In Buddhism, the term anattā (Pali: 𑀅𑀦𑀢𑁆𑀢𑀸) or anātman (Sanskrit: अनात्मन्) is the doctrine of "no-self" – that no unchanging, permanent self or essence can be found in any phenomenon.
[1][2][3] In contrast, dominant schools of Hinduism assert the existence of Ātman as pure awareness or witness-consciousness,[4][5][6][note 2] "reify[ing] consciousness as an eternal self.
[8][9] In Buddhism-related English literature, Anattā is rendered as "not-Self", but this translation expresses an incomplete meaning, states Peter Harvey; a more complete rendering is "no-Self" because from its earliest days, Anattā doctrine denied that there is anything called a "Self" in any person or anything else, and that a belief in "Self" is a source of Dukkha (suffering, pain, unsatisfactoriness).
[15][note 4] The concept of Anattā appears in numerous Sutras of the ancient Buddhist Nikāya texts (Pali canon).
[19] The elaboration of the anattā doctrine, along with identification of the words such as "puggala" as "permanent subject or soul" appears in later Buddhist literature.
First, they apply the "no-self, no-identity" investigation to all phenomena as well as any and all objects, yielding the idea that "all things are not-self" (sabbe dhamma anattā).
[23] Tibetologist André Migot states that original Buddhism may not have taught a complete absence of self, pointing to evidence presented by Buddhist and Pali scholars Jean Przyluski and Caroline Rhys Davids that early Buddhism generally believed in a self, making Buddhist schools that admit an existence of a "self" not heretical, but conservative, adhering to ancient beliefs.
[26] In another, states Peter Harvey, such as at Samyutta Nikaya IV.286, the Sutta considers the materialistic concept in the pre-Buddhist Vedic period of "no afterlife, complete annihilation" at death to be a denial of Self, but still "tied up with belief in a Self".
[27][28] According to Peter Harvey, while the Suttas criticize notions of an eternal, unchanging Self as baseless, they see an enlightened being as one whose empirical self is highly developed.
[3] The Buddha criticized the doctrine that posited an unchanging essence as a subject as the basis of rebirth and karmic moral responsibility, which he called "atthikavāda".
[34][35] Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism all assert a belief in rebirth, and emphasize moral responsibility in a way different from pre-Buddhist materialistic schools of Indian philosophies.
[43] The Buddhist denial of an unchanging, permanent self is what distinguishes Buddhism from major religions of the world such as Christianity and Hinduism, giving it uniqueness, asserts the Theravada tradition.
[44] According to Collins, "insight into the teaching of anattā is held to have two major loci in the intellectual and spiritual education of an individual" as s/he progresses along the Path.
The tradition, states Collins, has "insisted fiercely on anattā as a doctrinal position", while in practice it may not play much of a role in the daily religious life of most Buddhists.
[20] The Theravada doctrine of Anattā, or not-self not-soul, inspire meditative practices for monks, states Donald Swearer, but for the lay Theravada Buddhists in Southeast Asia, the doctrines of kamma, rebirth and punna (merit) inspire a wide range of ritual practices and ethical behavior.
He points to the experiences of prominent forest hermit monks such as Luang Pu Sodh and Ajahn Mun to support the notion of a "true self".
Ajahn Maha Bua, a well known meditation master, described the citta (mind) as being an indestructible reality that does not fall under anattā.
[58] American monk Thanissaro Bhikkhu of the Thai Forest Tradition describes the Buddha's statements on non-self as a path to awakening rather than a universal truth.
[60] Thanissaro Bhikkhu points to the Ananda Sutta (SN 44.10), where the Buddha stays silent when asked whether there is a 'self' or not,[61] as a major cause of the dispute.
[65][66][67] The Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna (~200 CE), the founder of Madhyamaka (middle way) school of Mahayana Buddhism, analyzed dharma first as factors of experience.
There can be no pride nor possessiveness, in someone who accepts anātman and denies "self" which is the sense of personal identity of oneself, others or anything, states Nāgārjuna.
[71][75] The texts attributed to the 5th-century Buddhist philosopher Vasubandhu of the Yogācāra school similarly discuss anātman as a fundamental premise of the Buddha.
[76] The Vasubandhu interpretations of no-self thesis were challenged by the 7th-century Buddhist scholar Candrakīrti, who then offered his own theories on its importance.
These Sutras suggest, states Paul Williams, that "all sentient beings contain a Tathagata" as their "essence, core or essential inner nature".
[81] Most scholars consider the tathāgatagarbha doctrine of an "essential nature" in every living being is equivalent to "self",[citation needed][note 6] and it contradicts the anātman doctrines in a vast majority of Buddhist texts, leading scholars to posit that the tathāgatagarbha sutras were written to promote Buddhism to non-Buddhists.
[102][103][104] She symbolizes, states Miranda Shaw, that "self is an illusion" and "all beings and phenomenal appearances lack an abiding self or essence" in Vajrayāna Buddhism.
[note 2] In Hinduism, Atman refers to the essence of human beings, the observing pure awareness or witness-consciousness.
[4][5][105][106] It is unaffected by ego,[107][108] distinct from the individual being (jivanatman) embedded in material reality, and characterized by Ahamkara ('I-making'), mind (citta, manas), and all the defiling kleshas (impurities).
"[7] In contrast, the Buddhist inquiry "is satisfied with the empirical investigation which shows that no such Atman exists because there is no evidence" states Jayatilleke.
[117] The Greek philosopher Pyrrho traveled to India as part of Alexander the Great's entourage where he was influenced by the Indian gymnosophists,[118] which inspired him to create the philosophy of Pyrrhonism.