[7] Some of the SADF's preexisting hardware was trying to maintain, and any national defence establishment would encounter hurdles in keeping these systems operational without access to foreign technical support as well as new deliveries of parts and equipment.

[8] Armscor pursued both covert arms deals and black market purchases in an effort to acquire restricted defence technologies as rapidly as possible.

[10] Armscor officials used aggressive covert techniques to acquire technology, bartering through other public sector enterprises, front companies, foreign agents, and even civil organisations.

[7] South Africa had already maintained a small arms producing capacity during World War II, and unlike most African states it possessed exceptionally competent scientists and engineers adept at substituting local manufacture for imports.

Armscor's powers included the authority to integrate military and civilian industrial projects: this allowed for an ambitious dual-use production effort.

[11] The government was initially dependent on its largest trade partner, the United Kingdom for arms, spares, and munitions; however, this preference was disrupted by British revulsion at South Africa's domestic and foreign policy.

Although British legislation restricting the transmission of certain types of technical armaments to South Africa barely affected the SADF's defence posture, it spurred diversification efforts, as the regime purchased arms from France, West Germany, Italy, Jordan, and Switzerland during the 1964-1977 period.

[9] The vehicles saw action against Cuban T-34-85 tanks in Angola during Operation Savannah,[13] and the Mirage III and F1 interceptors became the mainstay of the South African Air Force (SAAF).

During the Angolan War of Independence, Portugal's request for a loan of SA.316 helicopters and Panhard armoured cars from South Africa to supplement their own limited resources had to be routed through the French Minister of Armies, Pierre Messmer.

A notable aspect of this theory is the fact that South African Airways allegedly confirmed Armscor used their Combi and Freighter planes to smuggle arms.

The board also took over the Department of Defence's workshops and the ammunition section of the South African Mint, and was authorised to co-ordinate arms production in the private sector.

[18] In 1973, the government established the Defence Advisory Council (DAC) to co-ordinate the private sector's involvement in domestic arms production (Philip, 1989:205).

In 1992, with the establishment of Denel, the new South African government dominated military-industrial and technological conglomerate,[19] many parts of Armscor's missions and functions were changed and redirected.