The two countries' historic relationship has its roots in the Russo-Persian War of 1826 to 1828 between the Russian Empire and Qajar Persia after which Eastern Armenia was ceded to Russia.

Among the contracts and the agreements, which determine intergovernmental relations—a treaty of friendship, collaboration and mutual aid of 29 August 1997 are a number of the documents, which regulate bases of Russian military units and liaisons in Armenia.

[3] The significant part of the territory currently belonging to Armenia was incorporated into the Russian Empire pursuant to the 1828 Treaty of Turkmenchay signed between Russia and Persia following the Russo-Persian War (1826–28).

In 2013, the deputy prime minister of Azerbaijan Ali S. Hasanov said, "We need to become much stronger so that if we become involved in combat in Nagorno-Karabakh we can stand up to Russian troops, because that is who we will have to face.

The heads of the two states discussed Armenia's accession to the Customs Union and signed 12 agreements on enhancing cooperation in a number of key spheres such as security, economy, energy and others.

[18] Tensions were further raised following the arrests of former president Robert Kocharyan and CSTO Secretary General Yuri Khatchaturov[19][20][21] as well as business disputes involving Russian companies operating in Armenia.

[23][24] Russia ultimately held peace talks between Azerbaijan and Armenia, culminating in a ceasefire agreement of 10 October,[25] which was subsequently disregarded by both sides.

[29] The lack of Russian support during the conflict prompted a national debate in Armenia, as an increasing percentage of the population put into doubt whether it is beneficial to continue CSTO membership, calling for realignment of the state with NATO instead.

[30] This coincided with a visit from Speaker of the United States House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi to Yerevan on 17 September 2022, largely seen as an effort to reorient the security alliance structure of Armenia.

[35][36] During the meeting, large groups of protestors gathered and called for the withdrawal of Armenia from the CSTO and for the country to develop closer relations with the United States and the West.

[30] The diplomatic friction continued into January 2023, after Pashinyan refused to hold common military drills, because the organization did not unequivocally condemn Azerbaijan over its perceived aggression.

[38] To mend their ties, Sergey Lavrov offered the deployment of a CSTO mission along the Armenia–Azerbaijan border on 2 February 2023 within one or two days, "if our Armenian allies, friends are still interested in it like before".

[41] On 3 September 2023, during an interview, Armenian prime minister Nikol Pashinyan stated that it was a strategic mistake for Armenia to solely rely on Russia to guarantee its security.

Pashinyan stated, "Moscow has been unable to deliver and is in the process of winding down its role in the wider South Caucasus region" and "the Russian Federation cannot meet Armenia's security needs.

[43] Armenia declined participating in military exercises and the CIS summit in Kyrgyzstan in October 2023 and asked for Russian peacekeeping forces to return to Russia.

[45] A March 2024 poll conducted by the International Republican Institute showed a dramatic deterioration of public trust in Russia, with only 31% of Armenians considering Armenia–Russia relations good, compared to 93% in 2019.

Armenia's National Security Council's secretary, Armen Grigoryan accused Russian peacekeepers of failing to protect Nagorno-Karabakh,[54] which was also echoed by Pashinyan.

[56] Presidential spokesperson Dmitry Peskov denied accusations from Armenia that the country's peacekeepers had failed to protect Nagorno-Karabakh from the Azerbaijani attack, calling them "unfounded".

[54] Speaking at the 78th United Nations General Assembly in New York City on 23 September, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused the Armenian leadership of adding "fuel to the fire", referring to the conflict, and reiterated that agreements made following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 stated that the existing borders of its former constituent republics were inviolable, hereby recognizing Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan.

[57] On 25 September, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a statement highly critical of the Armenian government, accusing it of "attempting to severe centuries-old ties with Russia", marking the lowest point in relations between the two countries since the independence of Armenia in 1991.

Although the government claimed that the move was to create additional guarantees for Armenia in response to Azerbaijani aggression, it was also seen as a sign of worsening relations with Russia, whose president, Vladimir Putin, is wanted by the court on charges of war crimes in the invasion of Ukraine.

"[65][68] On 23 December 2015, Russian defence minister Sergey Shoygu and his Armenian counterpart, Seyran Ohanyan, signed an agreement to form a Joint Air Defense System in the Caucasus.

[77][78] In mid-October 2017, the Armenian cabinet approved a bill for signing a $100 million worth credit agreement with Russia to facilitate the weapons purchase in line with the domestic legislation.