[2] These Marines applied skills in topographic and hydrographic surveys by charting and measuring water depths, submerged coral heads, and terrain inland; taking photographs and soil samples for permeability for amphibious tractors and landing craft parties.

Ellis' prophetic study helped establish his reputation among the forefront of naval theorists and strategists of the era in amphibious warfare, foreseeing the eminent attack from Japan leading to the island-hopping campaigns in Central Pacific twenty years before the United States entered World War II.

General Holland Smith mordantly blamed the Carlson raid for the rapid Japanese buildup and allegiantly felt, even after his retirement, that instead of subjecting heavy Marine casualties during the horrific and bloody seizure, Tarawa should have been avoided.

Only a few ship captains had made single shots of sinkings, but Admiral Turner and General Smith were in need of more detailed and definitively located photographs of the beaches arranged in precise panoramic sequence.

The seizure of the Ogasawara archipelago and the Volcano Islands were outlined in the OCTAGON Conference in September 1944 between U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill and the Combined Joint Chiefs of Staff.

He acknowledged that it would provide airfields for the P-51 Mustangs, to escort the B-29 Bombers for bombing Tokyo on mainland Japan, traveling 625 nautical miles (1,200 km) north from the newly acquired airbases on the islands of Saipan and Tinian.

With news that the United States was delayed in the Iwo Jima operation, due to the support of Luzon and the campaigns in the Marianas, the Japanese took advantage of the opportunity in reinforcing their strength by attaching the 109th Infantry Division and adding heavier beach-defense weapons, artillery and tanks.

William U. Irwin wrote to Captain Jones: On October 16, 1943, USS Nautilus returned to Pearl Harbor after eighteen days of periscope photography and briefings were begun to prepare the Company for their first mission in the Apamama Atoll (codename BOXCLOTH),[1] becoming the first recon unit to perform amphibious reconnaissance in the Gilbert Islands.

[21] General Holland M. Smith conceived the concept of operations, reasoning that it would be best to land scouts on the main island of the Apamama Atoll by submarine to reconnoiter enemy positions before committing any sizable force.

Lieutenant E. F. Crosby, nicknamed "Bing", who was a Navy Civil Engineering Corps officer from the 95th Naval Construction Battalion assigned to make preparatory surveys, was to determine the location and suitability of an airfield.

[24] Nonetheless, water deluged down into the conning tower hatch, the gyroscope ceased to function, the main induction was flooded, and only immediate application of efficient damage control averted serious trouble.

At 1300, Captain Jones with all available Marines, First and Second Platoons, moved out to join Lt. Corey and the light machine gun section (who had just put the boat out of commission) at the road junction just west of Kabangak Village, to interdict the Japanese at the barge.

Their rubber boats were heavily damaged in crossing the coral reef from their initial landing a few days back; they were in no shape to be used to envelop their movement by sea to out-flank the Japanese machine gun defense.

Jones and his Marines standing by were convinced; after careful and lengthy observance, a native was called over and interrogated and it was learned that the objects were a beacon and several lone palm trees on the islets on the opposite side of the lagoon.

Prior to their disembarkation, Nautilus and the recon Marines developed a coded display system in the event of radio communication problems by using four twelve-by-sixteen-foot navy mattress covers to double as signal panels.

[1] Relying on the navy mattress covers that the Marines had hung in the palm trees to use for signaling, Nautilus fired a barrage of seventy-five rounds with super-quick fuses from four thousand yards at sea.

Captain Jones had taken a small group with him, Major Hunt, Lt. Crosby, Lt. Hand, George, the native pilot, and Sgt Daniel J. Bento and started across the lagoon in the whaleboat for the Task Force at the WEST PASSAGE, a three-hour boat trip.

By 0200 on January 31, 1944, Kane and the rest of VAC Amphib Recon Company reached their position approximately 3000 yards southeast tip of ROSALIE to coordinate a small landing on SALOME for reconnoitering.

Shinn's platoon located a village on RITA and reported no enemy with no natives present; twenty or more excellent temporary frame buildings in good condition, none of which had been damaged by the "friendly" naval gunfire.

The captured islets of CAMELLIA, CANNA and ZINNIA prevented the enemy from fleeing and "island-hopping" to a nearby island, potentially to regroup with reinforcements or settle into defensive fortifications, awaiting the American Marine/Navy Fleet.

On the next morning of February 24, 1944, the commanding officer of 22nd Marines detached VAC Amphib Recon Company at 1030 and withdrew to the beach where they embarked aboard a LCT for further transfer to the APD USS Kane.

Knowing the critical mission in obtaining pertinent information, Silver arranged six two-man swimmer teams of one officer and one senior staff NCO each, eliminating any junior ranked enlisted on the second night of reconnaissance, 11 – July 12, 1944.

Towing a rubber boat mounted a metal tripod wrapped in wire mesh with their highly radar-visible steel "pot" helmets, this provided a good, solid radar "target" for USS Stringham.

Admiral Turner wanted both the recon assets (Jones's Battalion and Army 77th Scouts) to land on Kerama Retto and Keise Shima, the western islets of ICEBERG for preliminary L-Day reconnaissance.

Finding the islands unoccupied of enemy Japanese defenders or coastwatchers, the Navy UDT teams came offshore and blew up coral with explosive charges for clearing a passage for the upcoming joint-provisional artillery elements.

With Major Jones now with his reassembled FMFPAC Amphib Recon Battalion (including Headquarters Company and its weapons platoon), they were temporarily attached under the echelon of the 'Eastern Islands Attack and Fire Support Group'.

Major Jones was transferred to the continental United States after having served 25 months under combative service, leaving his executive officer, Markovitch, to command the FMFPAC Amphib Recon Battalion.

The platoon at one time or another included the Communications Chief (S-6), Sgt Al Gray and SSgt Dave Twohey, along with five or so more men who subsequently were commissioned Marine Colonels, and TSgt Stan Lamote and Puckett, who retired as a Major and Captain respectively.

[58] One company of the battalion participated during the fall of 1952 aboard the USS Sea Lion (ASSP-315), first in Vieques, then acting as reconnaissance-in-force along the coast of North Carolina of 16–20 October 1952; both on Onslow Beach and an amphib recon mission in the vicinity of Bogue Field, 9–13 November 1952.

Both were to be employed as a unit once a year in a LANTFLEX exercise, and both were to dispatch a team of one officer or staff NCO and four to six enlisted to the Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, or NELM Battalion (Reinforced) alternating this commitment.