He was chief of staff to the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in August 1914 but appears to have suffered a physical breakdown in the retreat from Mons, and was required to step down from that position in January 1915.

He was subsequently Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force from January 1916 to June 1917, in which role he laid the military foundation for the defeat and destruction of the Ottoman Empire in the Arabian Peninsula and the Levant.

[4] Promoted to major on 1 June 1898,[6] Murray served in the Second Boer War as Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General for Intelligence in Natal from 9 October 1899[7] and then as chief of staff to the commander there.

[4] He was appointed Assistant Adjutant-General on 6 March 1900,[9] promoted to lieutenant colonel on 29 October 1900[10] and awarded the Distinguished Service Order on 29 November 1900.

[14] After the end of hostilities in South Africa, he returned to England in June 1902,[15] and became Assistant Adjutant-General at Headquarters 1st Division at Aldershot on 3 November 1902.

[27] When the First World War started in July 1914 Murray was not appointed QuarterMaster-General of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) as was originally intended.

[30] It is sometimes claimed that Murray was given the position largely because French's initial choice for the post, Wilson, was vetoed because of his role in the Curragh Affair.

He returned to find Murray at Rheims trying to "unravel" the strategic situation of the German Empire's armies' invasion of France on a set of large maps spread out upon the floor of his hotel room, on all fours, dressed only in his "pants" (underwear), whilst chambermaids came and went.

[28] Murray and his staff were working flat out in intense heat at Bavai, and recorded (24 August) that he had passed 24 hours without undressing or sleeping.

Wilson recorded that Murray had "completely broken down", had been given "morphia or some other drug" which made him incapable of work and when told (7 am on 26 August) of Smith-Dorrien's decision to stand and fight "promptly got a fainting fit".

[35] Spears' recollection (in 1930) was that Murray had collapsed with a weak pulse, but did not actually faint, when told earlier during the same night (the news later turned out to be exaggerated) that the Germans had fallen upon Haig's I Corps at Landrecies.

[35] On 4 September Murray had an important meeting with Gallieni (military governor of Paris) and Maunoury (commander, French Sixth Army) to discuss the planned Allied counterattack which would become the First Battle of the Marne.

[49] A staff officer, Brigadier General Philip Howell, wrote to his wife (27 February 1915) that Murray had been "incompetent, cantankerous, timid & quite useless".

[59] After the war he wrote to General Sir Ian Hamilton, criticising Kitchener in harsh terms, writing that "He seldom told the absolute the truth and the whole truth" and that it was not until Kitchener left for his inspection of the Dardanelles that Murray was able to inform the Cabinet that volunteering had fallen far below the level needed to maintain a BEF of 70 divisions, requiring the introduction of conscription.

Cabinet Secretary Maurice Hankey praised Murray highly as a real "St John the Baptist" to Sir William Robertson, his successor as CIGS.

[60] In his final days in office Murray issued a paper urging concentration of effort on the Western Front (16 December 1915) which was described by Robertson as the "Bible of the war".

Birrell wrote to the Prime Minister (29 December) that he and Runciman agreed that finance and "strategic policy as expounded in Murray's long, unconvincing and frightening paper" were more important than conscription.

In January 1916 Murray was relieved of operational command of (though not logistical responsibility for) British troops at Salonika, which was given to the French General Sarrail.

Initially General Maxwell still had command of Western Egypt (facing the Senussi Revolt) until he was sent to Ireland to suppress the Easter Rising.

[65] Murray wrote to Robertson (18 March 1916) that the Australians were "from a physical point of view a magnificent body of men" but had "no idea of ordinary decency or self control".

[66] Britain had 300,000 men in Egypt, many of them ANZACs or Gallipoli evacuees, supposedly to guard against a Turkish attack across the Sinai, which Robertson thought logistically unlikely.

[65] Trying to prevent another Turkish attack against the Suez Canal, Murray reorganized his troops and led a counterattack, winning a victory at Romani in August 1916.

The object was to sustain public morale and, with a compromise peace leaving Germany in control of the Balkans increasingly possible, to capture Aleppo.

At this stage Russia was still pinning down many Turkish troops, although the Admiralty were not enthused about suggestions that the Royal Navy make amphibious landings in Palestine.

[73] The Second Battle of Gaza coincided with the failure of the Nivelle Offensive, reports of unrest among Russian troops after the February Revolution and an escalation of the U-Boat War (it was thought that loss of shipping might make Egypt untenable) causing Robertson to prefer a return to a defensive policy in the Middle East, although this was not Lloyd George's view.

[80] Murray died at his home "Makepeace" at Reigate in Surrey on 21 January 1945 and was buried in a family vault on the west side of Highgate Cemetery.

[4] Murray was unsympathetically portrayed by Donald Wolfit in the cinema film Lawrence of Arabia as a stereotypical blimpish British general, obsessed with artillery.