, the handlers reported that the door had not latched electrically and had to be closed manually.

[citation needed] Investigators interviewed the ground crew in Detroit and learned that the cargo loader who operated the rear door had found it extremely difficult to close.

[1] Examination of the aircraft and the cargo door, which was recovered largely intact in Windsor, demonstrated that the latches had never rotated to their locked position.

In their locked position, pressure on the door presses the latches further shut, and no force is transmitted into the actuator system that closes and opens them.

With the latches only partially closed, forces on the door were transmitted back into the actuator, eventually overwhelming it at about 6,600 lbf (29 kN).

To ensure this rotation had completed and the latches were in the proper position, the DC-10 cargo door also included a separate locking mechanism.

If the latches were not in their correct positions, the pins could not enter the holes, and the operating handle on the outside of the door would remain open and visually indicate that there was a problem.

Although the vent door remained partially open, it closed enough to cause it to "blow shut", and thereby allow pressurization of the cargo hold.

Yet all of these indicators shared a single point of failure: the mechanical weakness of the locking system that allowed the handle to be moved.

[1]: 12 In response, the Federal Aviation Administration, in charge of implementing these recommendations, agreed with McDonnell Douglas that the additional venting would be difficult to install.

Instead, they proceeded with the modification of the locking system and additionally added a small clear window set into the bottom of the cargo door that allowed operators to directly inspect whether or not the latches were in place.

McDonnell Douglas had subcontracted design and construction of the DC-10 fuselage to Convair, and Applegate had overseen its development in ways that he felt were reducing the safety of the system.

He also noted that the floor would be prone to failure if the door was lost, and this would likely sever the control cables, leading to a loss of the aircraft.

The operator in Paris was Algerian and could not read either language and had been instructed that as long as the locking handle closed, the door was safe.

Many commentators subsequently blamed the aircraft manufacturer, McDonnell Douglas, and other aviation authorities, for failing to learn lessons from the Flight 96 accident.

[citation needed] The entire flight crew was awarded American Airlines' highest honor, The Distinguished Service Award for Merit: Bryce McCormick (Captain), R. Paige Whitney (First Officer), Clayton Burke (Flight Engineer), Cydya Joyce Smith (Purser), Bea Copeland, Janice Hickingbottom, Colleen Maley, Sandra McConnell, Carol Kay McGhee, Marlene Saydah and Carol Stevens (Flight Attendants).