On 3 May 2006, the aircraft operating the route, an Airbus A320-200, crashed into the sea while attempting a go-around following its first approach to Sochi airport; all 113 aboard were killed.

The airplane took off from Zvartnots airport at 20:47 with 113 occupants on board: 105 passengers (including five children and one infant), two pilots, one aircraft engineer, and five flight attendants.

The approach controller cleared the flight for a descent to 1,800 m (5,900 ft) and reported the observed weather at Sochi, as at 22:00, for runway 06, which was above the minima.

The crew was then handed over to the holding and tower controllers, and was cleared for descent to 600 m (2,000 ft), before entering the turn to the final approach.

About 30 seconds later, the controller advised the crew of the observed cloud ceiling at 100 m (330 ft) and instructed them to cease their descent, abandon the landing attempt, and carry out a right turn and climb to 600 m (2,000 ft) and also to contact the holding controller, who would give instructions for entering the airport's holding pattern.

He had passed a test for an Airbus A320 captain in SAS Flight Academy in Stockholm, Sweden, with satisfactory results.

First Officer Davtyan had passed a training course for an Airbus A320 in SAS Flight Academy in Stockholm, Sweden, with satisfactory results.

Chief of Flight Operation N.G Savelyev alerted all the search-and-rescue services in the area and deployed an Mi-8 helicopter.

A search helicopter was ready for takeoff to find the missing flight, but was not allowed by Sochi due to the deteriorating weather.

The Bureau of Enquiry and Analysis for Civil Aviation Safety (BEA) noted that at the time when Flight 967 impacted the sea, the landing gear was extended.

[4]: 18–20 The pilot had indicated unhappiness with the late hour of the flight and the automated procedures or techniques of the autopilot.

The pilot used some inputs and adjustments that appeared to be aimed at gaining command of the flight over what the automated systems had to offer.

Numerous deviations from standard procedures occurred once the captain was instructed to break off his landing approach and make a turn.

The deviations combined with the lack of inputs and actions resulted in the aircraft not doing all things desired of it and also sounding a number of warnings.

In the spring transition period, low clouds often occurred in the Caucasian Edge, which could have limited visibility for the pilots.

This proved to be dangerous, as most controlled flight into terrain (CFIT) occurs due to this kind of cloud (which obscures the pilots' visual reference).

The controllers instructed Flight 967 to abort their descent and conduct a go-around immediately, as low clouds were present at Sochi International Airport.

[4]: 11–14 Shortly after Flight 967 hit the water, the radio beacon signals, known as the emergency locator transmitter, started to sound.

Sochi tower instructed them to abort their descent and conduct a go-around, as low clouds had formed near the airport.

BEA stated that none of the crew's actions were important and necessary for a go-around procedure, such as extending the flaps and the landing gear.

This could happen during night-time flying (causing the crew to lose their visual reference, as it was dark) accompanied by the lack of monitoring of the flight's indicator.

One of the crew members might have adopted the reflex acquired in training, for example, in response to a TCAS warning when the pilot is anxious to avoid the displayed red part of the instrument scale, which may result in the instinctive forward movement of the side stick, especially when the pilot is in a state of psycho-emotional strain.

This version is substantiated by the fact that the pilot was monitoring the flight speed and its limitations (VFE) that depended on the Airbus A320 configuration and retracted the flaps and slats in a timely manner, and the control inputs on the side stick coincided with the moments when the current speed was getting close to the limit value.

[4]: 46 After First Officer Davtyan extended the flaps to full, a few seconds later, the master warning sounded, and continued to do so until the end of the recording.

The speed at the time was too fast, which could tear the flaps apart and could cause the plane to crash, similar to Austral Lineas Aereas Flight 2553.

Apparently, First Officer Davtyan was trying to counter the bank only, as he also made a nose-down input, causing the plane to descend even further.

While intervening, First Officer Davtyan had not pressed the take-over push button, so both pilot's control inputs were added and prohibited.

The dual-input warning should have sounded at the time, but because its priority is lower than the GPWS, it did not, and so neither pilot knew that he was making dual inputs on the aircraft.

While performing the climb with the autopilot disengaged, the captain, being in a psychoemotional stress condition, made nose-down control inputs due to the loss of pitch and roll awareness.

Along with the inadequate control inputs from the captain, the contributing factors of the crash were also the lack of monitoring the aircraft's pitch attitude, altitude, and vertical speed by the first officer and no proper reaction by the crew to GPWS warnings.