[4] Following Armenia's defeat in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, a border crisis began with numerous instances of incursions and occupations by Azeri forces of Armenian territory.
Additionally, the Azerbaijani enclave of Karki/Tigranashen lies just north of the border, however since May 1992, following the First Nagorno-Karabakh War, Karki has been controlled by Armenia, which administers the 19 km2 (7.3 sq mi) territory as part of its Ararat Province.
It then proceeds southwards, crossing the Aylakh-Lich Lake and Sev Lich State Sanctuary, terminating at the Iranian border on the Aras river.
Additionally, in the northern stretch of the boundary area there are one Armenian (Artsvashen) and four Azerbaijani (Karki, Yukhari Askipara, Barxudarlı and Sofulu) exclave villages which are now controlled by their 'host' nation.
[10] By the Russo-Persian War (1804–1813) and the subsequent Treaty of Gulistan, Russia acquired the bulk of what is now Azerbaijan and part of what is now Armenian's Syunik Province (known as Zangezur within the Russian Empire).
[15][16][17][18] Following the Russian Revolution in 1917 the peoples of the southern Caucasus had declared the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative Republic (TDFR) in 1918 and started peace talks with the Ottomans.
[48] An initial border was decided upon in July 1923, with amendments made later in the same month so as to include Shusha and the Khonashen (Martuni) and Skobolevskoe lowland regions within the NKAO.
[52] Over the following decades Armenia pressed for the inclusion of NKAO within the Armenian SSR, notably in the post-Second World War period when the USSR was pushing its territorial claims against Turkey (later dropped) and again in 1960 following the transfer of Crimea from Russia to Ukraine.
[54][55][56] Allegations of discrimination against Armenians in the NKAO by Azerbaijan's government continued, with many claiming that Azerbaijanis were being encouraged to move so as to alter the demographic balance in their favour.
[57] Mikhail Gorbechev’s announcement of glasnost and perestroika in 1987 allowed these frustrations to be publicly vented, and Armenians began openly pressing for the transfer of NKAO to Armenia.
[62] This left Armenia in control of the vast majority of Nagorno-Karabakh, organised as the Republic of Artsakh, and much of Azerbaijan proper, including the strategically vital Lachin Corridor.
For nearly 30 years until the conclusion of the 2020 Karabakh war the de facto situation was more complex – the western Nakhchivan segment of the boundary was not disputed (minus the Karki/Tigranashen enclave).
In late 2020 Azerbaijan took back the occupied territory and parts of Nagorno-Karabakh, with Russian forces stationed in the Lachin corridor connecting Karabakh to Armenia proper.
The area west of this line was organised into the Republic of Artsakh, a self-declared state recognised only by a handful of other non-sovereign entities, functioning effectively as a semi-autonomous part of Armenia.
In April 2024, Armenia and Azerbaijan began demarcating their common border based on Soviet-era maps, as a first step towards a potential peace agreement.
[5] This condition, imposed by Azerbaijan as a prerequisite for the peace treaty, was described by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan as an alternative to war, although the decision led to backlash in Armenia.
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev supported a proposal from Kazakhstan to host talks between foreign ministers, but stated that this did not constitute international mediation, and that the latter was not needed.
This was provided via a 5 km (3 mi) wide piece of territory called the Lachin corridor which was under the control of a Russian peacekeeping mission until 2023 Azerbaijani offensive in Nagorno-Karabakh, which resulted in dissolution of the de facto Republic of Artsakh.