With an interest in ships and aircraft from a young age, Radford saw his first sea duty aboard the battleship USS South Carolina during World War I.

Noted as a strong-willed and aggressive leader, Radford was a central figure in the post-war debates on U.S. military policy, and was a staunch proponent of naval aviation.

As commander of the Pacific Fleet, he defended the Navy's interests in an era of shrinking defense budgets, and was a central figure in the "Revolt of the Admirals," a contentious public fight over policy.

On 15 April 1938, while flying Grumman SF-1, BuNo 9465, CDR Radford suffered a noseover mishap at Oakland Airport following a mechanical failure of the landing gear.

The latter was so impressed that he ordered Rear Admiral John H. Towers, chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics, to transfer Radford to a newly formed training division.

[8] Radford took command of the Aviation Training Division in Washington, D.C., on 1 December 1941, seven days before the attack on Pearl Harbor that brought the United States into World War II.

With the U.S. mobilizing for war, Radford's office worked long hours six days a week in an effort to build up the necessary training infrastructure as quickly as possible.

This effort eventually led to the employment of the "Women Accepted for Volunteer Emergency Service", and 23,000 WAVES would assist in aeronautical training in the course of the war.

Radford got his first operational experience on 1 September 1943, covering a foray to Baker and Howland Islands as part of Task Force 11 under Rear Admiral Willis A. Lee.

Radford commanded Princeton, USS Belleau Wood and four destroyers to act as a covering force for Lee's marines, who built an airfield on the islands.

Though the effects on Japanese positions were not known, Radford and other leaders considered the operations useful for preparing their forces for the major battles to come in the Central Pacific.

[17] He improvised a unit to counter Japanese night raids, and was later credited with establishing routines for nighttime combat air patrols to protect carriers; these were adopted fleetwide.

He had hoped to return to combat duty at the end of this assignment, but in March 1944 he was ordered to Washington, D.C., and appointed as Deputy Chief of Naval Operations.

For the next two months, Radford remained on "make learn" status, again under Sherman's command, observing the operations and employment of carrier-based air power as a passenger aboard USS Ticonderoga, part of Task Group 38.3.

Throughout January 1945, Radford's fleet operated in the South China Sea striking Japanese targets in French Indochina and Hong Kong.

King issued a post-war plan calling for the U.S. to maintain nine active aircraft carriers, Radford suggested he double the number, a politically unrealistic proposal.

Fearing the loss of their branch's influence, Navy commanders opposed the formation of a separate Air Force and favored a more loose defense organization.

[9] In 1947, Radford was briefly appointed commander of the Second Task Fleet, a move he felt was to distance him from the budget negotiations in Washington, but nonetheless preferred.

[24] Debates continued with military leaders about the future of the United States Armed Forces as Truman sought to trim the defense budget.

He became acquainted with political and military leaders in New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Thailand, Malaya, Burma, India, Pakistan, Hong Kong, Formosa, and Japan, and learned about the sociopolitical issues facing each nation and the region as a whole.

[31] While the United States remained cancelled and the post-war cuts to the Navy were intact, funding was increasing during the Cold War era for conventional forces.

When the People's Volunteer Army did intervene in favor of North Korea the next month, Radford shared MacArthur's frustration at restrictions placed on the UN force in the war preventing it from striking Chinese soil.

[36] Eisenhower was looking for an exit strategy for the stalemated and unpopular war, and Radford suggested threatening China with attacks on its Manchurian bases and the use of nuclear weapons.

[33] This view was shared by Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and UNC Commanding General Mark W. Clark, but had not been acted on when the armistice came in July 1953, at a time when the Chinese were struggling with domestic unrest.

Radford's anticommunist views, however, as well as his knowledge of Asia and his support of Eisenhower's "New Look" defense policy, made him an attractive nominee, particularly among Republicans, to replace Omar Bradley.

[41] Radford was integral in formulating and executing the "New Look" policy, reducing spending on conventional military forces to favor a strong nuclear deterrent and a greater reliance on airpower.

[39] In this time, he had to overcome resistance from Army leaders who opposed the reduction of their forces, and Radford's decisions, unfettered by inter-service rivalry, impressed Eisenhower.

[3] In spite of his support of the "New Look", he disagreed with Eisenhower on several occasions when the president proposed drastic funding cuts that Radford worried would render the U.S. Navy ineffective.

[18] In late 1954, for example, Radford testified privately before a congressional committee that he felt some of Eisenhower's proposed defense cuts would limit the military's capability for "massive retaliation", but he kept his disagreements out of public view, working from within and seeking the funding to save specific strategic programs.

[18] Early in his tenure, he suggested to Eisenhower a preventive war against China or the Soviet Union while the U.S. possessed a nuclear advantage and before it became entangled in conflicts in the Far East.