[5] At the meeting in Damascus on 5 February 1948 to organize Palestinian Field Commands, Northern Palestine was allocated to Qawuqji's forces although the West Bank was de facto already under the control of Transjordan.

Its ranks included mainly Syrians, Lebanese, Palestinians and a few hundreds of Iraqis, Jordanians, Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt, Circassians, and Bosniaks.

This Greater Syria Plan (Mashru Suriya al-Kubra) had been supported by the British Empire throughout the thirties and forties.

Just as important as the financial reasons for building an Arab League force was the need to protect the Syrian army itself.

If the volunteer army were defeated, the loss and embarrassment would be borne by the Arab League in general and the Palestinians in particular, not by Syria alone.

Furthermore, if the Arab countries failed to commit their armies to fight in Palestine – a possibility which seemed likely as Egypt agreed to participate only four days before the war began on 15 May 1948 – the Syrian government would still be active.

Most importantly, however, the ALA was to be used as an instrument to nip Abdullah's Greater Syria plan in the bud and to keep him from expanding his state over half of Palestine.

Hashimi was an Iraqi pan-Arab nationalist and long-time intimate of Quwatli, whom the Syrian president wanted to head the Liberation Army rather than General Safwat, Egypt's candidate.

Hashimi was ultimately appointed Inspector General of the ALA and placed in charge of recruitment and training of the troops at the Qatana headquarters.

After the United Nations General Assembly voted in support of partitioning mandate Palestine between Arab and Jewish populations - UN 181 - Hashimi records that in October 1947, and after Syria had failed to win either Saudi Arabia or Egypt over to the idea of an anti-Hashemite military alliance, Quwatli explained: The Greater Syria plan will start from the Arab part of Palestine.

[fn]Quwatli's strategy in Palestine was designed from the outset to prevent Abdullah's possible advance north to Damascus.

A second reason for Quwatli's hesitation to commit Syrian military troops was that he had failed in his early efforts to reform the army and questioned the loyalty and effectiveness of its leadership.

Because [the Arab governments are undependable], I have decided... on the necessity of strengthening Palestine with arms and men and organizing their affairs and appointing a leader to take charge of their matters.

The trouble is that the Mufti [Hajj Amin al-Husayni] will not permit Fawzi al-Qawuqji to take the leadership in Palestine.

"[fn] The next several weeks of intense negotiations between Quwatli, the Mufti, Qawuqji and other Arab leaders over the question of who would direct the popular resistance in Palestine were a complete failure; agreement was impossible.

The Hittin Battalion, led by the Iraqi Madlul Abbas, crossed the Jordan River on the Damia bridge on 29 January 1948 and dispersed in the mountains of Samaria.

The move was made in coordination with Ernest Bevin who approved of Abdullah's plan to deploy the ALA through Samaria without the knowledge of the High Commissioner, provided it does not provoke intervention by the UN Security Council or accrue criticism from other Arab countries against the United Kingdom.

A final "Jabal al-Arab" battalion manned by 500 Druze soldiers and commanded by Shakib Wahab settled in Shfar'am.

Following the fierce battle that inflicted many casualties on both sides, the battalion commanders reached an agreement with the Haganah to withdraw.

Some members of the battalion, led by Ismail Qabalan, later fled from Syria and volunteered to the IDF to form the basis of its Druze forces.

In some places these forces showed firm opposition to Jewish militias, such as at the battle of Nabi Samuel and Tel Arish.

In October 1948 the ALA succeeded in taking the post of Sheikh Abed near Manara and a counterattack by the Carmeli Brigade failed.